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ABSTRACT 
KRISTEN BELL: Mercy and Criminal Justice 
(Under the direction of Gerald J. Postema)  
 
 
This dissertation analyzes criminal justice from the perspective of non-ideal 
theory.  In the first half of the dissertation, I propose a new understanding of mercy as a 
moral response to injustice within existing criminal justice systems.  In the second half, I 
argue that certain expressions of blame are an injustice plaguing most criminal justice 
systems.  In short, I am highlighting a new type of injustice and suggesting a new mode 
of response to injustice. 
In my analysis of mercy in Part I, I distinguish between two concepts of mercy in 
Western political thought:  negative mercy and positive mercy.  To grant negative mercy 
is to compassionately spare someone from harsh treatment that she deserves.  To grant 
positive mercy is to respond to someone justly when unjust social rules call for a harsher 
response.  Following Seneca and departing from most contemporary philosophical 
literature, I focus on the concept of positive mercy.  I argue that officials within criminal 
justice systems have moral reason to exercise positive mercy and that most political 
communities have moral reason to incorporate a general practice of positive mercy into 
their criminal justice systems.  I argue that judges who exercise positive mercy are not 
impermissibly derogating from rules in service of personal feelings, but are rather serving 
the rule of law and fulfilling their obligation to support just institutions.   
 iii 
In my analysis of blame in Part II, I identify a species of blame that I call abrasive 
blame:  the expression of attitudes meant to hurt a person because she did something 
wrong.  The political community expresses abrasive blame toward criminal offenders 
through the organ of the criminal justice system.  Although I argue that this abrasive 
blame is permissible under certain conditions, the justification is fragile at best.  I argue 
that it is unfair for the political community to abrasively blame battered offenders and 
fragile offenders.  I raise a red flag about abrasive blame toward these offenders; I do not 
argue that it is necessarily wrong to punish them.  I suggest that in some cases, the 
exercise of positive mercy might be the political community’s best response to these 
offenders. 
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INTRODUCTION:  “WHAT IS TO BE DONE?” 
 
“What you can’t put right you must try to make as little wrong as possible.  For things 
will never be perfect, until human beings are perfect – which I don’t expect them to be 
for quite a number of years!” 
~Sir Thomas More1 
 
 
A popular approach in the philosophy of criminal punishment is to reflect on what 
a just system of criminal punishment would look like if it were to exist in a nearly ideal 
political community.  This approach offers valuable insight into the conditions under 
which punishment can be just.  The practical application of the approach, however, is 
limited.  It calls for political communities to satisfy the conditions under which 
punishment can be just, but it is relatively silent on what these communities should do if 
these conditions remain unsatisfied. Unfortunately, these conditions do remain 
unsatisfied in many political communities around the world.2  Most existing systems of 
punishment are not fully just and requisite reform is not expected to be complete in the 
near future.   
                                                        
1
 More, Utopia, 42. 
2
 For example, Herbert Morris maintains that the justice in punishment is conditional on 
there being a legal system that imposes an equal amount of benefits and burdens upon all.  
Kant argues that justice in punishment is conditional on punishment being consistent with 
respect for offenders (and on law being in place to ensure equal liberty among people).  A 
Rawlsian view (and other mixed theories) requires that punishment offer more security 
than other reasonably available alternatives if it is to be just. I doubt that these conditions 
are met in political communities around the world. 
 2 
In the present, Lenin’s question is pressing:  What is to be done? For better or 
worse, philosophical analysis of punishment generally leaves us without much (if any) 
guidance on this question.  In a world where 9.8 million people are kept behind bars, 
many of them unjustly, this question is too pressing to ignore.  The question is especially 
pressing in the United States.  This country has the largest incarceration rate in the world, 
keeping over 2.3 million men and women in prisons and jails.3  Another 5.1 people are on 
parole or probation.4  In total, 7.4 million people in America (1 in 31) are under 
correctional supervision – more than the population of Los Angeles, Chicago, and Boston 
combined.5  These figures have been steadily climbing for decades without much sign of 
stopping. 6  If any American practices of criminal punishment are unjust (as many 
                                                        
3
 The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world:  756 per 100,000 
people in America are incarcerated.  Russia and Rwanda are respectively second and 
third with rates of 629 per 1000,000 and 604 per 100,000 people.  Almost three fifths of 
countries (59%) have rates below 150 per 100,000.  The world prison population rate is 
estimated at a rate of 145 per 100,000.  The US has about 25% of the world’s prison 
population, although it has only 4% of the world’s total population.  The US may also 
have the largest total prison population (with 2.3 million behind bars), but this statistic is 
disputed.  Although the Chinese government reports that it has 1.5 million sentenced 
prisoners, non-governmental sources estimate that China imprisons at least 2.5 million 
people.  Either way, the United States is still the world leader in per capita incarceration.  
Walmsley, “World Prison Population List.”  
4
 U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Correctional Populations in the United States, 2009.”   
5
 U.S. Census Bureau, “State and County QuickFacts.”  
6
 For analysis of why figures are rising, see, for example, Garland, The Culture of 
Control.  For analysis of why American figures are particularly rising, see Whitman, 
Harsh Justice, and Stuntz, “The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law.”  
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reasonably suspect they are7), then there is no time like the present to ask Lenin’s 
question:  What is to be done? 
In hope of shedding some light on this question, I recommend taking a slightly 
different approach to philosophical analysis of criminal punishment.  In addition to 
thinking about what a system of punishment would be like if it were to exist in a nearly 
ideal polity, I suggest investigating existing criminal justice systems. By “criminal justice 
system,” I mean the institutions of a political community that are charged with the task of 
detecting and punishing violations of criminal law—from arrest to indictment to 
sentencing and parole.  Investigation of these systems should seek to uncover problems of 
justice that may be lurking within them.  Although most philosophers8 are not particularly 
well positioned to critically review all the ins and outs of criminal justice systems, they 
are well positioned to raise red flags about injustice.  They are equipped to reveal prima 
facie reasons why general practices and rules of criminal justice systems might, pending 
fuller analysis, be unjust.9  But philosophical analysis of criminal punishment should not 
stop at raising red flags within existing systems.  Philosophical analysis can also shed 
light on what people ought to do in the short-term and long-term to address the injustice 
                                                        
7
 In the words of Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy:  “It requires one with more 
expertise in the area than I possess to offer a complete analysis, but it does seem justified 
to say this:  Our resources are misspent, our punishments too severe, our sentences too 
long…In too many cases mandatory minimum sentences are unwise and unjust,” 
(Address at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting). 
8
 Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill are among the chief exceptions here. 
9
 I take Joel Feinberg (in “The Expressive Function of Punishment”) and Herbert Morris 
(in “Persons and Punishment”) as paradigm examples of philosophers who investigated 
existing systems of criminal punishment and raised red flags.   
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they find in criminal justice systems.  Although most philosophers10 are not well 
positioned to draft legislative reform bills or detailed plans for interim action, they are 
equipped to highlight prima facie moral reasons for and against general modes of reform 
and interim action.  
Given this general approach to philosophical analysis of criminal punishment, my 
dissertation has two core parts.  In the first part, I assume that existing criminal justice 
systems have at least some unjust rules and I investigate what should be done in light of 
this fact.11  Unjust rules give people moral reason to act in a number of ways, for example 
to work for reform, to protest, and to develop interim coping strategies.  I argue that 
unjust rules within criminal justice systems also give officials moral reason to exercise 
mercy within those systems.  I argue not only that officials have moral reason to exercise 
mercy, but also that political communities have reason to incorporate a general practice 
of mercy into their criminal justice systems.  I am not arguing that mercy should, all-
things-considered, be exercised and incorporated in criminal justice systems.  I am rather 
claiming that there is prima facie reason to put (or perhaps more accurately resurrect) 
mercy on the menu of options for individual and institutional action within a less-than-
fully just criminal justice system.  
                                                        
10
 Bentham and Mill are again among the chief exceptions here.  
11
 In the second part, I raise a red flag suggesting that existing systems may have unjust 
rules.  But my argument does not prove that existing systems do have unjust rules.  
Defending this assumption is beyond my scope.  If the reader disagrees with it, she is 
welcome to read this part of the dissertation as an investigation of how people might 
reform or cope with unjust rules in criminal justice systems if such unjust rules were to 
exist.  
 5 
My argument in the first part of the dissertation is about how officials might use 
mercy to respond to injustice in systems of criminal justice.  My argument in the second 
part raises a red flag about those systems of criminal justice.  I present reason to suspect 
that modern criminal justice systems, especially the American system, may be harboring 
unjust practices and rules that have thus far escaped critical radar.  These practices 
concern the institutional expression of what I call abrasive blame toward offenders.  I 
identify abrasive blame as the expression of attitudes intended to sting a person for 
having done something wrong.  I argue that although the expression of abrasive blame in 
the criminal justice system may be permissible toward some offenders, it is prima facie 
impermissible toward (at least) two types of offenders.  Criminal justice systems 
generally have rules that call for abrasively blaming these offenders even though doing so 
is prima facie impermissible.  I raise a red flag about these rules and I suggest that a 
political community has reason to reform them.  
In the conclusion, I discuss how the two parts of the dissertation can work 
together.  In the first part I argue that there is reason to exercise mercy in response to 
unjust rules.  Then I identify a set of potentially unjust rules that could give occasion for 
such exercise.  Put in a different order, I identify a set of potentially unjust rules and 
argue that insofar as they are in fact unjust, officials in the criminal justice system have 
reason to exercise mercy in light of them.  Although the two parts of the dissertation 
work together, they do not strictly depend upon one another.  Rejection of one part does 
not preclude or jeopardize acceptance of the other part.  Thinking about how to address 
problems (Part 1) is different from thinking about which problems we have to address 
(Part 2).  But both must be done if we are to answer the question:  What is to be done? 
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With this general frame of the argument in place, I give a more specific outline of 
the chapters to follow. 
Part I:  A Case for Mercy 
Chapter 1:  Two Concepts of Mercy   
In this chapter, I analyze the conceptual nature of mercy.  I argue that there are 
two concepts of mercy:  negative mercy and positive mercy.  Negative mercy is 
compassionately sparing someone from some harsh treatment that she deserves.  Positive 
mercy, which is not the focus of contemporary literature but which is inspired by 
Seneca’s “On Mercy,” is treating a person justly when unjust social rules call for giving 
her harsher treatment.  I suggest that the conceptual contours of negative mercy pose 
significant challenges for using it in the context of most criminal justice systems.  
Positive mercy lacks these problematic contours and lies ready for further investigation. 
Chapter 2:  Defense of Positive Mercy   
Having explained the concept of positive mercy in the previous chapter, I 
investigate its potential merit in the context of criminal justice. I distinguish between law-
abiding positive mercy (which requires an official to derogate from a social rule but not a 
law) and outlaw positive mercy (which requires an official to derogate from a law). I 
argue that individual actors in criminal justice systems have reason to exercise both kinds 
of positive mercy.  I also argue that political communities have reason to incorporate a 
general practice of positive mercy into their criminal justice systems.  Exercises of 
positive mercy not only achieve substantive justice, but also help serve the rule of law. 
Part II: Abrasive Blame and its Wounds 
Chapter 3:  The Sting of Blame 
 7 
In this chapter, I identify a phenomenon that I call abrasive blame:  the expression 
of attitudes that are meant to sting a person because she did something wrong.  Abrasive 
blame is a common phenomenon in many people’s lives and it is very common within 
existing criminal justice systems.  It is tempting to presume that abrasive blame is a 
morally permissible response to any agent who freely and responsibly commits a wrong 
action.  I challenge this presumption.  Abrasive blame is only permissible when it is 
properly embedded in reasonable social practices that are developed within personal 
relationships and communities.  My claim is not that abrasive blame is usually 
impermissible, but rather that its permissibility is conditional on the features of the 
relationships and communities in which it is expressed.   
Chapter 4:  The Political Sting 
Having identified abrasive blame and the general conditions of its permissibility, I 
consider whether it is permissible within the context of a political community.  I do so 
with an eye to considering whether it is permissible within the more particular context of 
political communities’ criminal justice systems.  When a political community has 
developed decent social rules about abrasive blame (as almost all have), there is 
presumptive reason for people to act in accord with such rules and engage in abrasive 
blame.  Given this presumptive reason, many (but not all) acts of abrasive blame within 
political communities are prima facie permissible.  
Chapter 5:  The Sting’s Wounds in Criminal Justice 
Armed with the work of Chapters 3 and 4, I direct my focus to flagging injustice 
in existing criminal justice systems.  I highlight a general deficiency in social rules that 
govern abrasive blame toward criminal offenders in several political communities.  In 
 8 
several of these communities (e.g. America), the rules deem it appropriate for the 
criminal justice system to abrasively blame what I call battered and fragile offenders.  I 
argue that it is unfair for the political community to abrasively blame battered and fragile 
offenders.  Criminal justice officials have strong reason not to abrasively blame these 
offenders and to change social rules that would license such blame.  In general, blaming 
battered and fragile offenders usually does not sting them permissibly; it unfairly strikes 
at them and inflicts substantial wounds. 
PART I. 
CHAPTER 1:  TWO CONCEPTS OF MERCY 
 
“Everybody's cryin’ ‘Mercy’ When they don't know the meanin’ of the word.” 
~ Mose Allison12  
 
Modern political communities aim for justice under law in responding to crime.  
The political institutions that respond to crime are criminal justice systems.  People 
expect to “see justice done” in courts of law.  One may doubt that criminal justice 
systems achieve justice, but justice under law is certainly their aim.  Justice, however, has 
not always been the aim of political communities’ responses to crime.  At the turn of the 
first millennium, Seneca maintained that mercy is the proper aim of a political ruler’s 
response to crime.13  His letter on how rulers ought to respond to crime is not titled, “On 
Justice,” but “On Mercy.”14  He judges the quality of a ruler by tallying up his merciful 
actions.  According to Seneca, a ruler should respond to all offenders with mercy.  To a 
modern audience, this claim is bizarre in at least two ways.  First, most members of a 
                                                        
12
 Quoted by Rainbolt, “Mercy:  In Defense of Caprice,” 226. 
13
 Seneca wrote “On Mercy” in 55-56 AD.  For historical context, see De Clementia, ed. 
Braund. 
14
 The Latin title of Seneca’s work is “De Clementia.”  “Clementia” is translated as either 
“mercy” (see Moral Essays, trans. Basore and Dialogues and Essays, trans. Davie) or 
“clemency” (see De Clementia, trans. Braund and Anger, Mercy, Revenge, trans. Robert 
A. Kaster and Martha C. Nussbaum).  Throughout the dissertation, I use “mercy” rather 
than “clemency.” 
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modern audience think that if a ruler were to respond to all offenders in one way, it would 
be with justice, not mercy.  Second, Seneca suggests that a ruler should never withhold 
mercy from an offender.  This position conflicts with the modern thought that mercy is 
supererogatory, certainly not morally required toward any offender, let alone every 
offender.  Why is Seneca’s discussion of mercy so jarring to the modern ear?  Should we 
bend our ear to listen to his discussion or reject it as out of tune? 
Loosely echoing the strategy of Isaiah Berlin in “Two Concepts of Liberty,” I 
identify two concepts of mercy in Western political thought:  negative mercy and positive 
mercy.  To grant negative mercy is to compassionately spare someone from harsh 
treatment (generally in the form of punishment) that she deserves.  To show positive 
mercy is to respond to someone justly when unjust social rules call for a harsher response 
(generally in the form of punishment).  Contemporary people generally use the term 
“mercy” to mean negative mercy whereas Seneca and other pre-modern thinkers 
generally use it to mean something closely akin to positive mercy.  The stark contrast 
between these two concepts explains why Seneca’s discussion jars the modern ear.   
The purpose of this and the following chapter, however, is not to track changes in 
the use of the term “mercy” over time.  My aim is to compare negative mercy and 
positive mercy with an eye to investigating whether there is good reason to exercise 
either (or both) in a criminal justice system.  I argue that although negative mercy faces 
significant challenges for use in most criminal justice systems, positive mercy does not 
face such challenges.  In the next chapter, I explore positive mercy more fully and argue 
that there is reason to exercise it in most criminal justice systems.  My argument is not 
that positive mercy is closer to some metaphysical truth about Mercy (I doubt there is 
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one), but that it is likely more apt for use in most criminal justice systems.  We should not 
only bend our ear to Seneca’s discussion of mercy, but we should also maintain, or 
perhaps resurrect, something like his concept of positive mercy in our working repertoire 
of political and jurisprudential concepts. 
 The structure of the chapter is as follows.  In Section I, I present the concept of 
negative mercy which is at the forefront of most contemporary philosophical and 
jurisprudential literature on mercy.  Negative mercy is compassionately sparing someone 
from deserved harsh treatment (generally in the form of punishment).  In Section II and 
III, I present the concept of positive mercy.  I begin by offering an interpretation of 
Seneca’s “On Mercy” in Section II.  My interpretation is intended to be charitable and 
true to his work, but my main objective is not to pin down historic Seneca.  Instead, I am 
climbing on what I take to be his shoulders in order to see and spell out what I call 
positive mercy.  In Section III, I identify positive mercy as treating someone justly when 
unjust social rules call for harsher treatment (generally in the form of punishment).  I 
close this section with a comparison of positive mercy and negative mercy.  They are 
both the prerogative of a person with power to give or withhold harsh treatment, but they 
share little else in common. 
After having identified and contrasted negative and positive mercy, I turn to 
analyze their respective merit in the context of criminal justice.  In Section III, I argue 
that negative mercy faces significant challenges for use in a criminal justice system.  The 
features that count as strikes against negative mercy in the context of criminal justice do 
not apply to positive mercy.  In the next chapter, I show that there is reason to exercise 
positive mercy in most criminal justice systems.   
 12
Section I:  Negative Mercy 
Most philosophers and lawyers writing about mercy over the past fifty years share 
a general concept of mercy that I call negative mercy. Negative mercy is sparing someone 
from deserved suffering (generally the suffering of punishment) out of compassion or 
some other special concern for her.  Negative mercy is distinct from justice, it is 
supererogatory, motivated by compassion or some other form of special concern, and 
unrestrained by reason.  In this section, I consider each of these features in turn and show 
that it is indeed part of the received view on mercy in contemporary political thought.  
Most authors endorse most of these features, but some reject one or more.  I found no 
author, however, who rejects any features of the received view without argument. 15  For 
the purpose of this section, I will use the term “mercy” to mean negative mercy.  
                                                        
15
 The following is a reasonably comprehensive list of contemporary publications about 
mercy:  Moore, Pardons: Justice, Mercy, and the Public Interest; Murphy and Hampton, 
Forgiveness and Mercy; Sarat and Hussain, Forgiveness, Mercy, and Clemency; Adler, 
“Murphy and Mercy;” Bennett, “The Limits of Mercy;” Brett, “Mercy and Criminal 
Justice;” Brien, “Mercy, Utilitarianism, and Retributivism,” “Mercy and Desert,” and 
“Mercy within Legal Justice;” Card, “On Mercy;” Cartwright, “Revenge, Punishment, 
and Mercy;” Dolinko, “Some Naïve Thoughts about Justice and Mercy;” Duff, “The 
Intrusion of Mercy;” Garvey, “‘As the Gentle Rain from Heaven;’” Harrison, “The 
Equality of Mercy;” Hestevold, “Justice to Mercy;” Hurd, “The Morality of Mercy;” 
Johnson, “Entitled to Clemency;” Kleinig, “Mercy and Justice;” Kobil, “Mercy in 
Clemency Decisions;” Markel, “Against Mercy;” Nussbaum, “Equity and Mercy;” 
Nuyen, “Straining the Quality of Mercy;” O’Driscoll, “The Quality of Mercy;” Pearn, 
“The Quiddity of Mercy;” Rainbolt, “Mercy:  An independent, imperfect virtue” and 
“Mercy:  In defense of caprice;” Ransome, “Above the Sceptred Sway;” Roberts, 
“Mercy;” Sigler, “The Story of Justice;” Smart, “Mercy;” Statman, “Doing Without 
Mercy;” Steiker, “Tempering or Tampering;” Sterba, “Can a person deserve mercy?;” 
Tasioulas, “Mercy;” Twambley, “Mercy and Forgiveness;” Walker, “The Quiddity of 
Mercy.” 
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Contemporary philosophers and lawyers tend to define mercy as giving an 
offender less punishment than she deserves.16  John Tasioulas defines mercy as a “form 
of charity towards wrongdoers that justifies punishing them less severely than they 
deserve according to justice;”17 Heidi Hurd as “a properly-motivated suspension of just 
deserts;”18 H. Scott Hestevold as “tempering deserved suffering,”19 and Daniel T. Kobil 
as “an act of benevolence or compassion that reduces what [punishment] is owed.”20  
Others, like Jeffrie Murphy and Jean Hampton, have slightly different definitions of 
mercy, but they agree that mercy necessarily involves giving less than the deserved 
amount of punishment.  Peter Geach agrees that mercy must involve giving an offender 
less than he deserves; “relaxing the penalty of a general law in a ‘deserving case’ is not 
mercy at all but mere justice.”21 
                                                        
16
 The most obvious exceptions are Nigel Walker and George Rainbolt.  Rainbolt 
explicitly rejects the trend in defining mercy as sparing deserved suffering; “no analysis 
which defines mercy in terms of the relief of deserved suffering can account for all cases 
of the virtue,” (“Mercy: An Independent, Imperfect Virtue,” 228).  He points out that 
Nazis, pirates, and black knights can show mercy.  Walker argues that mercy’s “nature 
and function are uninterestingly obvious.  It merely allows benign interference when the 
programming of the system seems to be having unacceptable effects in special cases,” 
(“Quiddity of Mercy,” 27).  Walker, like Seneca but unlike the vast majority of 
contemporary writers about mercy, seems to endorse something quite close to the concept 
of positive mercy. 
17
 “Mercy,” 101. 
18
 “The Morality of Mercy,” 389. 
19
 “Justice to Mercy,” 281. 
20
 “Mercy in Clemency Decisions,” 39. 
21
 Truth and Hope, 96. 
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Mercy is not a part of justice, but rather a departure from justice; Tasioulas writes 
that mercy and justice are “incommensurable values” and that mercy has an “irreducible 
distinctiveness” from justice.22  Mercy is “an autonomous virtue, not reducible to 
justice,” according to Murphy23 and mercy is an “independent virtue…[that] modifies the 
demands of justice” according to George Rainbolt.24  Ross Harrison takes it as axiomatic 
that mercy is not part of justice.25 26 
Mercy is not morally required, but rather morally optional.27  Many contemporary 
authors take themselves to be capturing the thought expressed in Shakespeare’s line, “the 
quality of mercy is not strained.”28  Carol Steiker describes mercy as “irreducibly 
supererogatory.”29  Murphy claims that “mercy transcends the realm of strict moral 
obligation and is best viewed as a free gift; an act of grace, love, or compassion that is 
                                                        
22
 “Mercy,” 108, 114. 
23
 Forgiveness and Mercy, 169. 
24
 “Mercy:  An Independent, Imperfect Virtue,” 169.  
25
 “The Equality of Mercy.”  
26
 Exceptions to this view include:  Kleinig, Johnson, and perhaps Brien.  
27
 Exceptions to this view include:  Smart, Tasioulas, Walker, and perhaps Card. Card 
writes, “it is difficult to recognize an action as the showing of mercy if the agent was 
obligated to act as he did anyway,” but she thinks mercy is morally deserved and 
wrongfully withheld under certain circumstances (“On Mercy,” 184).  Although 
Tasioulas denies that mercy is supererogatory, he recognizes that he is arguing against the 
grain in this vein; “it is widely taken as axiomatic that granting mercy is a supererogatory 
act,” (“Mercy,” 125). 
28
 The Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Scene 1, line 179–197.   
29
 “Tempering or Tampering,” 26. 
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beyond the claims of right, duty, and obligation.”30  Hampton argues that mercy is always 
a gift because the alternative course of action (giving retributively just deserts) is always 
a morally legitimate option.31  Hestevold writes, “Mercy involves the sparing of deserved 
suffering when there is no moral obligation to do so.”32  According to A.T. Nuyen, mercy 
is “conceptually exclusive of rights and obligations;” like grace, mercy is “free and 
unmerited… If a judge ought to give the offender a certain treatment or if he is obligated 
to give the offender a certain treatment, then that treatment cannot be merciful.  By the 
definition of mercy, one can never be obligated to show mercy.”33  P. Twambley concurs, 
maintaining that mercy is freely given, “it is not something to which a man is compelled 
by the claim of other obligations.”34  
Although acts of mercy are not morally required, it is nevertheless morally good 
or virtuous for a person to perform them.  Mercy is taken to be an important virtue and 
merciful actions are generally morally good.  Murphy writes that “mercy is an 
autonomous virtue” and “a moral virtue.”35  Rainbolt maintains that as a matter of 
conceptual necessity, mercy is “prima facie morally good.”36  Antony Duff concurs, 
                                                        
30
 Forgiveness and Mercy, 166. 
31
 Ibid., 159-161. 
32
 “Justice to Mercy,” 288.  
33
 “Straining the Quality of Mercy,” 66. 
34
 “Mercy and Forgiveness.”  
35
 Forgiveness and Mercy, 166. 
36
 “Mercy:  In Defense of Caprice,” 234. 
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holding that mercy is right and virtuous by definition; “mercy is, of course, a virtue, and 
to act mercifully is to act rightly.”37 38 
Almost all contemporary philosophers agree that mercy must be motivated by 
sympathy, pity, or some other emotional concern for its recipient.39  As Hampton puts it, 
mercy must be “granted out of pity and compassion for the wrongdoer.”40  Murphy 
claims that people have a strong intuition that mercy involves “a character disposed to 
perform merciful acts from love or compassion.”41  Claudia Card, Tasioulas, and Duff all 
agree that mercy must be motivated by special concern for the recipient.  According to 
Jacob Adler, “a person possessing the virtue of mercy must be able to feel compassion, to 
recognize these feelings, and to act on them; and be disposed to act on them.”42  Nuyen 
extends the point a bit further and holds that the very function of “mercy is to benefit 
oneself by relieving a psychological discomfort.”43  
                                                        
37
 “The Intrusion of Mercy,” 361. 
38
 Among others, Steiker and Bennett disagree with this point.  They each maintain that 
mercy can be either good or bad depending on its use. 
39
 Rainbolt is an exception. He recognizes cases of “cold-hearted” mercy such as a Nazi 
showing mercy without compassion.  “Mercy:  An Independent, Imperfect Virtue,” 170-
171. 
40
 Forgiveness and Mercy, 158. 
41
 Ibid., 166. 
42
 “Murphy and Mercy,” 262-263. 
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 “Straining the Quality of Mercy,” 72.  Nuyen suggests that Seneca agrees with her idea 
that one shows mercy in order to relieve psychological discomfort at the sight of 
another’s suffering (ibid., 70-71).  I disagree.  As I will explain in the next section, 
Seneca thinks one should not feel pity or any kind of psychological discomfort in the first 
place.  He is a Stoic and rejects pity as the “defect of a small mind.” “On Mercy,” in 
Dialogues and Essays, 215. 
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Most also hold that mercy floats free from reason.  A person may have 
motivational or justificatory reasons for showing mercy, but she need not.44  Writing on 
the closely related concept of clemency, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
holds “the very nature of clemency is that it is grounded solely in the will of the dispenser 
of clemency.  He need give no reasons for granting it, or for denying it.”45  Mercy is not 
necessarily motivated by or justified by reasons.  Some authors make an even stronger 
claim that mercy necessarily cannot be justified by reasons.  Harrison leads the charge 
here.  Riffing off Shakespeare, Harrison maintains that if mercy is “[con]strained by 
reasons” or “given for reasons,” then it is not mercy.46  For Harrison, mercy is necessarily 
an arbitrary act; “reasons squeezes out mercy.”47  H.R.T Roberts seems to agree, 
maintaining that mercy cannot be justified by reasons; “a genuine act of mercy is always 
unjustified.”48  Most modern authors prefer the weak claim that reasons do no necessarily 
motivate or justify mercy.  Only a handful of authors endorse the strong claim that 
justificatory reasons are necessarily absent in grants of mercy.  Although only some think 
that mercy is allergic to reasons, most agree that mercy is not governed by reasons.   
Current scholarship about mercy is predominantly focused upon the concept of 
negative mercy.  As I have explained in this section, negative mercy is giving a person 
                                                        
44
 Tasioulas is somewhat of an exception.  Mercy need not be given for reasons, but the 
only defensible cases of mercy are justified by reasons. 
45
 McQueen v. Paton, 118 F.3d 460, 465 (6th Cir. 1997).  
46
 “The Equality of Mercy,” 109. 
47
 Ibid., 110. 
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 “Mercy,” 353. 
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less harsh treatment, generally punishment, than she deserves.  It is distinct from justice, 
morally supererogatory, driven by compassion or pity (or some other emotion), and not 
necessarily governed by reasons.  As I show in Section III, the concept of negative mercy 
runs into trouble quickly in the context of most criminal justice systems.  Before 
discussing this trouble, however, I want to contrast the concept of negative mercy in 
contemporary political thought with the concept of positive mercy that has roots in 
Seneca’s work.   
Section II:  Seneca’s Mercy 
Contemporary philosophers writing on mercy claim that Seneca’s “De Clementia” 
(“On Mercy”) is the first “self-conscious” discussion of the idea of mercy.49  I argue, 
however, that Seneca is not focused on the same concept of mercy that these 
commentators generally employ.50  Seneca states that mercy is not properly understood as 
“the moderation that removes something from the due and merited punishment.”51  
                                                        
49
 See Tasioulas, Nussbaum, and Steiker.  Cicero’s extensive discussion of and appeal for 
“misericordia” in his speech defending a young politician appears to have escaped the 
attention of these commentators.  See Pro Murena, Pro Marcello, Pro Ligario, and Pro 
Rege Deiotaro.  Ironically, Cicero appeals to the concept of negative mercy that 
contemporary philosophers have their eye on whereas Seneca does not.  As I argue, 
Seneca’s work focuses on the different concept of positive mercy.  See Braund, De 
Clementia for a careful history of “clementia” in Roman history. 
50
 For an interpretation of Seneca that echoes my own, see Barrozo, “Punishing Cruelly.”  
Barrozo maintains that Seneca did not just advocate for leniency in specific cases, but 
rather pushed for overall penal reform on grounds that the Roman system was cruel.  “On 
Mercy,” according to Barrozo’s interpretation is, “a systematic reflection on the 
repudiation of cruelty and the corresponding duty of mercy in the context of 
punishment,” (“Punishing Cruelly,” 71).  My interpretation of Seneca is different from, 
but not strictly inconsistent with Martha Nussbaum’s in “Equity and Mercy.” (Personal 
conversation with Nussbaum, April 16, 2010).   
51
 “On Mercy,” in Dialogues and Essays trans. Davie, 214. 
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Seneca admits that according to popular opinion, “mercy consists in stopping short of the 
penalty that might have been deservedly fixed.”52  He argues, however, that popular 
opinion is wrong on this point (indeed the next sentence begins, “men of limited 
judgment think…”53).54  He goes on to say that pardon, not mercy, is giving an offender 
less punishment than she deserves; “pardon is the cancellation of punishment that is 
due.”55  Seneca argues that the truly wise man does not pardon.  The argument is simple: 
“pardon is extended to a man who ought to be punished; but a wise man does nothing 
which he ought not to do, and leaves undone nothing which he ought to do; accordingly 
he does not cancel a punishment which he ought to exact.”56  Seneca is very clear that 
mercy is different from pardon; granting mercy is virtuous, pardoning is vicious.  As he 
puts it, “the superiority of mercy [over pardon] lies primarily in this, that it declares that 
                                                        
52
 Ibid. 
53
 Ibid. 
54
 It was a common strategy to consider popular opinion and sometimes reject it as 
wrong.  The strategy takes its cue from Aristotle’s method of considering popular 
opinions as endoxa (significant but rejectable data points).  A close look at the original 
Latin text suggests a slightly different interpretation.  Seneca writes, “Atqui hoc omnes 
intellegunt clementiam esse, quae se flectit citra id, quod merito consisui posset,” 
(emphasis mine); everyone understands the fact that mercy consists in stopping short of 
what is established as merited (emphasis mine).  Is Seneca reporting the popular opinion 
that mercy is giving less than what society deems as deserved (which is not necessarily 
less than what is actually deserved)?  If so, Seneca does not think popular opinion is 
wrong, but simply in need of careful interpretation.  I am indebted to Jim and Eleanor 
Lesher for help with the Latin translation. 
55
 “On Mercy,” in Dialogues and Essays trans. Davie, 217. 
56
 Ibid. 
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those who escape punishment should not have been treated in any way differently; it is 
more rounded than pardon, and more honorable” (emphasis mine).57 
To someone focused on the concept of negative mercy, Seneca’s praise for mercy 
appears blatantly inconsistent with his opposition to giving offenders less than they 
deserve.  Equally odd is Seneca’s harsh criticism of pity that moves people to give 
offenders less than they deserve; such pathos is the “defect of a small mind”58 according 
to Seneca the Stoic.  Surely Seneca is not using the concept of negative mercy that is 
popular today.  In what follows, I argue that Seneca is discussing and defending a 
different sort of mercy that is closely akin to what I call positive mercy.  My project in 
this section is to give an interpretation of Seneca’s work on mercy.  In the next section, I 
draw heavily on his work to spell out the concept that I call positive mercy. 
My interpretation begins with Seneca’s own definition of mercy.  For Seneca, 
mercy is a virtue59 and it is “the inclination of the mind towards mildness in exacting 
punishment.”60  This remark is difficult to interpret because Seneca does not indicate the 
standard according to which mildness counts as mildness.  Mildness is a relative term; 
what was mild in punishment under the reign of Draco (cutting off one finger instead of 
the whole hand) is certainly not mild today.  Mildness in punishment is giving less harsh 
punishment, but less harsh according to what standard?  For Seneca, mildness cannot 
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 Ibid., 218. 
58
 Ibid., 215 
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 He often uses the term, as I generally do, to refer to a type of action (namely the type of 
action that someone with the virtue of mercy is inclined to engage in). 
60
 “On Mercy,” in Dialogues and Essays trans. Davie, 214. 
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mean giving less than the deserved punishment, for he opposes giving less than deserved 
punishment.  I interpret him to mean that mildness in punishment is giving less 
punishment than the amount prescribed by operative social rules.61  
Seneca does not explicitly mention any social rules, let alone social rules that 
prescribe punishment.  By “social rules,” I mean the existing laws as well as the 
predominant cultural norms, customs, and social mores.62  The punishment prescribed by 
the operative social rules is the expected or standard punishment in a given culture or 
legal system.  At Seneca’s time (1BC - 65 AD), crucifixion63 and being whipped to death 
were standard punishments for treason, enslavement was a standard punishment for theft, 
and banishment was a standard punishment for forgery.  Criminals were often 
condemned to serve as gladiators (venatores), to be burned alive (crematio), or to be fed 
to bears, lions, or panthers (damnatio ad bestias) for public entertainment.  Many 
criminals were sentenced to play the roles of characters in gruesome Greek and Roman 
myths, which involved being raped, castrated, and/or being eaten by beasts in the 
                                                        
61
 Seneca also writes that mercy is the “forbearance of a superior towards an inferior in 
determining punishment,” (ibid.).  Again, interpretation is difficult here because 
forbearance is a relative term.  “Forbearance” does not tell us much unless we know what 
the merciful superior forbears from.  The truly merciful superior certainly does not 
forbear from giving deserved punishment.  Instead, I suggest that the merciful superior 
forbears from giving an inferior the full amount of punishment suggested by the social 
rules.  
62
 I fill out a more detailed account of social rules in “The Political Sting,” but the brief 
description is all that is needed here. 
63
 In his Dialogues, Seneca describes a particularly gruesome mode of crucifixion 
“whereby the victim was impaled through the genitals,” (Coleman, “Fatal Charades,” 61). 
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amphitheater.64  Seneca reluctantly witnessed such punitive entertainment and writes 
about it with reproach in his Epistles.65  Roman masters were free to punish slaves in any 
way they pleased; whipping, scourging, breaking bones, branding, and crucifixion were 
common.66  Seneca criticizes the cruelty of a master who planned to throw his slave to 
the giant lampreys in his fishpond for having broken a dinner glass.67  The standard 
punishment for parricide was to be tied in a sack with a serpent and a monkey and thrown 
into the sea or a river (poena cuelli).68  Seneca disparages this punishment in “On 
Mercy,” arguing that its inclusion in the law did not reduce instances of parricide, but 
spurred them on; “children were shown the way to the deed by its punishment.”69  Many 
of these punishments, including the poena cuelli, were prescribed by Roman law.  Others 
                                                        
64
 See Coleman, “Fatal Charades.” As part of some of the most gruesome punishments, 
female convicts were forced to play roles that involved being raped by a bull in the 
amphitheater.   
65
 “I happened to go to one of the lunchtime interludes, expecting there to be some light 
and witty entertainment, some respite for the purpose of relieving people’s eyes of the 
sight of human blood:  far from it… In the morning men are thrown to the lions and the 
bears:  but it is to the spectators that they are thrown in the lunch hour,” (Seneca, Epistles 
7, 3-4, as quoted in Coleman, “Fatal Charades”). 
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 Coleman, “Fatal Charades.” 
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 “On Anger,” in Dialogues and Essays trans. Davie.  According to Braund, “On Anger” 
and “On Mercy” are complementary texts (for her discussion of the relationship between 
the two texts see De Clementia, 70-73). 
68
 By the time of Constantine, a cock and dog were also put in the sack.  See Egmond, 
“The Cock, the Dog, the Serpent, and the Monkey” and Radin, “The Lex Pompeia and 
the Poena Cullei.” 
69
 “On Mercy,” in Dialogues and Essays trans. Davie, 209. 
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were prescribed by less formal social norms; for example, whipping was generally 
prescribed as the informal punishment for a personal insult.70  
Seneca criticized the popular norms about punishment on the grounds that they 
were cruel and tainted by the vice of anger and revenge.71  As a Stoic, Seneca deemed 
anger an unconditional evil, an “unbridled and deranged madness”72 to which people are 
prone unless they are strictly tutored to control themselves.  Shaped by people’s anger 
and their angry deeds, the social rules of his time often (if not always) prescribed cruel 
revenge as punishment.  Seneca describes typical Roman punishments as anger’s 
“equipment.”  In “On Anger,” he harshly criticizes Persian and Macedonian punishment 
practices as nothing but “savagery shown in anger”73 and then bemoans the fact that 
customary Roman punishments are no different; “How I wish that examples of such 
savagery had been confined to foreign races, and that the barbarism of torture and anger 
had not been imported into our Roman customs, together with other vicious practices 
                                                        
70
 I doubt that these Roman social rules prescribed punishments that were “proportionate” 
to crimes.  But if they were, then Nussbaum is correct in her interpretation of Seneca (see 
“Equity and Mercy”).  According to Nussbaum, Seneca sees mercy as giving less 
punishment than proportionate to the crime.  According to my interpretation, Seneca sees 
mercy as giving less punishment than prescribed by social rules.  Our interpretations are 
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 Seneca’s criticism of Roman punishment was not a popular opinion among those with 
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larger cross that was painted white.  See Braund, De Clementia. 
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from abroad!”74  He lists customary Roman punishments as the “equipment” of anger, not 
of justice. 
[T]he equipment that is [anger’s] very own – the horse of torture, the cord, the 
gaol, the cross, the fires that encircles live bodies buried in the ground, the hook 
that drags along corpses as well, the different kinds of chains and of punishments, 
the tearing of limbs, branding of the forehead, the pits where monstrous beasts 
prowl:  let anger be set in the midst of these implements, uttering a terrible and 
horrible shriek, more loathsome than all these instruments that let it vent its 
fury.75 
 
Seneca emphasizes a gap between the amount of punishment that justice called 
for and the amount of punishment that the corrupt social rules of his time called for.  
Seneca praises a merciful person as someone with the presence of mind (and the critical 
eye) to recognize this gap and to punish justly rather than cruelly.  In being merciful, a 
person gives an offender less than the socially prescribed amount of punishment, but no 
more or less than the offender ought to be given.  A ruler has the power and social license 
to inflict the punishment that social rules prescribe – cruel revenge in Seneca’s time – but 
the sage ruler exercises control and judges carefully to punish an offender justly.  As 
Seneca puts it, “mercy consists in controlling the mind when one has the power to take 
revenge.”76  The opposite77 of mercy is not strictness (indeed “strictness is her natural 
counterpart”78) but cruelty.79 
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 I read Seneca as understanding mercy and strictness (both virtues) in the following 
relationship with cruelty and pity (both vices). There are two ways for social rules not to 
track just punishment.  The rules can demand too much punishment; they can be too 
harsh (as they were in Seneca’s Rome).  Or the rules can demand too little punishment; 
they can be too lax.  Cruelty is the vice that drives us to give too much punishment and 
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Mercy is the virtue of exercising control and treating offenders justly rather than 
recklessly following social rules that prescribe overly harsh, cruel punishment.  In order 
to be merciful, one must know how to treat an offender justly.  According to Seneca, an 
offender does not necessarily deserve to be treated in a way that is proportionate to her 
crime, or to be punished in a way that somehow corresponds to the gravity of her crime.  
Rather, three considerations guide the way a ruler ought to treat to an offender:  the 
treatment should morally reform the offender, morally educate the general population, 
and decrease crime in the polity.80  Seneca argues that the most effective way to achieve 
these three aims is to inflict as little harsh treatment as possible on offenders (often none 
at all) without blurring the public distinction between the virtuous and the vicious. On 
pain of slipping into viciousness and instability, society needs to hear the message that 
vicious people are different and are treated differently from good or reformable men.  
The bad men are marked with punishment, the good are let go, and the reformable are 
                                                                                                                                                                     
pity is the vice that drives us to give too little punishment.  Strictness is the corrective for 
pity that brings punishment up to the just level when social rules are too lax.  Mercy is 
the corrective for cruelty that brings harsh punishment down to the just level when social 
rules are too harsh.  Mercy and strictness are virtues that are “in natural harmony” 
because they aim at the same mean—just punishment.  Full defense of this interpretation 
is beyond my scope because it would involve more thorough analysis of stoic theory of 
virtue.  I am not, at the end of the day, interested in mercy as a virtue, but rather as a type 
of action. 
78
 “On Mercy,” in Dialogues and Essays trans. Davie, 215. 
79
 “Men of limited judgment regard strictness as the opposite of mercy; but no virtue has 
a virtue as its opposite.  What, then, is set in opposition to mercy?  It is cruelty, which is 
nothing other than harshness of the mind in claiming punishment,” (ibid.). 
80
 Note the distinct lack of retributive aim in punishment; contemporary philosophers 
who think mercy only makes sense in a retributive framework clearly do not have 
Seneca’s idea of mercy in mind. 
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reformed. “Once the distinction between bad men and good is removed, what follows is 
confusion and the outbreak of vice; accordingly, a wise restraint should be shown, such 
as is capable of distinguishing between curable characters and ones past hope.”81  The 
ruler ought to punish offenders enough to maintain a public distinction between good and 
bad men, but not any more than this.  Punishing offenders more than this (as Seneca’s 
contemporaries often did) does not improve offenders, morally educate the population, 
and/or reduce crime.82  It is not just; it is simply a pointless infliction of harsh treatment; 
it is cruel.  According to Seneca, a person ought to be punished in a way that inflicts as 
little harm as possible while maintaining the public distinction between virtuous and 
vicious people.  
Seneca claims that mercy is not indiscriminate (“the mercy we exercise ought not 
to be indiscriminate”83), but he also holds that a ruler should show mercy to all men, good 
and bad; “no one is deprived of favor [mercy] from me, though he lacks everything but 
the name of man” (emphasis mine).84  When social rules prescribe punishment above and 
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 “On Mercy,” in Dialogues and Essays trans. Davie, 190. 
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 Seneca gives examples of how ineffective contemporary punishments were at 
achieving the three aims of punishment.  “A sparing hand in applying punishments is 
more successful in improving morals”—of both the offender and the population at large 
(ibid., 209).  Infamy (the punishment that denies a citizen the right to speak in public 
forums), enslavement, and other punishments that destroy a person’s reputation are 
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(ibid.). Poena cuelli (the punishment for parricide that involves tying the offender in a 
sack and throwing him into the seas) is ineffective at reducing crime; its use increased 
rather than decreased instances of parricide in Rome.  Seneca exaggerates the point, 
writing that “the act of killing a parent began with the law condemning it,” (ibid.). 
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 Ibid., 190. 
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 Ibid., 188. 
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beyond the amount needed to maintain the distinction between good men from bad men, 
a ruler should not follow these social rules.  Instead, a virtuous ruler gives just as much 
punishment that is needed to mark the distinction between the men.  He does not treat 
offenders indiscriminately; he discriminates among them, giving them different 
judgments to mark the differences between them.  The bad men he punishes (albeit less 
than the rules prescribe), the reformable man he reforms, and the good man he lets go.85  
The ruler is merciful to all these men, each in the proper way, by giving a just 
punishment that is less than the social rules prescribe.  Mercy may appear indiscriminate 
or haphazard with respect to the social rules, but it is continuous with discriminating 
justice.  Mercy, which is continuous with justice, is the aim in responding to all crimes in 
a society that has sorely corrupt social rules about punishment.  
Given this basic explanation of Seneca’s concept of mercy, I turn to highlight the 
features that distinguish it from negative mercy.  Unlike negative mercy, Seneca’s mercy 
is governed by reasons, it is not motivated by pity or compassion, and it is continuous 
with justice.  Although the language of moral requirements and supererogation are not in 
Seneca’s stoic vocabulary, it is clear that he thinks mercy is not optional; insofar as a 
ruler is fully virtuous, she must be merciful toward all.  I have mentioned some of these 
features in passing above, but I consider them in turn here in order to highlight the 
contrast with negative mercy.   
                                                        
85
 “To one man he will give simply a verbal caution, sparing him from any punishment if 
he is young and capable of reforming; another who is evidently labouring under the 
shame of his crime will be told to go free, because he was led astray, because wine 
caused him to fall,” (“On Mercy,” in Dialogues and Essays trans. Davie, 217).  
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Unlike most contemporary authors writing on negative mercy, Seneca maintains 
that mercy is reason-governed; “mercy operates together with reason.”86  As discussed 
above, merciful judgment is discriminating and draws distinctions between different 
offenders; “the mercy we exercise ought not to be indiscriminate.”87  When Seneca 
recommends mercy in a given case, it is for some reason.  Also unlike contemporary 
writers about mercy (and unlike his predecessor Cicero), Seneca holds that mercy is 
not—indeed must not—be motivated by pity, or any other emotion like compassion or 
sympathy.  Mercy is proper mental control in exacting punishment; pity is “the defect of 
a small mind… it is mental sorrow caused by the sight of others’ wretchedness…but no 
sorrow falls on the wise man; his mind is tranquil, and nothing can happen to cast a cloud 
over it.”88  When a person feels pity, she cannot properly control and exercise her mind.  
Given that mercy is a kind of proper mental control, a person who is feeling pity cannot 
grant mercy. 89 
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 There is one sentence that seems to contradict my interpretation: “One man’s youthful 
years moves me, another’s advanced age; one I have pardoned for his high standing, 
another for his low; whenever I discovered no excuse for pity, I spared the man for my 
own sake,” (“On Mercy,” in Dialogues and Essays trans. Davie, 189).  This passage is 
problematic in three respects.  First, the passage conflates mercy with pardon; a 
distinction that Seneca insists on later in his letter.  Second, it suggests that mercy is 
motivated by pity; a claim that Seneca flatly rejects later in his letter.  Third, the end of 
the passage suggests that a ruler can grant mercy for no reason; the ruler can simply grant 
mercy because he feels like doing so, for his “own sake.”  This sentence is clearly in 
tension with my interpretation.  The third problem is easiest to address. Seneca writes that 
the ruler is “the soul of the state and state is [his] body,” (ibid., 192).  Bearing this in 
mind, we can read the problematic remark as follows, ‘I spared the man for the sake of 
the state.’  This makes sense because Seneca thinks that the well being of the state is a 
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In contrast to contemporary writers about mercy, Seneca makes no suggestion that 
mercy is a departure from justice.  Instead, Seneca maintains that mercy is continuous 
with justice;90 mercy acts as though “the greatest justice resided in that action it has 
decided upon.”91  
Although Seneca does not use the language of moral obligation or requirement, it 
makes sense for us to infer from his view that people, insofar as they are fully virtuous, 
must respond to offenders with mercy.92  Mercy is a must, not an option. 93  In a small 
                                                                                                                                                                     
perfectly good reason to show mercy.  The other two problems are not as easily resolved, 
but I try to address them as follows.  The sentence appears at the beginning of “On 
Mercy,” well before Seneca draws firm distinctions among mercy, pity, and pardon.  
Given the sentence’s early position in the work and the firm distinctions drawn later, 
Seneca can be charitably interpreted as speaking loosely in this sentence.  Seneca indeed 
suggests that people use terms like “clementia” loosely and tend to run it together with 
different but related concepts like pity and pardon.  Seneca prefaces his definition of 
mercy by remarking on this looseness in language; “to avoid being sometimes deceived 
by the attractive name of mercy and directed into an opposite quality, let us see what 
mercy is, what its nature is, and what its limitations,” (ibid., 214).  He makes a similar 
remark elsewhere when explaining why he bothers to define mercy; “there are certain 
vices that simulate virtues [and] they cannot be distinguished unless you stamp them with 
marks that enable you to tell them apart,” (ibid., 190).  Early in the work, before Seneca 
has used his “stamp” to mark off mercy from pity and pardon, it is understandable for 
him to use these terms loosely.   
90
 Several of Seneca’s contemporaries and immediate predecessors use “justitia” and 
“clementia” as synonyms to mean righteous behavior or behavior that is in accord with 
divine law.  See Julius Caesar, Commentaries on the Gallic Wars (circa 50 BC).  Also, in 
History of Rome (circa 25 BC), Livy combines justitia and clementia and refers to 
“clementiae justitiaeque.”  Although Seneca and several of his contemporaries sometimes 
conflate “justitia” and “clementia,” they generally do not conflate these terms with “jus.”  
“Jus” refers to behavior that is obligatory (that one is bound to do, that one must do, that 
others can rightly force one to do)—whereas justitia and clementia refer to behavior that 
is righteous (that one should do, but which others may not rightly force one to do).  See 
Oxford Latin Dictionary.  I am indebted to Jim and Eleanor Lesher for help on this point.   
91
 “On Mercy,” in Dialogues and Essays trans. Davie, 217. 
92
 The moral requirement to show mercy does not, however, entail a moral right to mercy.  
An offender cannot demand that the sovereign grant mercy as a matter of right because 
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extract from the lost third book of “On Mercy,” Seneca boldly writes, “he who does not 
remit the punishment of wrong-doing is a wrong-doer.”94  Mercy is a necessary virtue in 
a “blameless soul” and it is even a moral must for Caesar.95  Although no other people 
could hold Caesar96 accountable for granting mercy, Seneca argues that the gods would 
do so and his conscience would do so (as long as it is functioning properly).  “On Mercy” 
opens with an “inspection of a good conscience” of a ruler who has kept “mercy always 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the offender cannot demand anything of the sovereign by right.  The sovereign is his 
superior; the sovereign has the power to decide his fate.  Seneca does not defend a right 
to mercy because he does not defend any rights against the sovereign.  He may have 
grounds for objecting to the general idea of rights against a sovereign, but he has no 
specific grounds for objecting to a right to mercy.  
93
 One might think that a passage at the end of the text challenges this point, but the 
passage actually confirms it when we interpret freedom properly. Seneca writes:  “Mercy 
has freedom to decide; not the letter of the law, but what is fair and good determines the 
sentence it passes,” (“On Mercy,” in Dialogues and Essays trans. Davie, 217).  The 
freedom here is not freedom in the sense of having multiple options that are all morally 
right. The freedom here is freedom in the Stoic sense of judging on the basis of right 
reason.  The merciful judgment follows directly from right reason; it is determined by 
what is fair and good.   
94
 Extract preserved in a letter by Hildebert of Tours (“On Mercy,” in Moral Essays, 
trans. Basore, 449).  The quote may be somewhat misleading because it may suggest that 
mercy is giving less punishment than is justly due.  In context, however, it seems that 
mercy is refraining from giving an overly harsh punishment that one has the social power 
to give and giving instead only as much punishment as needed.  “It is the part of mercy to 
cause some abatement of a sentence that aims at revenge.  He who does not remit the 
punishment of wrong-doing is a wrong-doer.  It is a fault to punish a fault in full.  He 
shows himself merciless whose might is his delight.  It is a shining virtue of a prince to 
punish less than he might.  It is a virtue to be forced by necessity to take vengeance, not 
to visit it voluntarily,” (ibid.). 
95
 “On Mercy,” in Dialogues and Essays trans. Davie, 189. 
96
 Caesar’s social power was supreme; everyone was his social inferior and no one could 
hold him accountable for his decisions.  He decided and acted with impunity from others.  
For discussion of how theories of kingship influenced Seneca’s work, see Braund, De 
Clementia. 
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in readiness.”97  Only the merciful ruler is “prepared to give the immortal gods a full tally 
of the human race, should they require a reckoning.”98  Seneca is not concerned about the 
existence of moral constraints on Caesar.  He embraces the constraints as part of godly 
power rather than arguing that they improperly restrict sovereign power.99  
On Seneca’s account of mercy, mercy is a virtue consisting in the inclination to 
punish justly rather than in accord with social rules that call for harsher treatment.  
Drawing heavily from this account, I turn to spell out the concept of positive mercy. 
Section III:  Positive Mercy 
Using Seneca's conception of mercy as a starting point, I develop an account of 
positive mercy in this section.  I describe the ways in which my account departs from 
Seneca’s view of mercy.  Then I compare positive mercy to related concepts like equity, 
justice, and negative mercy.  
Positive mercy is treating a person justly when unjust social rules call for harsher 
treatment (generally in the form of punishment).  Positive mercy is, like Seneca’s mercy, 
continuous with justice, governed by reason, morally required, and not necessarily 
motivated by compassion or other forms of special concern. 
Positive mercy departs from Seneca’s account of mercy in five respects.  First, I 
define positive mercy as an action-type rather than a virtue.  I take this departure not on 
principled grounds, but because doing so is apt for my overall project.  Second, although 
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 “On Mercy,” in Dialogues and Essays trans. Davie, 188. 
98
 Ibid., 189. 
99
 In such constraints “lies the slavery inherent in supreme greatness:  it is unable to 
become less great; but you share with the gods this inescapable position,” (“On Mercy,” 
in Dialogues and Essays trans. Davie, 195). 
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positive mercy is generally exercised with respect to punishment, it is not necessarily 
limited to the punitive context.  For example, a knight can show positive mercy upon his 
opponent at the end of sword fight.  Given that my focus is on the punitive context, 
however, this is a very minor point.  Third, the exercise of positive mercy is not 
incompatible with (but also does not require) feelings of compassion, sympathy, or pity.  
I neither want nor need to defend Seneca’s stoic rejection of pathos in order to defend 
positive mercy.  Fourth, Seneca maintains that mercy involves treating a person justly, 
but he sometimes takes a very broad, amorphous view of justice.  He sometimes folds 
into justice considerations that we would not take as relevant to justice; for example, 
raisons d’état and maintenance of family loyalty.  When I say, however, that positive 
mercy is treating a person justly, I mean to appeal to the more richly textured modern 
concept of substantive justice.   
I tweak Seneca’s account in a fifth respect.  According to my view, exercising 
positive mercy is treating a person justly when unjust social rules (rather than any social 
rules, just or unjust) call for harsher treatment.  For the purpose of the dissertation, I 
define an unjust social rule as a rule that is incompatible with a full theory of political 
justice.  That is, the full theory rejects the rule based on a principle of justice.  I contrast 
unjust social rules to decent rules.  A decent social rule is compatible with (that is not 
ruled out by) a full theory of political justice.100  
The exercise of positive mercy treats a person with justice in derogation from an 
unjust social rule that calls for harsher treatment.  I depart from Seneca’s account in this 
                                                        
100
 I generally refrain from using the term “just rule.”  This label connotes (to me at least) 
that the rule is entailed by—rather than simply compatible with—a theory of political 
justice. 
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respect in order to distinguish positive mercy from the closely related concept of equity 
that Aristotle defends and contemporary literature and practice draws upon.101  On 
Seneca’s account, mercy and equity are easily run together.  On my adapted account, the 
distinction remains securely in place and can help provide a more richly textured 
understanding of positive mercy and equity.   
Equity, argued Aristotle, is tailoring judgments to the particular features of a case 
rather than simply rendering judgments based on a strict application of rules.102  In his 
defense of equity, Aristotle maintains that justice depends on particularities of cases that 
laws, given their generality, cannot capture.  The generality of rules is not an 
imperfection or failing of the rules themselves that can somehow be fixed;103 rules must 
be general in order to be rules.  Due to their generality, however, rules do not perfectly 
track justice and so derogation from the rules is sometimes required to achieve justice.  
Equity is derogation occasioned by a gap between the generality of rules and the 
particularities to which justice is sensitive.  
The exercise of both equity and positive mercy involves departing from rules in 
order to act in a substantively just manner.  Equity and positive mercy are different, 
however, in (at least) two respects.  First, equity has a broader scope or extension than 
positive mercy.  The exercise of positive mercy is limited to the modulation of harsh 
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 Nussbaum, “Equity and Mercy.” 
102
 Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Irwin, Bk. 5, Ch 10, 1137b 10-35.  Aristotle limits his 
discussion of equity to laws.  His discussion, however, can be applied to all (other) social 
rules. 
103
 As Aristotle puts it, “the source of the error is not the law or the legislator, but the 
nature of the object itself, since that is what the subject matter of actions is bound to be 
like,” (ibid., 1137b 15). 
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treatment (generally punishment) in the downward direction.  The exercise of equity can 
give a person less or more harsh treatment than rules prescribe in a given case.  A judge 
can also exercise equity with respect to decisions that do not necessarily involve the 
modulation of punishment.  A judge can exercise equity whenever she is in a position to 
uphold any kind of rules, which due to their generality, call for an unjust decision.  For 
example, a judge can exercise equity in making decisions about the admissibility of 
evidence and various points of trial procedure.  A judge generally cannot exercise 
positive mercy when making these kinds of decisions because they generally do not 
involve modulation of punishment.  
The more important difference for my purpose, however, is that the exercise of 
equity derogates from rules on different grounds than the exercise of positive mercy.  An 
exercise of equity locates the grounds for derogation in the complexity of the specific 
case to which the rules are being applied whereas an exercise of mercy locates the reason 
for derogation within the rules themselves.104  Equitable derogation from rules is 
occasioned by the gap between justice and the necessary generality of rules; merciful 
derogation, on the other hand, is occasioned by the gap between justice and the 
unnecessary imperfections in rules.  In Aristotle’s words, equity is a “rectification of law 
insofar as the universality of law makes it deficient” (emphasis mine).105  But positive 
mercy is a rectification of law insofar as the cruelty or injustice of law makes it 
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 I am indebted to Emily Kelahan for her help in formulating this distinction.   
105
 Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Irwin, Bk. 5, Ch 10, 1137b 25. 
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deficient.106  The general/particular problem to which equity responds is a necessary 
feature of rules, but the injustice to which positive mercy responds is not necessary.  
Unlike positive mercy, equity would not be an endangered species in a society with 
perfectly just rules.  Equity, guaranteed its place in the best possible polity, is on the mind 
of Aristotle the philosopher.  Mercy, mired in the muck of imperfection, is drawn from 
the stuff of Seneca the jurist and politician.107  
In a criminal justice system with perfectly just rules (or even all and only decent 
rules), positive mercy would be obsolete.  Like an appendix in the human body, it would 
be a non-functional vestige of a less perfect age.  Beccaria seems to agree, maintaining 
that mercy should be excluded if the penal code were made perfect.108  Interestingly, only 
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 Jeremy Bentham recognizes a similar distinction, but puts it in terms of interpreting 
the will of the legislator and he does not use the labels equity and positive mercy.  
Interpretation may be distinguished into strict and liberal.  It may be stiled strict 
where you attribute to the legislator the will which, at the time of making the law, 
as you suppose, he really entertained.  It may be stiled liberal where the will you 
attribute to him is not that which, you suppose, he really entertained, but a will 
which, as you suppose, he failed of entertaining, only through inadvertency:  
insomuch that, had the individual case which calls for interpretation been present 
to his view, he would have entertained that will, which, by the interpretation put 
upon his law, you act up to, as if it had been his in reality. [Equity involves this 
kind of departure from the letter, but not the spirit, of the law.]  I say through 
inadvertency:  for to attribute to the legislator a will which you suppose him to 
have failed of entertaining though any other cause than inadvertency, that is from 
wrong judgment or perverse affections, and to act accordingly, is not to interpret 
the law, but to act against it. [Positive mercy involves this kind of departure from 
both letter and spirit of the law.] (Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence, 
Section 16, “Idea of a Compleat Law,” 130) 
 
107
 Seneca received mercy from Caligula who had intended to execute him on grounds of 
having aroused his jealousy. Later, Seneca was not so lucky.  Ironically, he was wrongly 
sentenced to death by Nero, the man to whom he had addressed “On Mercy.”  He was 
forced to commit suicide and chose to do it by reenacting the last hours of Socrates.  See 
Reinhardt, “Introduction,” in Dialogues and Essays trans. Davie. 
108
 Becarria writes: 
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one regime has ever officially abolished mercy—and that regime was radically optimistic 
about the prospect of achieving perfect justice.  The unique and short-lived experiment 
occurred in 1789 during the French Revolution.109 
Before moving on to compare positive mercy to negative mercy, I would like to 
briefly describe the relationship between positive mercy and justice (I say more about this 
relationship in the next chapter).  Following Seneca, I maintain that positive mercy is a 
continuous part of justice.  It is not, however, equivalent to the whole of justice.  All 
exercises of positive mercy are exercises of justice, but not all exercises of justice are 
necessarily exercises of positive mercy.  Justice involves a great deal more than correctly 
doling out (or withholding) punishment and other harsh treatments.  It involves, for 
example, developing and maintaining institutions that respect civil rights, treating people 
as free and equal persons, and fairly distributing goods and services.   
                                                                                                                                                                     
As punishments become more mild, clemency and pardon are less necessary. 
Happy the nation in which they will be considered as dangerous!  Clemency, 
which has often been deemed a sufficient substitute for every other virtue in 
sovereigns, should be excluded in a perfect legislation, where punishments are 
mild, and the proceedings in criminal cases regular and expeditious.  This truth 
will seem cruel to those who live in countries, where, from the absurdity of the 
laws, and the severity of punishments, pardons, and the clemency of the prince 
are necessary. (“On Crimes and Punishments,” 97-98; emphasis mine)   
A similar view is endorsed by Filangieri:  “If a pardon is just the law is wrong, but if the 
law is not wrong a pardon is,” (as quoted in Walker, “The Quiddity of Mercy”).  For 
modern defenders of this general kind of view, see Leslie Sebba, “The Pardoning 
Power;” Walker, “The Quiddity of Mercy,” and Pearn, “The Quiddity of Mercy—A 
Response.” 
109
 Moore, Pardons.  Moore puts the point in terms of “pardon” rather than “mercy,” but 
given my definition of positive mercy and her definition of pardon, the two are roughly 
the same.  Moore explains that pardoning was abolished in 1789, but ad hoc procedures 
for clemency developed over the course of the following ten years.  The pardoning power 
was formally granted to First Consul in 1802. 
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Within the more limited context of justice in criminal punishment, positive mercy 
might be extensionally equivalent to justice, but (I hope) this is a rare state of affairs.  
One can only exercise positive mercy in a case if unjust social rules (these include but are 
not limited to laws) call for overly harsh punishment in that case.  One can exercise 
justice regardless of whether the relevant social rules are unjust or not.  If all the social 
rules bearing on criminal punishment are unjust in a society (as perhaps they were in 
Seneca’s time), then positive mercy would be extensionally equivalent to justice within 
the context of criminal punishment.  I hope such a state of affairs is the exception and not 
the rule in modern political communities!  
With the account of positive mercy in place, I turn to compare it to negative 
mercy.  These two concepts of mercy do not have much in common.  Negative mercy is 
sparing from deserved harsh treatment and positive mercy is derogating from rules to 
give just treatment (generally in the form of punishment).  Negative mercy is distinct 
from justice and positive mercy is continuous with justice.  Negative mercy is 
supererogatory, not necessarily justified by reasons, and driven by emotions like pity.  In 
contrast, positive mercy is morally required, justified by reasons, and not necessarily 
driven by emotions like pity.  Positive mercy cannot be exercised unless unjust social 
rules call for excessively harsh treatment toward some people.  Negative mercy can be 
exercised regardless of whether operative social rules call for too little, too much, or just 
enough harsh treatment toward offenders.  The concept of negative mercy is parasitic on 
the concept of desert (usually “just desert”), but positive mercy has potential to float free 
from desert (insofar as just treatment can be determined without an appeal to desert). 
Given that negative mercy is a departure from justice and is nevertheless good, it 
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presupposes that justice sometimes calls for excessively harsh treatment toward 
offenders.  Positive mercy presupposes no such deficiency in justice.  Positive mercy 
departs from social rules and presupposes that social rules are somehow deficient, but 
negative mercy presupposes that justice is somehow deficient. 
Given the stark contrast between positive and negative mercy, one might object to 
my labeling of positive mercy as mercy.  The concept is so different from the familiar 
concept of negative mercy that one might not want to call it “mercy” at all.110  I defend 
the label “positive mercy” on the basis of three reasons.  First, historical evidence 
suggests that many people (other than Seneca) have used the term “mercy” to refer to the 
concept of positive mercy or something closely akin to it.111  Second, there are many 
actions that we call “mercy” today that are instances of positive, rather than negative 
mercy.  For example, people commonly say that pirates, black knights, and even Nazis 
show (positive) mercy when they spare their victims from harsh treatment.112  Surely this 
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 There are really two worries with the label “mercy.”  The first worry, which I address 
here, is “why does positive mercy share the term ‘mercy’ with negative mercy?”  The 
second worry is “why not call an exercise of positive mercy an exercise of plain old 
fashioned justice?”  I address the second worry in the Conclusion of the dissertation. 
111
 “The prerogative of mercy in the English legal system, for example, was used for 
centuries to distinguish the punitive treatment of those who had killed intentionally from 
those who had done so accidentally, a distinction not drawn by the law of murder,” 
(Tasioulas, “Mercy,” 113).  
112
 A BBC News article reports the following incident as a case of mercy (see “Glass of 
Milk ‘Saved’ Nazi Victim”). A visibly pregnant Jewish woman was on a train headed to a 
concentration camp during World War II.  En route to the camp, the train stopped in a 
small farming village and everyone was forced to get off the train.  The pregnant woman, 
who had not eaten anything in three days, looked extremely ill.  A farmer who happened 
to be in the area reached out to give the woman a glass of milk.  A Nazi guard saw the 
farmer reaching out to the woman.  According to the rules, no passengers were allowed to 
receive food or beverages so the guard lifted his arm as if to strike the woman or prevent 
the farmer from giving her the milk.  But the guard did nothing.  He stood by and 
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is not negative mercy; their victims do not deserve the harsh treatment from which they 
are spared.113  Third, negative and positive mercy share two important similarities despite 
their differences.  Given these similarities, it makes sense for them to share the term 
“mercy.”  First, both negative and positive mercy involve a powerful person withholding 
harsh treatment (generally punishment).  Second, negative and positive mercy are both 
thought to flow from a recognition of human imperfection; negative mercy flows from a 
recognition of the frailty of human individuals (no one is perfect, we easily stumble, 
“there but for the grace of God go I”) and positive mercy flows from a recognition of the 
frailty of social rules and human institutions (social rules are rarely perfect, most 
institutions fail to be perfectly just).114   
These reasons support my decision to call the concept that I have adapted from 
Seneca’s work “positive mercy.”  If the reader remains unconvinced by my three reasons, 
I invite her to substitute the term “positive mercy” with “clemency” (from Seneca’s 
“clementia”).  I do not want the label to impede the argument of the next section and 
chapter:  the use of negative mercy faces several challenges in the context of criminal 
                                                                                                                                                                     
watched the woman gratefully receive and drink the milk.  He never struck or said a word 
to the woman or the farmer.  The article calls both the Nazi’s and the farmer’s actions 
“mercy.”  Both are positive, not negative mercy.   
113 Rainbolt makes this point in “Mercy: An Independent, Imperfect Virtue.” 
114
 The etymology of the term “mercy” is perhaps a fourth reason to call both negative 
and positive mercy “mercy.”  The etymology of “mercy” is often traced to the Latin 
“misericordia” which means pity or sorrowful heart at the sight of another’s suffering.  
This etymological root supports the use of the term “mercy” in the label “negative 
mercy.”  There is another root that supports the use of the “mercy” in the label “positive 
mercy.”  The etymology of “mercy” is also traced (by way of the French “merci”) to the 
Latin “merces” which means giving what is owed, payment that is due, or treatment that 
is deserved.  Oxford Latin Dictionary. 
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justice systems, but what I call positive mercy is apt to play an important role in those 
systems.   
Section IV:  Stumbling Blocks for Negative Mercy 
 Having identified and contrasted negative and positive mercy, I turn to compare 
their respective merit in the context of a criminal justice system.115  In this section, I 
present two problems for using negative mercy in a criminal justice system.  These 
problems are not meant to blow negative mercy out of the water in criminal justice, but to 
raise important challenges to it.  Instead of (or while we are) holding our breath for a 
resolution to these challenges, I recommend that criminal justice systems investigate and 
potentially revive positive mercy.  Positive mercy is not susceptible to the problems of 
negative mercy and, as I discuss in the next chapter, has a great deal of merit in its own 
right. 
The first problem with the exercise of negative mercy in a criminal justice system 
has its roots in a longstanding concern about the independence of mercy from justice.116  
Negative mercy is defined as being independent from justice.  But if mercy is indeed 
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 By “criminal justice system,” I do not mean any centralized authority that engages in 
judging and punishing a set of offenses.  I mean a public institution that is charged with 
achieving justice in response to a set of offenses.  I assume that a public institution 
charged with achieving justice is obliged to treat like cases alike.  Any criminal justice 
system, in the way I am using the term, is committed (at the very least) to the broad aim 
of justice and to the more particular aim of maintaining formal equality (that is, treating 
like cases alike). 
116
 This problem has its roots in a puzzle that was first articulated by St. Anselm.  The 
puzzle has been dubbed “the paradox of mercy” and it has been the focus of much 
concern in philosophical literature.  See Anselm, Murphy, Rainbolt, Tasioulas, and Brien.  
Anselm resolves this puzzle by maintaining that mercy is part of justice.  Indeed mercy is 
the very root of justice according to Anselm.  In this respect, Anselm appears to be 
working with the concept of positive mercy rather than negative mercy.  I am indebted to 
Marilyn Adams for insightful conversation on this point. 
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independent from justice, then mercy requires some departure from justice.  A departure 
from justice, however, is unjust.  We should not act unjustly, so we should not show 
mercy.  A common response to this problem is to suggest that not all departures from 
justice are unjust (they are perhaps a-just).  This response may be helpful in some 
contexts, but it is unsatisfying in the context of a criminal justice system.  Doing justice is 
the criminal justice system’s raison d’être.  A system that exists to do justice should not 
depart from justice, regardless of whether a departure from justice is strictly speaking 
unjust or simply a-just.  We should not advocate for departures from justice in the very 
pursuit of justice.  Let the departures happen elsewhere.   
 The second problem with negative mercy in criminal justice arises from a conflict 
between the supererogatory nature of negative mercy and the requirement of formal 
equality in criminal justice.  I assume, not implausibly, that officials acting in the 
criminal justice system are obligated to treat like cases alike.  Suppose that two 
defendants, D1 and D2, have committed similarly serious crimes, causing similar harms, 
with similar kinds or levels of culpability.  In order to rightfully show mercy to D1 and 
not D2, a relevant reason must distinguish D1 from D2.  Otherwise mercy would violate 
the obligation to treat like cases alike.  Suppose a good reason does distinguish D1 from 
D2 and a judge grants mercy to D1.  Now suppose the judge encounters D3 who has 
committed a crime with similar seriousness, harm, and culpability as D1 and D2.  The 
reason that distinguished and grounded mercy for D1 also applies to D3 (and D3 has no 
other features that relevantly distinguish him from D2).  On pain of failing to treat like 
cases alike, the judge is obligated to grant mercy to D3.  But negative mercy is 
supererogatory, not obligatory; it is never morally required.  Unless criminal justice 
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systems relinquish the obligation to treat like cases alike, they cannot rightfully 
accommodate the exercise of negative mercy.117  
The features of negative mercy generate these two problems.  Positive mercy is 
immune from these problems because the concept of positive mercy lacks the tension-
generating features of negative mercy.  The second problem does not arise because 
positive mercy is reason-governed and morally required rather than morally optional.  
The first problem does not arise because positive mercy is part of justice.  Positive mercy 
has moral value not because it tempers justice, but because it is part of justice.  Positive 
mercy’s particular aim, which is part of the broader aim of justice, is to correctly temper 
unjust social rules and give offenders just punishment.  
My point, however, is not to show that positive mercy outperforms negative 
mercy in problem contests.  Contemporary philosophers have crafted interesting 
responses to these (and other) problems with negative mercy in criminal justice.  The 
responses generally fall into one of two camps.  Both camps agree that the use of 
negative mercy—as understood on the received view—poses initial problems and 
challenges in the context of criminal justice.  The optimistic camp maintains that the 
concept of negative mercy can be adequately fixed for use in the criminal justice system 
by altering or abandoning one (or more) of the features of the received view.118  The 
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 Duff, “The Intrusion of Mercy,” and Harrison, “The Equality of Mercy” discuss 
versions of this problem.  Anselm also worries about this kind of problem.  Although he 
finds a resolution to the first problem, he asserts that we cannot resolve the second 
problem: “No reasoning can comprehend why, from those who are alike in wickedness, 
you [God] save some rather than others through your supreme goodness and condemn 
some rather than others through your supreme justice,” (Proslogion, Ch. 11, 14). 
118
 The following authors argue for rejecting (or reinterpreting) one of the features of the 
received view of mercy.  Johnson and Card reject the idea that mercy is distinct from 
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pessimistic camp retorts that the relevant feature(s) of mercy cannot be abandoned 
without changing the topic or improperly distorting the concept of mercy.119  Unwilling 
to discard any of the features of mercy, the pessimists generally respond to the puzzles by 
recommending that we resign mercy in the criminal court120 to the trash heap of archaic 
political ideas.  
Rather than adjudicating between these camps and declaring a victor, I propose a 
compromise between them.  I maintain that the optimists are on to something when they 
defend an altered kind of mercy in the criminal justice system.  Instead of defending what 
the pessimists take to be a contorted version of negative mercy, I suggest (re)adopting 
positive mercy for use in the contemporary criminal justice system.  It is a different 
concept of mercy, but it has a venerable lineage and, as I will show in the next chapter, it 
is still a useful concept today.  I am offering an olive branch in the form of an alternative 
positive view, not indicting either side. 
The compromise I propose neither proves or denies that negative mercy is apt for 
use in the context of criminal justice.  Some may want to further analyze negative mercy 
and make room for it in criminal justice in spite of (or in light of) its problematic 
conceptual features.  I have no “knock-down” objection to such an approach, but it is not 
                                                                                                                                                                     
justice.  Smart, Walker, Brien and Tasioulas reject the supererogatory nature of mercy, 
holding that mercy is morally required when certain reasons apply.  Walker and Tasioulas 
also reject the view that mercy is not reason-governed.  Still other authors are inclined to 
make distinctions within kinds of mercy, holding that mercy is sometimes obligatory and 
sometimes supererogatory (see Sterba and Rainbolt).   
119
 See Hurd, Markel, Statman, Harrison, Nuyen, and Murphy, Forgiveness and Mercy. 
120
 Most critics refrain from making the strong claim that mercy tout court should be 
resigned to the trash heap.  They generally do not object to the use of mercy in the 
context of interpersonal interaction (Hurd), private law (Murphy), and theology (Nuyen).  
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my own.  My argument is that discussion of mercy in the context of criminal justice 
should not be limited to negative mercy.  Positive mercy not only lacks the problematic 
conceptual features of negative mercy, but as I argue in the next chapter, it also has a 
great deal to say for itself in its own right.  I will not show that it is wrong to stop 
investigating the use of negative mercy in criminal justice, but that it is myopic to carry 
on as if negative mercy were “the only game in town.” 
CHAPTER 2:  DEFENSE OF POSITIVE MERCY 
 
“The American Bar Association should consider a recommendation to reinvigorate the 
pardon process at the state and federal levels. The pardon process, of late, seems to have 
been drained of its moral force. Pardons have become infrequent. A people confident in 
its laws and institutions should not be ashamed of mercy.”  
~US Supreme Court Justice, Anthony Kennedy121 
 
Although modern criminal justice systems respond to crime in a considerably 
more humane fashion than the Roman Empire, they still harbor some unjust social rules 
that call for excessively harsh punishments.  The existence of such unjust rules give rise 
to ample occasions for the exercise of positive mercy, but it is unclear whether officials 
in criminal justice systems should actually exercise positive mercy when such occasions 
arise.  If, for example, an unjust law requires a judge to give an offender an excessively 
harsh sentence, should the judge derogate from the law and give the offender a just 
sentence?   
Seneca does not seem to think twice about advocating for the use of mercy.  After 
all, exercising positive mercy gives substantively just treatment to offenders in individual 
cases.  A modern audience, however, should think twice about directly importing 
Seneca’s approach into the modern context.  Seneca lived in a context in which formal 
justice under law was virtually non-existent; he was writing to Nero who was ruled by no 
one and who had absolute power.  Officials in modern criminal justice systems (judges, 
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lawyers, police officers, wardens, etc.) are in a very different position.  They are ruled by 
the laws of the institutions in which they operate and through which they are given 
restricted power.  Unlike a Roman Emperor, their proper aim is not to single-handedly 
mete out substantive justice in each case that comes before them.  They are constrained 
by formal justice under law; their proper aim is generally understood to be achieving 
justice under the rule of law.  The fact that positive mercy does substantive justice in 
individual cases does not necessarily give them, unlike Nero, an appropriate reason to 
show positive mercy if doing so stands in violation of law.   
Seneca’s work is of interest to a modern audience because (among other things) it 
directs our attention to positive mercy, but not because it articulates good reasons for 
modern government officials to exercise positive mercy.  We fortunately live in a very 
different political climate than Seneca and his audience.  If we are interested in using 
positive mercy in modern criminal justice systems, we must do our own work to defend 
it.   
In this chapter, I aim to do this work.  My objective is not to show that specific 
criminal justice systems should incorporate a practice of positive mercy in any particular 
fashion.  Rather, my objective is to show that officials within criminal justice systems 
have standing reason to exercise positive mercy and that most political communities have 
standing reason to incorporate a general practice of positive mercy into their criminal 
justice systems.  To see what reason stands in favor of positive mercy, I suggest how a 
general practice of positive mercy might work and explore some of its advantages and 
potential challenges.  In Section I, I present an outline of how a political community 
might incorporate a practice of positive mercy into its criminal justice system.  With this 
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outline in place, I begin my substantive argument for why officials have reason to 
exercise positive mercy and why political communities have reason to incorporate a 
practice of positive mercy in their criminal justice systems. 
To argue that officials have reason to exercise positive mercy, I distinguish 
between two types of positive mercy:  a) law-abiding positive mercy that requires 
derogation from a social rule that is not a law and b) outlaw mercy that requires 
derogation from a law.  In Section II, I show that officials have reason to exercise law-
abiding positive mercy.  I also argue that political communities have reason to 
incorporate a general practice of such law-abiding positive mercy.  In Section III, I take 
up the significantly more challenging question of whether officials have reason to 
exercise positive mercy when doing so requires them to derogate from law.  By engaging 
in a substantial analysis of the value of the rule of law in modern political communities, I 
argue that judges have reason to exercise such outlaw positive mercy.  I show that 
exercising positive mercy is a way for judges to do justice not outside of the rule of law, 
but in service to the rule of law.  On the basis of this argument, I conclude that political 
communities have reason to incorporate not only a general practice of law-abiding mercy, 
but also a judicial practice of outlaw mercy.  In Section IV, I consider and respond to a 
powerful objection to my argument.  To conclude the chapter, I say how my discussion 
and defense of positive mercy in Part 1 of the dissertation leads to Part 2 of the 
dissertation.   
Section I:  Outlining a Practice of Positive Mercy  
 A criminal justice system that has incorporated a practice of positive mercy is 
different from one in which officials occasionally exercise positive mercy as “one-off” 
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acts.  This section provides a tentative description of how a criminal justice system might 
incorporate a practice of positive mercy.  The description is not meant as a policy 
recommendation; it has neither the detail nor the requisite analysis to support it.  Rather, 
the description is meant to fill-out the potential role that positive mercy can play in a 
criminal justice system so that we can better analyze its potential merit.   
 A criminal justice system that has incorporated a practice of positive mercy will 
have basic guidelines about which officials can exercise positive mercy, when they 
should do so, and how they should do so.  It should also have a procedure designed to 
hold officials accountable for their decisions to grant positive mercy.   
Who?  A political community can incorporate positive mercy into its criminal 
justice system by giving any number of officials the authorization to grant positive 
mercy.  Almost any type of official with control over criminal sentencing is an eligible 
candidate for granting positive mercy.  Not all types of officials are equally good or 
advisable candidates for showing positive mercy, but I list them all because they seem 
reasonably eligible for the task.  Judges are perhaps the most obvious candidates because 
they play the most visible role in deciding criminal sentences.  Juries can also be 
authorized to show positive mercy when they play a role in sentencing (as they do in 
capital cases in the American system).  Prosecutors can also be authorized to show 
positive mercy when they are deciding which charges to press, which sentences to 
recommend, and which bargains to negotiate.  Probation and parole officers are also 
eligible candidates; they can suggest mercy in their sentencing recommendations and 
they can grant mercy in deciding parole and probation conditions and in deciding on 
whether to report offenders who violate terms of parole or probation.  Prison wardens and 
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guards may also be authorized to show mercy to offenders by improving conditions 
within the prison to make sentences less harsh.  Police officers generally are authorized to 
show positive mercy by deciding whether or not to arrest someone.  In some criminal 
justice systems, many of the above officials already have authorized discretion that they 
can use to show positive mercy.122  
In many political communities, the executive branch of government is given 
broad clemency and pardon power that it can use to exercise positive mercy with respect 
to criminal punishment. The executive branch, however, does not operate as a part of the 
criminal justice system.  It exerts an important, but external influence upon it.  As such, 
the executive use of positive mercy falls slightly outside my aim of investigating the use 
of positive mercy within criminal justice systems.  That said, however, I agree with 
Anthony Kennedy (quoted above) that the executive pardon process should be 
reinvigorated.  The arguments of this chapter can lend indirect support to the claim that 
executives have reason to make use of their pardon power to exercise positive mercy.   
When?  A criminal justice system that has incorporated a practice of positive 
mercy should give officials rough guidelines on when to show mercy.  For example, the 
guidelines could recommend showing mercy when two conditions are met.  The first 
condition is that an applicable law(s) and/or other social rule(s) is unjust and prescribes 
overly harsh punishment.  The law/rule might be entirely unjust (no amount of exceptions 
can make the rule just—for example, Aryans are superior to Jews) or they might be 
partially unjust (the rules can be salvaged if a few more exceptions are built into it).  The 
second condition is that the official has it within her power not only to withhold an 
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excessively harsh treatment from an offender, but also to respond to offender in a way 
that is just (or at least significantly closer to just).123 
How? A criminal justice system that has incorporated positive mercy should have 
rough guidelines on how officials should show mercy.  These guidelines may widely vary 
from official to official (the way a judge ought to show mercy may be very different from 
how a prosecutor ought to show mercy).  As will become clear for reasons that I discuss 
in the next two sections, I think the guidelines should recommend that officials show 
mercy publically; that is, in a fashion that is open and transparent to all members of the 
public.  When possible, officials who grant mercy should publically articulate their 
reasons for granting mercy (and the reasons should be public reasons rather than the 
official’s personal preferences).  Officials should assert that the rule from which they are 
derogating is unjust and explain why it is unjust.  They should also explain why the 
merciful response (whatever that might be) is just.  I suspect that publicity will help get 
the most out of a practice of mercy and limit officials’ abuse of the power to grant mercy. 
Accountability? A criminal justice system that has incorporated a practice of 
positive mercy may have a procedure for reviewing officials’ decisions to show mercy.  
A political community may hold officials accountable for mercy decisions by enacting a 
scheme that is specially tailored for periodically reviewing mercy decisions.  Or it may 
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security prison.  The jury decides that sentencing the man to death would be unjust, but 
they also decide that sentencing him for five years would be unjust (suppose he is a 
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man to five years would be a worse miscarriage of justice then sentencing him to death, 
then the jury is not in an appropriate position to grant positive mercy.  They should leave 
it to the judge who is empowered to give the man a just sentence. 
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hold officials accountable for mercy decisions within the general scheme(s) it already has 
in place for holding officials publically accountable.  Either way, officials who reduce 
just sentences for bad reasons (like cronyism, nepotism, racism, or sexism) and glorify 
such miscarriages of justice with the name “mercy” should be held accountable.  They 
may be held accountable for abusing their power in a variety of ways; their decision 
might be overturned (if that is an option), they may be publically criticized, denied 
promotions, fired, or even criminally punished.  There is a great deal more to be said 
about how officials should be accountable for their decisions to show mercy, but I 
postpone this discussion until I have more carefully investigated the reasons that officials 
have to exercise mercy in modern criminal justice systems.   
Section II:  Law-Abiding Positive Mercy  
The exercise of positive mercy in a criminal justice system grants a person a just 
punishment (that might mean no punishment, a shorter punishment, or an otherwise 
lighter punishment) when unjust social rules operative in the system would have called 
for harsher punishment.  In order for a person to exercise positive mercy, she must 
derogate from some unjust social rule.  Sometimes the exercise of positive mercy requires 
the granter of mercy to derogate from an unjust social rule that is not a law and 
sometimes it requires the granter to derogate from a law.  In this section, I argue that 
officials have reason to exercise positive mercy when doing so does not require them to 
derogate from the law.  In the next section, I analyze cases in which positive mercy does 
require officials to derogate from the law.   
I begin by explaining when occasions for such law-abiding positive mercy arise.  
Sometimes criminal justice systems have unjust informal rules, policies, or non-legal 
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customs that call for overly harsh punishment toward criminal offenders.  Non-legal rules 
exert a great deal of influence over the way that many criminal justice systems treat 
criminal offenders.  For example, informal (or formal) social rules often govern the way 
in which prosecutors cut deals, how parole boards are expected to interpret and weigh 
various factors, how wardens run prisons, and the ways in which judicial discretion is 
appropriately used and abused.  The law is often silent on whether officials should follow 
these rules or not.  Suppose that one of the rules is unjust and that an official is not legally 
bound to follow it.  If she deviates from the rule to give an offender just, rather than 
overly harsh treatment, the official exercises positive mercy in a law-abiding fashion.   
Officials have two reasons to exercise positive mercy in such a law-abiding 
fashion.  First, and most obviously, officials have reason to do justice under law and these 
exercises of positive mercy do justice under law.  If an official were to withhold positive 
mercy when she had occasion to exercise it, she would deny an offender substantively 
just treatment when the law provided her with the opportunity to provide it.  This kind of 
behavior might be acceptable in rare circumstances, but in general, officials should avoid 
it and show positive mercy when they have occasion to do so. 
The achievement of substantive justice is also a reason for officials to exercise the 
closely related act of law-abiding equity.  Sometimes a social rule demands excessively 
harsh treatment in a given case but the rule itself is not unjust.  If the official is not legally 
bound to follow the rule and she derogates from it in order to give an offender just 
treatment, then the official exercises law-abiding equity.  I do not, however, discuss 
equity in great depth here because my focus is on positive mercy. 
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In addition to doing justice under law, officials have a second reason to exercise 
positive mercy (this reason does not seem to apply to equity).  The exercise of positive 
mercy is one way in which an official can fulfill her moral obligation to support just 
institutions.  Following Rawls, I assume that members of a political community—
officials as well as non-officials—have a pro tanto moral obligation to support and 
maintain existing, minimally just institutions within their community. 124  Part of what it 
means to support these institutions is to correct for injustice that is harbored within them.  
(Just as part of what it means to support and maintain one’s health is to root out disease 
harboring within it.)  A person who conscientiously fulfills her duty to support just 
institutions keeps a critical eye out for injustices that might be lurking within (or glaring 
on the surface of) those institutions.  Insofar as there is injustice within the institution, she 
stands in active opposition to it and acts in ways that are conducive to rooting it out.  
There are several courses of action she can take to do so.  For example, she can lobby for, 
vote, or pass (if she is a legislator) new legislation; she can raise public awareness, or 
engage in symbolic protest.125   
Law-abiding positive mercy, I contend, is a way for officials within criminal 
justice systems to support the just institution126 in which they work and which they 
generally know the most about.  The act of positive mercy takes an active stand against 
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unjust social rules in the criminal justice system, derogating from them because they are 
unjust and not worth having in the system.  In many cases, the act of positive mercy not 
only takes a stand against an unjust rule, but also is conducive to calling forth positive 
change in the rule.127  If positive mercy is strategically exercised in public or “on record,” 
it can add to (or establish) a body of practice (including but not limited to legal 
precedent) surrounding an unjust rule that can fund positive change of that rule.  Like 
protests that are sometimes “only” symbolic but sometimes bring about significant 
reform, positive mercy will sometimes have no effect on changing the rules and 
sometimes will have considerable effect.  Either way, the exercise of positive mercy is a 
way for an official to fulfill her obligation to support just institutions.  This reason to 
exercise positive mercy stands in addition to the first reason that officials have to exercise 
law-abiding positive mercy:  to do substantive justice under law.   
Unfortunately, a variety of obstacles make it difficult for officials to recognize 
and act on occasions for positive mercy.  Officials often internalize informal social rules 
and policies; they often take them for granted as correct and apply them without a second 
thought.  Officials who do not exercise law-abiding positive mercy when they ought to do 
so might aptly be described as guilty of a callous (perhaps cruel) conventionalism or the 
maintenance of a brutal status quo.  As history teaches us, it is easy for people to fall into 
this kind of behavior and often difficult for individuals to resist it.  To exercise positive 
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mercy, officials must question the rules around them; doing so is often difficult.  In 
addition to the psychological difficulty of questioning the rules, officials may also face 
social sanctions for questioning and derogating from social rules.  Exercising positive 
mercy is a kind of “whistle-blowing” on bad practice in the criminal justice system and it 
comes with many of the general difficulties that whistle-blowers generally face.   
Having a general practice of positive mercy would help officials engage in the 
difficult exercise of positive mercy.  It would give a name to their practice and make it 
more visible for others to see (and be encouraged by).  A general practice of positive 
mercy would also include an accountability scheme to protect individuals exercise 
positive mercy.  Like laws and policies that are designed to protect corporate whistle-
blowers, an accountability scheme for positive mercy would help protect those who have 
exercised positive mercy when they ought to have done so (the protection would prevent 
them from losing their jobs or facing other sanctions) and sanction those who abuse the 
practice by masking unjust decisions under the name of “mercy.”   
Section III:  Outlaw Positive Mercy 
In this section, I argue that officials have reason to exercise positive mercy when 
doing so requires them to derogate from law128 rather than (or in addition to) a non-legal 
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 By “laws” I mean laws in Dworkin’s post-interpretive sense.  A law “on the books” 
may be a law in a pre-interpretive sense, but not in the post-interpretive sense.  According 
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in the strong, post-interpretive sense.  It is only a law in the weak, pre-interpretive sense 
(it is a law only on its face, “prima facie,” but not a substantive law).  Officials in most 
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social rule.  Let me explain the circumstances under which occasions for such “outlaw” 
exercises of positive mercy arise.  Many political communities have sentencing laws that 
not only allow, but require officials to give minimum punishments for certain offenses.129  
For my purposes, I call this kind of sentencing law unjust if it is incompatible with a full 
theory of justice.  In virtue of its generality as a law, a just sentencing law may prescribe 
excessively harsh punishments in a haphazard handful of cases.  Judges have occasion to 
exercise equity with respect to just laws, but they do not have occasion to exercise 
positive mercy.  The exercise of outlaw positive mercy is a response to an unjust 
sentencing law.   
Generally, an unjust sentencing law is incompatible with a full theory of justice 
because it has some defect in virtue of which it prescribes excessively harsh punishments 
in an identifiable pattern of (or perhaps all) cases.130  By “excessively harsh” 
punishments, I mean punishments that involve more harsh treatment than is justifiable 
according to a fully theory of political justice.  The defect could be, among other things, 
that the law fails to draw distinctions where distinctions ought to be drawn (for example, 
by prescribing the same punishment for mentally insane offenders as sane offenders who 
                                                                                                                                                                     
criminal justice systems have a duty to uphold law in the strong, post-interpretative sense, 
but not in the weak, pre-interpretative sense. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 107-108. 
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judicial discretion in criminal sentencing.  Roberts, “Public Opinion and Mandatory 
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 There may be other sentencing laws that are incompatible with a full theory of justice 
because they have some flaw that assigns too little punishment in a set of cases.  These 
laws are not my focus here.  My argument in the latter part of this section can be applied 
to show that derogation from these laws generally conflicts with the rule of law.  In 
contrast, I argue that positive mercy serves the rule of law.   
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commit the same offenses), or that it draws distinctions where they should not be drawn 
(for example, by prescribing more punishment for black offenders than white offenders 
who commit the same offenses), or that it otherwise requires punishments that are 
morally unjustifiable (for example, by prescribing twenty-five to life sentences for petty 
theft like stealing a TV or some videos131).  Without introducing any greater injustice, 
legislators could remove these laws or add exceptions to them to prevent them from 
prescribing overly harsh treatment toward types of offenders.132  Legislators should do so, 
but sometimes they do not.  Through negligence, iniquity, political pressure, or other 
reasons, legislators sometimes let these unjust sentencing laws persist in the system.   
These unjust laws are the focus of the remainder of this chapter.  They leave 
officials in the criminal justice system in a sour predicament.  We generally think that 
officials are charged to do substantive justice while remaining within the constraints of 
the law; they are to seek justice under law.  The unjust laws described above, however, 
make it impossible for the official to give certain offenders a substantively just outcome 
while remaining within the constraints of the law.  Should an official uphold these laws in 
cases where they require her to mete out excessively harsh punishment to offenders?  Or 
should she derogate from them in such cases and deliver substantive justice to the 
offender who stands before her?  If she takes the latter course of action, she shows 
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positive mercy.  The question is:  should she, or does she have any good reason to show 
positive mercy in such an outlaw fashion?  (Henceforth in this section, I use “positive 
mercy” to refer to the exercise of positive mercy in such an outlaw fashion.)  
In what follows, I argue that officials in the criminal justice system have standing 
reason to exercise positive mercy.  First, I give what I take to be the best case against 
positive mercy:  it seems to be at odds with the rule of law which has considerable 
instrumental and non-instrumental value in political communities with minimally just 
legal systems.  Second, I argue that, contrary to appearance, positive mercy serves rather 
than threatens the rule of law in the criminal justice system.  I conclude that insofar as 
officials have reason to pursue justice under the rule of law, they have reason to exercise 
positive mercy.   
Rule of Law and the Case Against Positive Mercy 
To begin, let me explain what the rule of law is and why it appears to conflict 
with positive mercy.  Legal and political philosophers have developed slightly different 
conceptions of the rule of law.  Lon Fuller maintains that the rule of law is an ideal that is 
achieved, to a greater or lesser degree, when the law satisfies eight principles:  laws must 
be general, promulgated, prospective, clear, non-contradictory, possible to keep, constant, 
and most importantly for my purpose, congruent with the behavior of officials of the 
regime.133  For Joseph Raz, the rule of law is the “principled, faithful application of the 
law,”134 for Ronald Dworkin it is the “ideal of rule by an accurate public conception of 
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individual rights,”135 and for John Rawls it is “regular and impartial, and in this sense 
fair, administration of law.” 136  Jeremy Waldron characterizes the rule of law very 
broadly as “law being in charge in a society.”137  He maintains that the philosophical core 
of the debate over the rule of law is not really about what the rule of law is, but about 
how, if at all, to structure institutions such that law is in charge.  Waldron’s approach has 
a great deal of merit and it guides me through the argument of this section.  
Although legal and political philosophers disagree a great deal over how to 
structure an institution such that law is in charge, they do generally agree on at least one 
principle.138  If law is to be in charge, political institutions must meet Fuller’s eighth 
principle.  The rule of law requires government officials to uphold and apply the law as it 
is, not as they would like it to be.  If the officials do not actually apply the law in practice, 
then the law is “a lame duck” or some other kind of powerless figurehead.  Just as no 
number of crown jewels can make it the case that Queen Elizabeth II is in charge of 
modern Britain, so too no amount of generality, clarity, promulgation, or constancy can 
make it the case that law is in charge of a political community if its officials do not 
actually apply or enforce the law.  Law does not have a magical scepter; it cannot rule 
unless there are officials charged to uphold and apply it.  To use Fuller’s phrase, officials 
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must have “fidelity to the law” if law is to rule.  If officials toss aside laws that they do 
not like rather than uphold them, the laws are not in charge.  The officials are in charge.   
The case against positive mercy is beginning to take shape.  An official who 
exercises positive mercy derogates from a law instead of applying it.  Her exercise seems 
to stand at odds with Fuller’s eighth principle and the rule of law.  But as it stands, this is 
not yet an argument against the exercise of positive mercy.  So what if the exercise of 
positive mercy is at odds with the rule of law?  To understand the best case against 
positive mercy, we need to see why the rule of law is worth having and maintaining in a 
given political community.   
In what follows, I present four values of the rule of law in the context of a 
political community with a minimally just legal system.139  I will return to analyze these 
values in much greater depth later in the argument, so I only briefly outline the four 
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in which today’s liberal democracies are situated and in which positive mercy faces a 
deep challenge.  
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values here.  Following the literature on the rule of law and its value, I group the rule of 
law values into two categories:  instrumental values and non-instrumental values.140   
The rule of law has (at least) two instrumental values.  First, the rule of law is 
instrumentally valuable because it is needed in order for law to do its job of guiding and 
coordinating human behavior.  As Raz puts it, “the rule of law is essential for securing 
whatever purposes the law is designed to achieve.”141  Insofar as the laws in a minimally 
just legal system serve some worthwhile purposes (which they do in most modern 
political communities), the rule of law has instrumental value in helping the law achieve 
those purposes. 
Second, the rule of law is instrumentally valuable because it keeps the law 
transparent to the public.  Among other things, transparency afforded by the rule of law 
bolsters the public’s ability to reform the law (they cannot change a law if they do not 
know it exists) and it minimizes the chance (and the suspicion) that some people, usually 
the elite, have access to secret laws from which they can glean an unfair advantage. 
The rule of law also has (at least) two non-instrumental values.  First, the rule of 
law respects the autonomy of individuals in the political community.  It respects each 
individual as a self-directed agent with the capacity to make decisions and plan her own 
life—as she sees fit, not as the ruling class deems fit.  By ensuring that the ruling power 
is used according to stable, promulgated, and non-retroactive rules, the rule of law 
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respects the capacity of an individual to guide her life by her own decisions.  When the 
rule of law is in place, officials judge members of the political community according to 
“standards of behavior that they had a real opportunity to follow.  Thus it is the decisions 
and actions of individuals—not the whims of officials—that determine the legal 
treatment that individuals receive.”142  The rule of law lays out a map upon which we can 
chart our own course; with the rule of law, we do not have to constantly guess which way 
to jump in order to avoid trouble from an arbitrary and unpredictable will.  The rule of 
law is not just a tool that happens to bring about a state of affairs in which people can 
make decisions and plans based on reliable expectations (although that is good too!); in 
its very structure, the rule of law respects our capacity to make autonomous choices and 
plans.  It treats us as self-directed, responsible agents.143 
Second, the rule of law structures a relation of reciprocity between those who rule 
and those who are ruled.144  It is unfair for rulers to be unconstrained in their use of 
power while the ruled are kept constrained by that power.  When law is in charge, those 
on both sides of political power are constrained.  Waldron, picking up on Fuller’s 
recognition of the value of reciprocity in the rule of law, explains how this works.  
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Suppose the government wants to pursue goal G and decides to do it through rules (i.e. 
the rule of law).  Officials are then bound to act according to the rules.  They cannot act 
outside of the rules with respect to individuals even if doing so helps the government 
pursue goal G.  Individuals then feel like they are being taken into account.145  Non-
officials are not the only ones constrained by law and forced to make sacrifices in light of 
them; officials who make and enforce the law also face such constraints and are forced to 
make sacrifices in light of them.  The ruled and the ruling are together facing constraints 
of life in a political community.  Under the rule of law, the ruled are not continually 
giving while the rulers continually take; instead, there is “give and take” on both sides.146  
As Fuller puts it, “there is a kind of reciprocity between government and the citizen with 
respect to the observance of rules.  The government says to the citizen147 in effect, ‘these 
are the rules we expect you to follow.  If you follow them, you have our assurance that 
they are the rules that will be applied to your conduct” (emphasis mine).148  This “kind of 
reciprocity” is certainly not tantamount to a full achievement of the political ideal of 
reciprocity, but it nevertheless instantiates an important aspect of that ideal.   
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It is easy to miss the importance of the kind of reciprocity that the rule of law 
instantiates.  In order to help us appreciate its importance, let us imaginatively enter into 
a regime where it was absent:  Seneca’s Rome.  A myriad of political values and ideals 
were absent there and reciprocity is one of them.  There was no fair give and take 
between ruler and ruled.  If Seneca so much as ruffled the feathers of the Emperor, he 
would be executed.  But if the Emperor committed any number of evil actions against 
Seneca, he would walk (or be carried) away with entire immunity.  The emperor could do 
anything toward his subjects with impunity, but his subjects could do nothing without the 
threat of imperial sanction.  “That’s just not fair,” we say (or exclaim) in our effort to 
articulate what is wrong with such a state of affairs.  What is missing (among other things 
of course) is reciprocity in the relationship between the Emperor and the subject.149  
Waldron, Fuller, Finnis, and Murphy purport that the rule of law captures, in its very 
structure, the valuable reciprocity that I take to be missing here.  
Equipped with an understanding of the rule of law and its value in, I can now 
make what I take to be the best general case against positive mercy.  Modern political 
communities have created and strive to maintain the rule of law.  Not without good 
reason, the rule of law has both instrumental value as a method of governance and it 
respects autonomy and reciprocity.  Modern political communities give officials power 
on the condition that these officials use it in service of the rule of law.  To maintain the 
rule of law in virtue of which they have been given their power, officials are obligated to 
faithfully uphold the law.  They must follow Fuller’s eighth principle and keep their 
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behavior as officials congruent with the law.  If a law is unjust, officials can use the legal 
channels that citizens use to seek reform.  But when acting as officials, they are obliged 
not to derogate from law in some effort to “save the system from itself.”  Officials are 
required to stay (and maintain) the path set by law, not off-road in their own Hummers of 
personal conviction.  The exercise of positive mercy, however, seems to do just that.  The 
official who derogates from law to show positive mercy seems to commit a kind of 
mutiny; she declares that she, not the law, is in charge of how the offender standing 
before her is to be treated.  She is overstepping her office; she is not authorized to take 
charge over law, but obliged in virtue of her position to remain faithful to law.   
This argument does not entail that officials should never exercise positive mercy; 
in special circumstances, it may be the case that an official should, all-things-considered, 
overstep her office.  The argument does, however, suggest that officials’ obligation to 
uphold the rule of law gives them standing reason to withhold rather than exercise 
positive mercy.  
The case against positive mercy only gets worse when we recall how positive 
mercy differs from equity.  An act of equity can be defended as an act that derogates from 
the letter of a law, but upholds the spirit of a law.  The law cannot take all particularities 
into account, but if it could, then it would make the exceptions that the equitable judge 
makes.  In exercising equity, an official does not fail to uphold the spirit of a law; she 
remains faithful to the spirit of the law and respects it as a constraint on her power.  But 
the same cannot be said of positive mercy. A person who grants positive mercy does not 
just derogate from a law, she indicts a law as unjust, as a cancer in the system.  She takes 
a noncompliant even insubordinate stance against the law per se; as Bentham would put 
 66
it, she does not uphold or interpret law, she over-rules law.  Such conduct may be fit for a 
legislator (or an autocrat), but certainly not for an official charged to uphold the rule of 
law.150    
The Strategy of My Response 
My response proceeds on two levels.  First, consider a political community that 
has incorporated a practice of mercy into its legal system (I am arguing that political 
communities have good reason to do this).  Certain officials would be legally authorized 
to derogate from criminal sentencing laws when such laws are unjust and prescribe too 
much punishment.  When an official shows positive mercy in such a system, she may 
well derogate from a criminal sentencing law, but she does not derogate from the law.  
She is not engaging in an act of insubordination against the rule of law; the law allows 
her action.  The merciful official is no more “insubordinate” than for example, a 
conscientious objector in a political community that makes legal room for conscientious 
objection.  If a legal system allows positive mercy and an act of positive mercy falls 
within that allowance, then it does not violate officials’ duty to uphold the rule of law.   
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The response at this level, however, misses the heart of the problem.  The 
response shows that in legal systems that have incorporated a practice of mercy, acts of 
mercy do not violate officials’ obligation to uphold the rule of law.  But the response 
does not show that legal systems can incorporate a practice of mercy without posing a 
significant (perhaps paralyzing) threat to the rule of law in the system.  Officials in legal 
systems are obligated to maintain law’s rule and so, at least according to Fuller’s eighth 
principle, they are obligated to keep their behavior congruent with laws as they are, not as 
they might be.  A practice of positive mercy clashes with this obligation because it 
authorizes officials to derogate from actual laws on grounds that such laws are not what 
they ought to be.  A practice of mercy just does not fit in the context of a system that 
obliges its officials to remain faithful to upholding laws as they are.  To successfully 
respond to the case against positive mercy at its deepest level, I must show that this clash 
is merely apparent. 
The strategy of my response is to show that contrary to appearance, positive 
mercy is in the service of the rule of law.  I do not deny that officials are obligated to 
uphold the rule of law.  Rather, I affirm their obligation to uphold the rule of law but I 
argue that this obligation furnishes a standing reason to exercise rather than withhold 
positive mercy.   
My response hinges on an analysis of the rule of law in the criminal justice 
system.  I follow Waldron in his keen recognition that a) the rule of law has to do with 
the law being “in charge,” and his honest admission that b) there is deep debate over how 
to structure our institutions such that law actually is in charge.  Fuller’s list of eight 
principles is not an authoritative and detailed “how-to” guide on how to structure 
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government such that law is in charge.151  Even if his list were the best guide for 
structuring the government’s basic framework, it may not be the best guide for 
structuring each particular institution of the government.  Indeed Fuller insists that his 
eight principles are not a good guide for structuring military institutions.  How, then, do 
we figure out the best way to structure a government institution such that law is, if at all, 
in charge?   
My methodological suggestion is that we think about what is valuable about law’s 
being in charge.  Then we should aim to structure a government institution in a way that 
best realizes these values (if they are indeed worth pursuing in the given institution).  We 
should be open to the possibility that the best way to realize these values may not be the 
same in each institution.  There may be no general recipe for having law be in charge of 
an institution.  This thought may lie behind Waldron’s suggestion that “the rule of law” is 
a contested concept; perhaps what it takes for law to be in charge is very different in one 
institution compared to the next (what it takes for law to be in charge of the criminal 
justice system may be different from what it takes for law to be in charge of the civil 
court or the tax system).  
To apply this method, I return to the four rule of law values I described above.  I 
argue that the best way of structuring the criminal justice to realize these values is not by 
obliging officials to sentence offenders in strict congruence with the law.  Although 
adherence to Fuller’s eighth principle may be a good, even essential, way to realize rule 
of law values in some government institutions, I will show that it is not a good way to 
realize rule of law values in the criminal justice system.  I will demonstrate that rule of 
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law values are better realized in the criminal justice system if judges derogate from, 
rather than remain congruent with, unjust sentencing laws that prescribe excessive 
punishment.  Or in other words, rule of law values are better realized in the criminal 
justice system insofar as judges exercise positive mercy.152 
Given limitations of scope, I cannot analyze the full structure of the criminal 
justice system.  Instead of considering whether rule of law values are best served in a 
system where police, prosecutors, parole boards, juries and judges exercise positive 
mercy, I focus only on whether rule of laws values are best served by judges exercising 
positive mercy.153  This is a significant limitation, but it is not “an easy way out.”  
Compared to other officials, judges arguably have the most robust obligation to uphold 
the rule of law and retain fidelity to the law.  They are, if you will, closest to the reins of 
law’s rule.  The public affords them their position of power on the very strict condition 
that they do not seize those reins.  Judges who are suspected of even mildly deviating 
from the law in their decisions are harshly criticized as “legislating from the bench,” and 
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as Bentham put it, “contriving to steal power.”154  I argue that such criticism should not 
be leveled against judges who exercise positive mercy.  Judges who exercise positive 
mercy are not stealing power, but rather fulfilling their obligation to uphold law’s rule as 
it is best understood in the context of the criminal justice system. 
Positive Mercy in Service of Law’s Rule 
In what follows, I analyze the four values of the rule of law.  I argue that 
derogation from law in the form of positive mercy rather than strict congruence with law 
is the best way for judges to instantiate these rule of law values in the criminal justice 
system.   
Reciprocity:  The rule of law has non-instrumental value in structuring and 
maintaining a relation of reciprocity between the ruling and the ruled. The government 
expects members of the political community to follow the laws and in turn each member 
has the assurance that the government will follow those laws with respect to them.  This 
is the general idea, but the devil (or rather, a god of mercy) is in the details.  The 
government cannot legitimately demand members of the political community to follow 
every law.  As the practice and study of civil disobedience over the past decades has 
shown, members of a political community are not required to obey unjust laws.155  
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Respect for the rule of law calls for people to be very careful and conscientious in their 
consideration of whether a law is unjust.  If a law is unjust, however, people are not 
required to obey it.  
With the idea of civil disobedience in mind, let us return to reciprocity and the 
rule of law. The judge who exercises positive mercy in derogation from an unjust law 
mirrors the individual who engages in civil disobedience of an unjust law.  Each faces a 
situation in which the constraint of the law misses the moral mark.  Reciprocity calls for 
the constraint to be qualified on both sides, not just on the non-official’s side of the 
power relationship.  The qualification on the official side might be significantly different 
and more restrictive than it is on the non-official side.  I do not give a general analysis of 
the qualification; I limit my remarks to the exercise of positive mercy.  
Suppose a judge is in a situation such that following an unjust sentencing law 
would require her to give an offender an excessively harsh sentence.  If she withholds 
positive mercy and gives the offender the excessively harsh sentence, she says, in effect, 
“The government should not have passed this unjust law.  But you are the offender here, 
so we expect you to bear the burden of your mistake and our mistake by serving the 
excessive sentence that our unjust law requires.”  Reciprocity in the power relationship is 
jeopardized, not instantiated by, such a decision to withhold positive mercy.  We 
generally characterize a relationship as abusive, not reciprocal, when the more powerful 
party makes mistakes and forces the less powerful party to bear the burden of them.  The 
judge who withholds positive mercy sounds like a bit like an abusive father who tells the 
child he beats, “Just look what you have made me made me do!”  That kind of behavior 
is not appropriate in a reciprocal relationship.   
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A party in a reciprocal relation recognizes her own faults and shoulders the 
burden of them, she does not try to pass them off as the other’s faults and force the other 
to suffer for them.  The best way to maintain this kind of reciprocal relation in the 
criminal justice system is not for judges to act in accord with every constraint the law 
places on them.  Rather, the best way to maintain reciprocity is for judges to violate the 
constraints of unjust sentencing laws by exercising positive mercy. 
Autonomy:  Although the value of reciprocity is best served through the judicial 
exercise of positive mercy, the other three rule of law values may be best served by 
judges withholding positive mercy.  Is respect for individual autonomy best served by 
judges withholding or exercising positive mercy?   
In order for individuals to exercise their capacity to make meaningful decisions 
that guide their own lives, they need to be able to form reliable expectations about what 
behavior the political community will and will not punish.  The laws—as long as they are 
clear, stable, non-retroactive, and consistently enforced—allow people to form stable 
expectations about the kind of legal treatment they will receive. When officials judge an 
individual on the basis of such laws, the individual is judged on the basis of standards 
that she knew (or could have known) about and could have followed.  She is judged as a 
self-directed, responsible agent.  Any punishment she receives is a direct result of her 
own choices, not a result of the passing whim of an official.  
When a judge punishes an individual in derogation from law, the individual’s 
autonomy might be threatened.  If a judge punishes an individual more than the law 
allows, then the individual’s autonomy is likely threatened.  She is judged on the basis of 
a standard (the judge’s) that she did not have a reasonable opportunity to follow.  She 
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knew or could have known about the law, but she did not know and could not have 
known about the judge’s standard.  If she had known about the judge’s standard, then she 
might have chosen not to commit the crime so as to avoid this added punishment.  But 
she was not given this opportunity.  The added punishment is not attributable to her own 
choices.  The judge who gives her such punishment is not treating her as a self-directed 
autonomous agent.156    
When a judge punishes an individual less than the law prescribes, however, the 
judge does not necessarily fail to respect her autonomy. 157  To the extent that the 
individual receives any punishment from the judge, the punishment is still attributable to 
her choice to commit the crime.  If she had known about the judge’s more lenient 
standard, this knowledge would almost surely not have prevented her from choosing to 
commit the crime.  She violated a law that she could have obeyed and that she knew 
could have come with at least as much punishment as the judge makes her suffer.  One 
cannot legitimately object that the judge has failed to respect her as a self-directing agent. 
An offender like Oliver Wendell Holmes’ “bad man” might try to object as 
follows.  Had she known the more lenient standard she would be judged by, she would 
have chosen to commit more (or worse) crimes.  The discrepancy between the judge’s 
decision and the law hinders her ability to form reasonable expectations about exactly 
                                                        
156
 This line of reasoning is often used to explain why retroactive laws are inconsistent 
with the rule of law.  
157
 One might worry that there are exceptions here. On Herbert Morris’s view, if a judge 
punishes an offender less based on a false judgment that the offender is incapable of self-
directed action (when the offender actually is capable), then the judge fails to respect the 
offender’s autonomy (“Persons and Punishment”). But such a decision would not qualify 
as positive mercy because it does not give the offender substantively just treatment. 
 74
how much mischief she can get away with without suffering punishment (or some 
minimal amount of it).  The judge is hindering her ability to make efficient crime choices 
that are important for guiding her life and so the judge is hindering her autonomy.  
This is not a legitimate objection.  The objector seems to assume that respect for 
an individual’s autonomy requires supplying her with information to make all of her 
options clear.  But that assumption is false.  Respect for autonomy (in the valuable sense 
that the rule of law is interested in protecting) means respect for a person as a 
responsible, self-directing agent.  To respect a person as a self-directing agent, the law 
must give her a reasonable opportunity to avoid punishment, but it need not give her 
exact assurance as to what will result from every legal risk she takes.  To insist that the 
law must provide such assurance out of respect for autonomy is to confuse autonomy 
with the maximization of bare negative liberty.  I maintain that although respect for 
autonomy is a value of the rule of law, maximizing bare negative liberty is not.158  
I have argued that respect for individual autonomy does not necessarily count 
against positive mercy.  Now I turn to argue that positive mercy actually helps the rule of 
law in instantiating respect for autonomy.  I assume, following the general lead of 
Herbert Morris, that political communities can morally justify some amount of 
punishment to some individuals by arguing that punishment is necessary in order to 
respect them (and others in the community) as self-directed agents.159  When a judge 
withholds positive mercy when she has occasion to exercise it, she gives an offender an 
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excessive punishment that goes above and beyond the amount needed to respect the 
offender as a self-directed agent.  This additional punishment is not innocently gratuitous 
from the point of view of autonomy.  On the contrary, it is generally damaging to the 
offender’s autonomy.  As I explain more fully in Chapter 5, most modern punishments 
take the form of incarceration that not only severely diminishes an individual’s 
opportunity to make choices that guide her life, but can also degrade an individual’s very 
capacity to make choices for herself (by both lack of exercise and by jeopardizing the 
individual’s self-respect).  By giving just rather than excessive punishment, the exercise 
of positive mercy avoids this outcome.  That is, positive mercy respects rather than 
jeopardizes the autonomy of the offenders who receive it.   
A tool to guide behavior:  The rule of law has instrumental value as a tool for 
social coordination.  The government uses laws to achieve various goals (such as 
environmental protection, education, maintenance of security, etc.).  For law to achieve 
such goals, it must be capable of guiding human behavior.  According to Raz, law guides 
behavior by playing a role in people’s practical reason.160  In order to play such a role, the 
law must (among other things) be clear, stable, prospective, and general.  Also, those 
enforcing the law must not deprive the law of its ability to guide human behavior.  
Officials must not “pervert” or “subvert” the features of law (clarity, stability, etc.) that 
are needed for the law to play a role in people’s practical reason.  When officials derogate 
from law, they tend to subvert law’s clarity and thereby tend to diminish law’s ability to 
play a role in people’s practical reason.  This means that law will be less effective in 
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guiding people’s behavior and in turn be less effective at achieving its variety of 
purposes.  The deterioration of law’s ability to achieve its purposes is deleterious for the 
political community insofar as those purposes are just.  
There are two ways that positive mercy could exert an effect on law’s ability to 
guide human behavior:  it could have an effect on the law’s general ability to guide 
human behavior or on particular laws’ ability to guide human behavior.  I consider these 
effects in turn.   
Law’s general ability to guide human behavior depends on the public’s trust that 
the law will be enforced reliably.  In strong, well-established legal systems, people’s trust 
in law enforcement will almost surely not be shaken by the judicial exercise of positive 
mercy.  A public with reasonable trust in its system will not infer that positive mercy will 
lead to a scourge of judges and other officials off-roading from law.  Of course it is 
possible for them to draw such an inference, but it is highly unlikely in practice.  The 
scope of mercy is very limited; it is not general judicial discretion to disobey any laws.  
Judicial mercy is limited to derogation from sentencing laws.  A judge can only exercise 
positive mercy in the determination of sentences, not in the determination of 
guilt/innocence for crime.  Offenders who are granted judicial mercy are still arrested, put 
on trial, and punished justly.  Given mercy’s limited scope, it is highly unlikely that the 
exercise of positive mercy will shake public trust in law enforcement.  As such, we 
should not expect exercises of positive mercy to seriously threaten law’s general ability 
to guide human behavior.  The possibility may be more of a live concern in a fledgling 
legal system that has not yet won public trust in its ability to enforce clear, stable, and 
promulgated rules.  But in most modern political communities, this is not a realistic 
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worry;161 as Kennedy puts it, “a people confident in its laws and institutions should not be 
ashamed of mercy.”162 
In some contexts, the exercise of positive mercy may actually enhance law’s 
general ability to guide behavior.  If, as is arguably the case in America, there are unjust 
sentencing laws that disproportionately affect certain neighborhoods or communities (like 
inner city ghettos), then people in those neighborhoods may increasingly view the legal 
institution with justified derision and suspicion.  The police have a more difficult time 
enforcing law in these neighborhoods (those who help the police are stigmatized as 
“snitches”) and so law loses some of its ability to guide behavior.  In even worse 
circumstances, large proportions of neighborhoods can be incarcerated due in part to 
unjust sentencing laws.  When this happens, there is often an inversion of value within 
the neighborhood;163 illegal behavior and incarceration ceases to be seen as something to 
avoid and is instead seen as a badge of honor.164  In such circumstances, law has certainly 
lost its ability to guide human behavior in the right direction.  The exercise of positive 
mercy can help the law gain back its ability to guide behavior in these neighborhoods in 
two ways.  First, by decreasing the proportion of the population that is incarcerated.  
Second, by showing that the criminal justice system is trying to do substantive justice 
rather than continuing to enforce unjust rules.  In these ways, the exercise of positive 
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mercy might help win back at least a measure of public trust in the legal institution in 
these neighborhoods.  Even if positive mercy does not win back any public trust, it will at 
least not further alienate trust.  In this respect, it does better than the status quo of 
withholding positive mercy. 
Positive mercy does not hinder and may even help law’s general ability to guide 
human behavior.  But does it hinder particular laws’ ability to guide behavior?  The 
exercise of positive mercy might affect law’s ability to enter into an individual’s 
reasoning over whether to obey particular criminal laws.165  With mercy in the picture, 
people (like Holmes’ bad man described above) have to take one more factor into account 
in their decisions about whether to commit crime.  The factor is:  will I get a reduced 
sentence through positive mercy?  One might think that this added “mercy factor” 
diminishes law’s ability to guide behavior because it makes the consequences of violating 
law less clear.  But does it?  The “mercy factor” certainly does not inject any additional 
uncertainty about the consequences of violating laws in all cases.  If the sentencing law 
covering a given offense is not unjust, then there is no chance of positive mercy (unless 
the judge makes an error or abuses her power—but this is a possibility with or without 
positive mercy).  If the sentencing law is unjust, then the “mercy factor” does introduce a 
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 The worry here is potentially overstated.  A general practice of positive mercy may 
have little effect on diminishing predictability.  If judges abuse their power to show 
positive mercy, then predictability might diminish.  But if judges use their power to show 
positive mercy publically and in all and only the appropriate cases (i.e. by giving just 
treatment when unjust laws prescribe excessively harsh treatment), then predictability 
might only diminish marginally.  Insofar as members of the political community can spot 
an unjust law as well as a judge, they will be able to predict when positive mercy will be 
shown.  They might not be able to pinpoint what the just treatment will be in positive 
mercy cases, but they should have a general idea of the range of options.  They will be no 
less able to predict the sentence in a mercy case than in a usual case where a judge is 
given sentencing discretion. 
 79
degree of additional uncertainty about the consequences of violating the law.  The judge 
may or may not be merciful (as I discuss later, there is no way to force judges to be 
merciful) and the agent has to take this uncertainty into account.  Positive mercy 
marginally decreases the law’s ability to influence practical reason in these cases, but the 
decrease here is marginal and well-worth accepting. 
Suppose there were no positive mercy.  Then an agent considering a given crime 
would know full well that if the sentencing law covering her offense were unjust, she 
would receive an excessively harsh sentence.  There would be no added uncertainty about 
the sentence due to a “mercy factor.”  So law would be marginally more effective at 
guiding practical reason.  But there is no intrinsic value in this marginal improvement.  
One might argue that the marginal improvement has instrumental value.  The agent 
considering crime may be less likely to commit the crime because she has greater 
confidence that she will be harshly punished.  Without positive mercy, the law might be 
more effective at deterring crime.   
But this argument fails to fully appreciate that the sentencing law is unjust.  Even 
if it does deter crime, it does so in an unjust fashion.  An example helps explain this 
point.  Consider the three-strikes law in California.  Suppose a person has committed two 
offenses that count as “strikes.”  She knows that if she is found guilty of a single petty 
offense, she will get a twenty-five to life sentence.  This knowledge might deter her from 
committing a third crime, but it will also make her live the rest of her life in fear of 
committing some third offense (being in the wrong place at the wrong time, having a 
minor drug relapse, or being set-up in some way).  With this disproportional threat 
constantly hanging over her, she cannot put the past fully behind her or say she has fully 
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paid her debt to society.  The sentencing law may deter, but because the way in which it 
deters is unjust, the deterrence is not to be celebrated as a good (or even an innocent) 
achievement.  The fact that unjust sentencing laws are marginally better at influencing 
people’s practical reason in an unjust fashion is not a triumph for the rule of law.  It is 
almost always an embarrassment.166  Positive mercy helps the rule of law avoid this 
embarrassment. 
Transparency:  The rule of law has instrumental value in keeping the use of power 
transparent to the public.  When law rules, people know (or can know) that power will be 
kept within the constraints of law, for better or for worse.167  This transparency affords 
the law the predictability and clarity needed for it to play a role in people’s practical 
reason, but it also has two other instrumental values.  First, it helps prevent the elite from 
gaining an unfair advantage.  Second, it gives people the knowledge that is required for 
them to engage in just reform of the law.  I consider these values in turn.  I show that 
mercy does not obfuscate transparency in a way that unfairly favors the elite.  Also, 
mercy helps rather than hinders the people’s ability to engage in just reform.   
When the workings of power are secret, the elite tend to get an upper hand 
because they can often gain access to the secrets and use them to their advantage.  For 
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 There may be a handful of unjust sentencing laws that a) have a defect of justice that 
makes them determine substantively unjust outcomes in recognizable types of cases, but 
b) deter in a just fashion and c) would lose justifiable deterrent value if their defect were 
removed.  Positive mercy with respect to these laws might marginally diminish the ability 
of these particular laws to guide behavior.  The loss of value in such cases, however, is 
generally outweighed by the law’s increased ability to achieve another purpose:  the 
determination of substantively just outcomes.   
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 Lon Fuller, among others, endorses this value of rule of law.  See Postema, “Law’s 
Ethos.” 
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example, those close to the King know the “magic words” to find favor with the King (or, 
to use a more modern example, those close to legal officials know just how to bribe them 
in order to get legal favors).  But there is no secret way to find favor with a judge if she is 
bound to always apply the law and never derogate from it.  Allowing judges room to 
derogate from laws in general seems to allow room for “secret rules” on how to win the 
judge’s favor.  Allowing judges to derogate from laws to show positive mercy in 
particular, however, poses no such threat.  The judge can only grant positive mercy if the 
relevant sentencing law is unjust.  The elite may be able to hire better lawyers to argue 
that certain sentencing laws are unjust, but their doing so is not pernicious.  They are not 
“kissing the king’s ring” to win favors for themselves and not others.  Rather, they are 
providing an important public service.  If the elite’s lawyers decisively reveal that 
sentencing laws are unjust and this knowledge is public, then society as a whole is better 
off for knowing that a cancerous law is present in their system.  That knowledge, 
although it may initially be applied primarily to the elite, will also benefit the less 
fortunate if and when they are subject to the same laws.  Unlike secrets about how to win 
favor, public knowledge that a law is unjust is, at least in principle, transferable from the 
elite to the less fortunate.  Positive mercy does not threaten transparency in a way that 
necessarily gives the elite an upper hand.  
Transparency is not only valuable as an equalizer, but also as a necessary tool for 
just reform.  If people know what the laws are, they can take an active and critical stance 
on their laws.  They can engage in protest against unjust laws (or any laws for that 
matter) and make it difficult for the powerful to maintain unjust laws.  Even if people 
cannot exert enough influence to make changes in unjust laws, transparency at least 
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affords them the opportunity to engage in symbolic protest or opposition.  If judges 
derogate from the promulgated laws in a willy-nilly but significant fashion, then people 
will not know what the real rules in their community are.  They cannot take a stance 
against rules that they do not know exist.  If judges, for example, lie whenever they 
confront an unjust law in the system, then people will not be aware that the law needs to 
be changed.168 
Although the reform-value of maintaining transparency is jeopardized by general 
and widespread judicial derogation from law, it does not count against the particular kind 
of derogation that is involved in exercising positive mercy.  Positive mercy does not 
necessarily obfuscate the fact that there are unjust laws in the criminal justice system.  A 
judge can exercise positive mercy in a public fashion.  When a judge publically exercises 
positive mercy, she communicates the fact that the relevant sentencing law in the case 
before her is unjust.  Her act is open to the eye of the public; it signals rather than hides to 
the public the need for reform.  Of course there is no guarantee that judges will exercise 
mercy in a public fashion.  They might show mercy in a secretive, deceptive, or behind-
the-scenes fashion.  This potential problem, however, is not a reason for judges to 
withhold positive mercy.  Rather, it is a reason for judges to show positive mercy in a 
public rather than a secretive fashion.  Having a general practice of mercy in a criminal 
justice system can help encourage judges to make their exercises of mercy public.  
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 Dworkin suggests that judges may face the difficult normative decision to either lie or 
resign in cases where the law is unjust (Taking Rights Seriously, 327, 342).  With respect 
to unjust sentencing laws, there is a third and morally superior option here:  exercise 
positive mercy.   
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In addition, a general practice of positive mercy can play a role in reforming 
unjust laws from within the legal institution.  If a judge exercises positive mercy in a 
given case, then other judges facing similar cases can follow her lead.  Sometimes these 
exercises of positive mercy can add up to a legal precedent that might effectively change 
the law.  There is a great deal of value to building-in mechanisms for reform of the law 
from within the legal institution.169  Law’s rule, like almost any kind of rule that aims at 
stability and justice over time, is generally better if it has mechanisms for self-correction.  
A general practice of positive mercy within the criminal justice system provides the rule 
of law with such a mechanism.170 
Both the social equalizing effect and the opportunity for reform that are afforded 
by transparency in law’s rule are best served by the exercise of positive mercy.  I have 
also shown that these values are best served by the public exercise of positive mercy that 
is preferably embedded in a general practice of mercy.   
I have argued that the exercise of positive mercy helps rather than hinders the 
instantiation of the four rule of law values.  The best way for law to rule in the context of 
criminal justice systems is not by insisting that judges strictly adhere to Fuller’s eight 
principles.  Although rule of law values are generally best served by congruence between 
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 Hampton, “Democracy and the Rule of Law,” and Valcke, “Civil Disobedience and 
the Rule of Law.” 
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 A passage in Seneca echoes this point. He writes that a person trained to grant mercy 
says to herself, “I keep mercy always in readiness; such guard do I keep over myself as 
though I am going to render an account of the laws that I have called forth from the 
darkness of decay into daylight,” (“On Mercy,” in Dialogues and Essays, trans. Davie, 
188-189).  Mercy performs a critique of the laws (and other social rules), an “accounting” 
of them, which shines the light of justice upon them and openly reveals any decay in 
them.  A merciful judgment remedies the decay not only by giving a just verdict in an 
individual case, but also by “calling for[th]” improvement in the laws themselves.” 
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the law and judicial decisions, this is not so in the particular context of the criminal 
justice system.  In this context, rule of law values are best served by selective 
incongruence between the law and judicial decisions.  The values are best served when 
judges exercise positive mercy in derogation from law rather than withholding positive 
mercy in keeping with the law.  The best way to structure a criminal justice system for 
law’s rule is therefore to have judges practice positive mercy.  In this sense, positive 
mercy is a service to law’s rule, not a mutiny against it. 
A judge who withholds positive mercy on the purported grounds of serving the 
rule of law is committing an error in most cases.  The judge is not demonstrating healthy 
fidelity to the rule of law, but rather a faith in the fact that Fuller’s eighth principle is the 
way to maintain the rule of law.  I have argued that such faith is misguided in this 
context.  A judge who withholds positive mercy on such grounds may not be vicious, but 
in most cases she is mistaken about what her obligation to uphold the rule of law means 
and entails in the particular context of criminal justice.  Her mistake here can be labeled 
as improper formalism.  She may be accustomed to hearing, saying, and thinking that her 
obligation to uphold the rule of law means that she has “no choice” but to follow the law.  
This mantra may be useful in most contexts, but it may make her blind to the fact that her 
obligation to uphold the rule of law does give her a choice on whether to follow unjust 
sentencing laws.  In fact, her obligation to uphold the rule of law generally stands as a 
reason to choose in favor of derogating from the law to show positive mercy.   
Sometimes a judge who withholds positive mercy on purported rule of law 
grounds is not just engaging in misguided formalism, but a much worse failing. 
Throughout history, government officials have often abused the idea of “rule of law” as a 
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guise to “justify” cruelty and brutal injustice.  Consider a judge who knows that the rule 
of law, properly understood, stands in favor of mercy.  Suppose she nevertheless 
withholds positive mercy when she should exercise it.  She proclaims that she “must” 
apply the law and that the law gives her “no choice” but to sentence the offender to an 
excessive punishment.  She not only abuses the offender, but also abuses the idea of the 
rule of law.171  By doing willful violence to the offender and the rule of law, she is guilty 
of the cruel formalism that has often greased the wheel for injustice under the guise of 
legality.172  
The judge who stands willing to show positive mercy does not engage in either a 
misguided or a cruel formalism.  She has a healthy understanding of the contours of her 
role in governing people by law.  To use the words of David Lyons, she is not playing 
some esoteric game under “the naive assumption that ‘the proper function of a court is to 
apply an established rule of law to the dispute before it.’  [S]he would do more justice to 
the judicial role.”173  
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 Judith Shklar cynically argues that abuse like this has been so extensive that it has 
rendered the rule of law nothing more than “a bit of ruling class chatter…‘the Rule of 
Law’ has become meaningless thanks to ideological abuse and general overuse,” 
(“Political Theory and the Rule of Law,” 21).   
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 For insightful discussion of how the rule of law has been used and abused see 
Dyzenhaus, Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems. 
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 “Justification and Judicial Responsibility,” 198.  Lyons’ work in this paper paves the 
way for my own.  He argues that “if a decision cannot be justified on its merits, then there 
must be a morally adequate argument for following the rule, or else the decision cannot 
be justified at all,” (ibid.).  I have argued that with when occasions for positive mercy 
arise, the decision to give an offender excessive punishment cannot be justified on its 
merits nor is there a morally adequate argument for following the rule.   
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I have argued that judges have reason to exercise positive mercy—that is giving 
offenders just punishment when unjust laws (or other unjust social rules) call for (or even 
require) them to give harsher punishment.174  The argument, at least with respect to 
outlaw positive mercy, is not that judges have reason to do substantive justice in 
individual cases and that this reason sometimes outweighs the reason to do uphold the 
rule of law (or, in roughly similar terms, to do procedural or formal justice).175  I have 
argued that positive mercy stands in service to the rule of law, not against it.  A judge’s 
decision to exercise positive mercy is generally not a decision between upholding the rule 
of law and doing substantive justice in a given case.  The judge does not have to 
compromise one of these for the other.  Both serving the rule of law and delivering 
substantive justice stand in favor of the judicial exercise of positive mercy.  There may, 
as always, be special considerations that complicate individual cases, but as a matter of 
general guidance, judges have standing reason to show positive mercy in order to do 
justice under the rule of law. 
Perhaps, however, I have over-simplified the matter by using “exercise positive 
mercy” as a success term.  If a judge derogates from a just law and gives an offender an 
unjust punishment (be it too much or too little), she has not exercised positive mercy in 
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 My general definition of positive mercy has to do with harsh treatment in general, not 
necessarily punishment.  In the context of criminal justice, however, the relevant kind of 
harsh treatment is generally punishment. 
175
 Rawls suggests such an argument: “Sometimes we may be forced to allow certain 
breaches of the precepts of legality if we are to mitigate the loss of freedom from social 
evils that cannot be removed, and to aim for the least injustice that conditions allow,” 
(Theory of Justice, 243).  I have no objection to an argument of this structure in other 
contexts, but I think we can do better than this in the context of criminal justice with 
respect to unjustly harsh sentencing laws.   
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my sense.  If a political community incorporates a general practice of mercy that 
authorizes judges to exercise positive mercy, then this does not mean that judges will use 
that authorization appropriately.  They may use their power not to exercise positive 
mercy, but rather to decrease sentences in an unjust manner.  Is this a risk worth taking?  
Should political communities incorporate a general practice of mercy just because judges 
have reason to exercise positive mercy in certain cases?   
I do not answer this question; it is a question that is best answered by doing a 
more substantive policy analysis in the context of a particular political community.  I 
instead argue that political communities have a reason to adopt a general practice of 
positive mercy in the law-abiding fashion for all officials in the criminal justice system 
and a general practice of positive mercy in the outlaw fashion for (at least) judges in the 
criminal justice system.  The reason to adopt a general practice is that doing so helps 
encourage the judicial exercise of positive mercy that I have defended in this section.  A 
general practice particularly encourages judges to exercise positive mercy in a public 
fashion that I have shown to be especially valuable.  Upon further policy analysis, it may 
turn out that the reason in favor of adopting a practice of judicial positive mercy is 
outweighed by other considerations in a particular criminal justice system.  I hope to have 
shown, however, that we at least have reason to conduct this analysis.  Positive mercy 
deserves a place on the menu of options about “what is to be done” in response to 
injustice in criminal justice systems. 
Section IV:  An Objection  
A deeper objection suggests that positive mercy does not even deserve to be 
considered as an option in modern political communities (at least not liberal ones).  The 
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objection presses on the fact that the concept of positive mercy is parasitic on the idea 
that certain treatment of criminal offenders is substantively just and other treatment is 
not.  The idea of judges making extra-legal determinations of substantive justice often 
makes audiences in liberal, pluralistic communities legitimately concerned.  Substantive 
justice with respect to criminal justice from one comprehensive moral view can look 
quite different from substantive justice from another comprehensive moral view.  Instead 
of trying to decisively determine which substantive view is “right,” liberal political 
communities aim for procedural justice.  They have just procedures that allow the 
community to settle on certain answers about what qualifies as justice for the purpose of 
living together as a political community.  When a judge exercises positive mercy, she 
appears to step outside of this framework.  She self-righteously deems that a law which 
the democratic legislature has passed is unjust—not unjust in the way it was passed, but 
because it is substantively unjust. As Waldron puts it, even if a judge’s dissent from law 
“is conscientious and based on impeccable moral arguments…it is announcing in effect 
that it is better to revert to a situation in which each acts on their own judgment about 
justice.”176  Liberal political communities have by and large decided that we should avoid 
reverting to such a situation.   
The way to address this concern is not to take positive mercy off the table in 
liberal political communities.  I do not dispute the fact that members of these political 
communities disagree about a wide variety of questions surrounding substantive criminal 
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 The Dignity of Legislation, 59.  As Postema puts it, “Kant taught well the lesson that 
exercising power with the most sincere conviction…of right in the absence of public 
accountability is, from the perspective of one subjected to that exercise of power 
indistinguishable from being subjected to action on whim,” (“Law’s Ethos,” 1864). 
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justice.  I also agree that the passage of law through procedurally just channels is a very 
important way for members of a political community to settle those disagreements for the 
purpose of living together.  We should not forget, however, that despite wide 
disagreement on matters of substantive justice, a political community might still agree on 
a few matters of substantive injustice.  Even if they disagree about what the justifiable 
ends of criminal punishment are and how they are to be accomplished, they might still 
have an “overlapping consensus” on which punishments are unjust.  Consider a 
punishment in a given case that goes above and beyond what is required to achieve any 
and all of the justifiable ends of punishment that public reason recognizes.  Insofar as 
people modulate their judgments about punishment in accord with public reason, they 
will agree that the punishment is unjust.   
It would be naïve to hold, however, that the legislature could never pass laws that 
require such punishment (or that it would always remove existing laws that require such 
punishment).  If there is a law that requires such an unjust punishment and the judge 
exercises positive mercy, she is not turning her back on a shared view of justice in favor 
of her own personal conception of justice.  She is rather defending the shared view of 
injustice.177   
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 One might think that American jurisprudence surrounding the Eighth Amendment on 
cruel and unusual punishment works in such a manner.  I think this is an open question.  
The court often determines whether punishment is “cruel and unusual” on the basis of 
legal precedent and not on the basis of considerations of substantive justice (for example, 
in Lockyer v. Andrade the court’s decision was based on the thought that it had no choice 
but to follow the law, see Pater, “Struck out Looking”).  Sometimes they consider the 
public’s “evolving standard of decency,” but again it is not clear that this tracks public 
reason about criminal punishment or public fears about crime and the political rhetoric 
that leverages these fears.  I leave further investigation of this question for future work.   
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Although the objection does not necessarily preclude positive mercy, it does raise 
an important concern about it.  The right way to address this concern is to develop a 
public accountability scheme for the judicial exercise of positive mercy.  As discussed in 
Section I, the political community can set up a way to review the judicial exercise of 
mercy powers.  As I mentioned previously, such a scheme can sanction judges who try to 
pass off nepotism or racism as “positive mercy.”  But it can also play another role.  A 
review system can examine whether judicial use of mercy power is consistent with the 
shared conception of substantive justice in the political community.  The review system 
would encourage members of the political community to engage in meaningful dialogue 
about what they agree is substantively unjust treatment.  It could take the results of such 
dialogue and apply them as follows.  
Suppose the review finds that a judge showed mercy in a case where the law 
required a punishment could not be justified by any proper use of shared public reason.  
In this case, the judge’s decision to show mercy should easily pass review.  Other cases 
will be more difficult.  A law may require punishment that appears unjustly harsh but 
which might also be consistent with a shared view of justice in the political community.  
If a judge exercises positive mercy in these circumstances, then she takes a risk that “tests 
the water.”  Her decision may, upon review, be deemed inconsistent with the shared view 
of substantive justice in the political community.  If she made her decision 
conscientiously, however, she should not be sanctioned for her error.  Her decision should 
simply be overturned.  In a third kind of case, it may be reasonably clear that a 
punishment is consistent with the shared view of justice in the political community.  If a 
judge exercises positive mercy in these circumstances, then she takes a grave risk.  Her 
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decision should not only be overturned, but she could be sanctioned legitimately for her 
behavior.  Unless she can demonstrate that the shared view of justice is deeply 
pernicious, then the political community is probably right to sanction her for trying to 
substitute her own personal conception for the shared conception of justice in the law.   
By having such a review scheme, judges will think twice about their decisions to 
show positive mercy.  Are they inserting their own personal conception of substantive 
justice into the law or are they acting in service of the public conception of substantive 
justice?  As the practice and study of civil disobedience attest to, the fact that this kind of 
question is difficult is not a reason to stop thinking about it and acting on one’s best 
judgment of it.  There is considerable reason, however, to encourage and exercise caution 
in answering this kind of question.  Judges should exercise caution in using their power to 
show positive mercy and an accountability scheme that involves sanctions for reckless 
use of this power is one way to encourage such caution.178  The scheme should not stifle 
positive mercy, however, by assuming from the outset that all sentencing laws are 
consistent with the public conception of justice.  Instead, it should rely on judges to use 
their best judgment and then, when needed, there can be substantive public debate on 
whether their judgment was correct (or at least conscientious). 
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 Note the difference here between law-abiding mercy and outlaw mercy.  With respect 
to law-abiding mercy, I suggest that the primary worth of the accountability scheme will 
be to help encourage officials in using mercy power that might otherwise remain 
dormant.  With respect to outlaw mercy, I suggest that the primary worth of the 
accountability scheme will be to caution judges from abusing mercy power that might 
otherwise be used too liberally.  In both contexts, the idea of the accountability scheme is 
to try to achieve the right balance so that mercy powers are neither abused nor neglected, 
but used to exercise positive mercy. 
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There is no doubt that positive mercy in a political community ultimately requires 
its members to trust their judges (and those reviewing them) to make good judgments 
about substantive justice.  I hope to have shown, however, that this trust in a judge’s 
judgment is not to be confused with giving judges the reins over law.  I have argued that 
positive mercy does not jeopardize, but rather best serves law’s rule in a political 
community.   
Conclusion of Part I: 
Much contemporary discussion of mercy has focused on negative mercy:  
compassionately sparing an offender from harsh treatment that she deserves. Drawing on 
Seneca’s discussion of mercy, I have articulated a different concept of positive mercy:  
treating a person justly when social rules call for harsher treatment.  Negative mercy has 
conceptual features that raise doubts about its use in the criminal justice system.  Positive 
mercy lacks these problematic features and, as I have shown in this chapter, it has a great 
deal of potential in a criminal justice system.  Judges have reason to exercise positive 
mercy insofar as they have reason to seek justice under the rule of law.  Given what 
stands in favor of positive mercy, it deserves a place at the table in discussion of mercy in 
criminal justice; it would be myopic to give place to negative mercy but not positive 
mercy.  
My purpose in these two chapters is not solely to articulate two concepts of mercy 
and compare their merit in the criminal justice system.  Recall from my introduction that 
my overarching aim is to investigate what might be done in face of injustice in the 
criminal justice system.  If unjust rules are lurking in a criminal justice system, they 
should be changed.  If they are laws, they should be changed by passing new legislation.  
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If they are informal rules or institutional policies, they should be reformed using various 
means that might include legislation.  But these changes and reforms do not happen 
overnight and sometimes we have reason to think they will not be changed anytime in the 
near future.  In the meantime, officials have reason to show positive mercy rather than 
abide by and uphold these unjust rules.   
As a criminal justice system improves its rules, the occasions for officials to show 
positive mercy diminish. But our rules about punishment are far from perfectly just.  As 
long as our criminal justice systems harbor some unjust rules, we still have good reason 
to incorporate, or at least further investigate incorporating, positive mercy into these 
systems.  If I have succeeded in my defense of positive mercy, the reader may be curious.  
Are there unjust rules in her political community’s criminal justice system that officials 
have reason to respond to with positive mercy?   
In the next part of the dissertation, I turn to the task of identifying unjust rules that 
lurk within many modern criminal justice systems.  I do not comb through the rules of 
existing criminal justice systems and pick out the unjust ones.  Instead, I raise a red flag 
about a set of rules that are found in many modern criminal justice systems.  I am 
concerned about rules that regulate the political community’s expression of a certain kind 
of blame – what I call abrasive blame – toward criminal offenders.  After identifying 
abrasive blame and explaining why it is permissible for the political community to 
express it toward some criminal offenders, I argue that it is not permissible for the 
political community to express it toward at least two types of offenders:  battered and 
fragile offenders.  I raise a red flag about rules that call for officials in the criminal justice 
system to express abrasive blame toward battered and fragile offenders.  We have reason 
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to think such rules are unjust; they call for impermissible treatment toward a significant 
set of offenders.  If these rules are indeed unjust, they should be changed.  In the 
meantime, officials have reason to treat these offenders justly (however that may be) and 
withhold the harsh abrasive blame that the unjust rules call for.  That is, if the rules about 
abrasive blame are indeed unjust, officials have reason to exercise positive mercy toward 
a significant set of offenders. 
PART II. 
CHAPTER 3:  THE STING OF BLAME 
 
“Down, down to hell, and say I send thee thither.”  
~Shakespeare179 
 
“Like Judas of old, you lie and deceive…For threatening my baby, unborn and unnamed, 
you ain’t worth the blood that runs in your veins.”  
~Bob Dylan180 
 
* * * * * * * * * * 
 
“Anger should be circumvented… When Socrates once received a box on the ear, the 
story goes, he merely said it was a nuisance that men couldn’t tell when to wear a helmet 
when going for a walk.  What matters is not how an offence is delivered, but how it is 
endured.” 
~Seneca181 
 
* * * * * * * * * 
 
 Sometimes people express attitudes that are meant to sting a person because she 
did something (or many things) wrong.  I call such expressions abrasive blame.  It is 
difficult to explain the “sting” that abrasive blame is meant to inflict.  I invite the reader 
to survey her own moral experience of either stinging or being stung by abrasive blame.  
I provide the first two quotes above to help jog the reader’s memory.  I can say what the 
“sting” is not – it is not a verbal “slap on the wrist” intended only to improve the 
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wrongdoer’s future behavior or advance her moral education.  The sting of abrasive 
blame is much more personal than a teaching tool.182  The sting of abrasive blame is also 
not merely an attempt to “let off steam” or assert one’s rights.  A victim with healthy self-
respect can let off steam by taking a brisk walk and can assert her rights by saying, “You 
did something wrong, but I forgive you.”183  Abrasive blame may involve letting off 
steam, asserting rights, and morally educating, but it paradigmatically involves a distinct 
something else:  the sting.  In short, abrasive blame is not benign.184  Abrasive blame is 
undoubtedly part of the human experience. But is abrasive blame morally permissible?  It 
stands at odds with a general moral injunction against intentionally hurting people. 
I investigate abrasive blame and its permissibility in this chapter with the ultimate 
aim of investigating whether the institutional expression of abrasive blame toward 
offenders in the criminal justice system is morally permissible.  Abrasive blame toward 
offenders in the criminal justice system is often taken for granted in moral critiques of 
criminal justice.  It has not been recognized as a distinct way in which we treat criminals 
that stands in need of justification.  Abrasive blame may be off the critical radar because 
people have underappreciated its significance or because they assume it is obviously 
permissible.  Over the course of the next three chapters, I will argue that abrasive blame 
toward criminal offenders does stand in need of justification, that the justification is 
                                                        
182
 I take this point from Peter Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment.” 
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 I defend this claim elsewhere in “Forgiveness as an Alternative Response to 
Wrongdoing.” 
184
 Susan Wolf aptly identifies these negative reactive attitudes and calls them “angry 
blame,” (“Blame, Italian Style”).  I chose “abrasive blame” to emphasize that this set of 
reactive attitudes involves the intentional infliction of a sting, something that hurts.   
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fragile (at best), and that it is prima facie morally wrong for the political community to 
abrasively blame some offenders.  Although it may appear artificial in some ways to 
draw a distinction between abrasive blame and closely related behaviors (or aspects of 
our moral psychology), the proof here is in the pudding.  I contend that carving out 
abrasive blame as a category of its own has dividends in a moral critique of the way we 
treat one another, especially the way we treat criminal offenders who are often the targets 
of some of our most powerful and hurtful expressions of abrasive blame.  
In this chapter, I identify abrasive blame and I dispel the commonly held notion 
that a person’s commission of a wrong action is itself an adequate justification for people 
to abrasively blame her.  The judgment that a person committed a wrong action is a 
necessary and sufficient reason to motivate abrasive blame.  But neither the commission 
of a wrong nor the judgment of the commission is a sufficient reason to morally justify 
abrasive blame.  The fact that a person commits a wrong within the context of a 
relationship or community can, however, provide an adequate justification for people in 
that context to abrasively blame her under the appropriate conditions.  I do not argue that 
abrasive blame is usually morally wrong.  As a matter of sociological fact, I suspect most 
people are usually in personal relationships or communities in which abrasive blame is 
permissible. For now, however, I leave the sociology to the experts and put the 
conclusion of my argument in a qualified form:  abrasive blame is morally permissible 
only within the context of certain personal relationships and communities.  This 
conclusion paves the way for my work in Chapters 4 and 5 in which I argue that abrasive 
blame toward criminal offenders is only justified under certain conditions (that may or 
may not turn out to be met).   
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In Section I, I clarify what I mean by abrasive blame.  In Section II, I argue that 
abrasive blame is morally permissible only within the context of certain relationships or 
communities.  This argument calls for two supporting arguments as well as a careful 
explanation of what I mean by a personal relationship and community.  I give these 
arguments and explanation in Sections III-V. In Section VI, I raise and respond to an 
objection and contrast my view of blame in personal relationships to a closely related 
view developed by T.M. Scanlon.  
I engage in considerable analysis of the conditions under which abrasive blame is 
justified in personal relationships for its own interest in Section V, but also for another 
reason.  People may be hesitant to accept my claim that the commission of a wrong 
action is not sufficient to justify abrasive blame.  This hesitancy may be due to the 
intuition that it “just seems obviously right” for us to abrasively blame certain people in 
our lives for the sole reason that those people have done something wrong (for example, 
when a friend has lied, when a partner cheats, when a colleague insults or takes others’ 
work for granted, etc.).  My discussion of abrasive blame explains that this intuition is 
often right, but it cautions us from importing it to justify the expression of abrasive blame 
toward anyone.  
Section I:  Abrasive Blame 
Abrasive blame is the expression of an attitude (or attitudes) that is intended to 
sting a person because she did something wrong.  Examples of such attitudes include 
resentment, blame, righteous anger, and condemnation.  It is important to note, however, 
that these attitudes can sometimes be expressed without the intention to sting a person 
because she did something wrong.  Scanlon, for example, argues that you can blame 
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someone by withdrawing a measure of trust or goodwill without intending to hurt the 
person at all. 185  It seems to me that you can also blame someone by pointing out that 
their character is flawed in various respects without intending to hurt that person.  I call 
these kinds of blame “benign blame” and I think benign blame plays an important role for 
many in their lives.  I suspect that purported “benign blame” is sometimes abrasive blame 
in sheep’s clothing, but I trust that it is often sincere (i.e. it honestly involves no intention 
to sting the wrongdoer). The important point here is that blaming (or resenting) someone 
is not necessarily abrasively blaming someone.  Abrasively blaming someone necessarily 
involves the intention to sting a person because she did something wrong. 
Abrasive blame is distinct from pointing out that a person did something wrong or 
“calling her out.”  Pointing out that a person did something wrong generally involves 
intending that the person fully recognize and understand that she did something wrong.  
If a person comes to fully recognize and understand that she did something wrong, she 
will generally suffer pangs of conscience and guilt.  So pointing out that a person did 
something wrong often involves intending that the person suffer in the recognition of her 
wrong.  Abrasive blame is different; it involves an intention to sting a person above and 
beyond the pangs of conscience that come with recognition of a wrong.  Abrasive blame 
can (although it need not) continue even after a person realizes that she has done wrong 
and feels remorse for it.  This is because abrasive blame involves an intention to sting 
from the outside, not (just) to shine light on a truth that gnaws from the inside.  For 
example, suppose I confront a person and calmly tell her that she told a lie.  I intend that 
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 See Moral Dimensions:  Permissibility, Meaning, Blame.  Susan Wolf calls this kind 
of blame “wimpy blame,” (“Blame, Italian Style”).  
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she recognize her wrong action and thereby feel a pang of conscience, but I do not intend 
to make her feel any additional hurt.  If and when she acknowledges and understands her 
wrong action I will no longer bring it to her attention.  In this case, I do not abrasively 
blame her.  But suppose instead that I call her a “rotten two-faced liar who has got a 
different story for every pair of eyes.”  I hope the words will hurt her and I am prepared 
to use them regardless of whether she has recognized her wrong action.  In this case, I 
abrasively blame her.  I intend to sting her over and above any pangs of conscience she 
might feel in the privacy of her own heart. I make my remarks not because (or not only 
because) I want her to recognize a painful truth, but because I want to hurt her for having 
done something wrong. 
An example may help.  Consider the following dialogue taken from a scene in the 
movie Good Will Hunting.  Will is incredibly intelligent and has had no formal education 
after high school.  He and his friends go to a bar and have the misfortune of meeting a 
man named Clark who is a first-year graduate student at Harvard.  Clark insults one of 
Will’s friends and Will steps in to defend his friend by outsmarting Clark.  Clark tries to 
shut down Will’s defense by beginning to quote, without reference, a passage from a 
book on the American colonies prior to the revolution.  Will interrupts with the full quote 
and continues as follows: 
WILL:  You got that from Vickers.  Work in Essex County, page 98, right?  Yeah, 
I read that too.  Were you going to plagiarize the whole thing for us?  Do you 
have any thoughts of your own on this matter?  Or is that your thing, you come 
into a bar, you read some obscure passage, and then pretend, you pawn it off as 
your own, as your own idea just to impress some girl and embarrass my friend? 
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[Thus far we have statements that are arguably intended to make Clark recognize 
that he has done something wrong.  We do not yet have a clear case of abrasive 
blame.  The following remarks, however, are meant to do more than make Clark 
recognize that he has done something wrong.  They are meant to sting him for it.]  
You see, the sad thing about a guy like you is that in fifty years, you’re going to 
start doing some thinking on your own and you’re going to come up with the fact 
that there are two certainties in life.  One: don’t do that.  And two: you dropped 
150 grand on a f#$% education you could have gotten for a dollar fifty in late 
charges at the public library. 
CLARK:  Yeah, but I will have the degree, and you’ll be serving my kids fries at 
a drive thru on our way to a skiing trip.”  [This insult is meant to sting, but it is 
not abrasive blame because it is not meant to sting Will for having done 
something wrong.  Unless, of course, Clark judged that Will had done something 
morally wrong and uttered this insult to sting him for it.  But I highly doubt that 
this was the case.] 
WILL:  “That may be, but at least I won’t be unoriginal. But I mean, if you have a 
problem with that, I mean, we could just step outside – we could figure it out.” 
[This remark is not an expression of abrasive blame.  Instead, it is a threat to sting 
Clark with something other than an attitude (likely a sucker punch or a fist in the 
face).] 
 
A few more clarifications about abrasive blame are in order before analyzing 
whether abrasive blame is permissible.  Privately thinking nasty thoughts about a 
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wrongdoer does not count as abrasive blame.  This kind of thinking does not generally 
involve an intention to sting the wrongdoer.  Of course there is an exception.  If a person 
(let us call her “the passive-aggressive one”) intends for the wrongdoer to read her mind 
and be hurt by its mean and nasty contents, then her thinking nasty thoughts does count 
as abrasive blame.  Similarly, saying nasty things about a wrongdoer while talking to a 
confidante does not count as abrasive blame – unless the person (let us call her “the back 
stabber”) intends for the wrongdoer to hear and be hurt by her comments through the 
grapevine.  If Bob Dylan were privately singing “Masters of War” instead of recording it 
for a popular audience that included his target, then the lyrics quoted at the start of the 
paper would not be an example of abrasive blame.  The point is that abrasive blame is the 
expression of an attitude that is intended to sting the wrongdoer – without mindreading 
and grapevines (or other sneaky tactics) it has to involve actively communicating 
something to the wrongdoer.   
It is important to clarify the relationship between abrasive blame and criminal 
punishment.  I give a detailed analysis of this relationship in the next chapter, so I limit 
myself to brief remarks here.  Abrasive blame is not synonymous with punishment, nor is 
it necessarily a part of punishment.  Abrasive blame is, however, often a part of 
punishment.  In modern political communities, criminal punishment often involves the 
expression of attitudes that are intended to sting the offender above and beyond her own 
pangs of conscience because she did something wrong.  But criminal punishment in the 
modern world also characteristically involves deprivation of liberty.  Criminal 
punishment used to (and often still does) involve torture, death, and other harms that go 
well beyond the sting of blame. 
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Someone who expresses abrasive blame intends for the expression of her attitudes 
to hurt a person because that person did something wrong.  Although the abrasive blamer 
must intend to hurt the wrongdoer, she need not have a calculated or pre-meditated plan 
to hurt the wrongdoer.  Many instances of abrasive blame are not pre-meditated plans to 
hurt wrongdoers, but are relatively spontaneous or impulsive responses to wrong action. 
186
  It is tempting to see such spontaneous responses to wrong action in a benign light.  
People often respond to wrong action with anger that does not appear to be meant to 
burn, sting, or hurt anyone in particular.  In such cases, harm done to the wrongdoer 
appears to be an unintended consequence or side effect of the blamer’s general anger.  
Under this benign light, many impulsive acts of blame appear to have thorns that 
accidentally pierce, but do not intentionally sting.  Such acts of blame are not pleasant, 
but they are not abrasive. 
We should beware, however, of the temptation to shine too much benign light on 
the subject.  Sometimes blame pierces in a way that is accidental, sometimes blame has a 
pre-meditated sting, but many acts of blame lie somewhere in between these extremes.  
Abrasive blame is like many other human actions; it generally flows from general habits 
over which we have long-term control.187  Most people have a general practice, pattern, 
or habit of responding to wrongs in a relatively consistent fashion.  People are generally 
aware (or can easily become aware) of how abrasive they are in responding to wrongs.  
People are also capable of changing their practices and habits of blaming behavior.  If a 
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 I am drawing on a somewhat Aristotelian understanding of human behavior.  For 
criticism of this point, see Doris, Lack of Character.   
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person is aware that her habit of responding to wrong action hurts those whom she is 
responding to and if she chooses not to change that habit, then her stings of blame are not 
unintended consequences or side effects.  Her blame is abrasive blame that is meant to 
sting people, not spontaneous blame that just accidentally happens to pierce people.  
An example might help illustrate this point.  Suppose I have a strong, but not 
pathological cursing habit and suppose I have a child.  I know that cursing in front of the 
child is harmful for her development, but I do nothing to curb my habit.  If my friend 
were to hear me speak long strings of curses in front of my child, I am certain that she 
would express disapproval and criticize my behavior.  It would be ridiculous for me to 
protest her disapproval on grounds that I do not intend to sully my child’s vocabulary.  
Although creating a little potty mouth is not a cold-blooded, pre-meditated project of 
mine, it is also not an unintended consequence of my venting frustration with the world.  
It is intentional in the broad sense of being under my control.  It is the result of a habit 
that I know is bad for my child and that I have the power to change.  My friend would 
rightly criticize me for not changing my habit; it is a bad habit and I should get rid of it.   
Let us get back to abrasive blame.  I grant that blame is often a spontaneous or 
impulsive response to wrong action, rather than a calculated sting.  This does not mean, 
however, that spontaneous blame cannot inflict intentional harm.  Blame, like cursing, 
may be impulsive in a moment, but it is intentional in the broad sense of being under our 
control.  Keeping in mind a few exceptions, blame usually flows from a general habit that 
people can be made aware of and that people can change.  If this habit is a bad habit, if it 
results not just in hurting people but in impermissibly hurting people, then people should 
change this habit and suggest that others do likewise.  The prevalence and acceptance of 
 105
this habit in our society suggests that people generally do not see anything impermissible 
about expressing attitudes that hurt people because they have done something wrong.  
This point takes us back to the guiding question of this chapter; how can the sting of 
blame be morally justifiable in the light of a standing injunction against hurting people?  
Before addressing this question, I want to briefly contrast it to other questions that 
philosophers generally ask about blame.  Philosophical focus on blame has a tendency to 
center around freedom and responsibility.  What kind of freedom and/or responsibility do 
attitudes like blame and praise presuppose?  Do most people have the presupposed kind 
of freedom and/or responsibility?  Do children, addicts, and psychopaths?  These 
questions are interesting and engrossing, so much so that it is tempting to take other 
features and questions about blame for granted.  It is tempting to assume that – if a person 
freely and responsibly acts wrongly (and this may be a big “if”) – then it is permissible to 
blame her.  But we should question this assumption.  Blame is often intended to hurt 
people; abrasive blame is meant to sting.  This abrasive aspect of blame is at odds with a 
standing moral injunction against intentionally hurting people.  How (if at all) is the sting 
of blame permissible in light of this injunction?  This question, I argue, is worth asking.  
Like most questions worth asking, it is not easily answered.   
Section II:  Is Abrasive Blame Permissible?  
 One might think an easy answer (or simply dismissal of the question) is readily 
available.  Although there is an injunction against hurting people, it is a general, standing 
injunction that is not without exceptions.  The commission of a wrong action is simply 
another exception to the standing injunction against harm.  Although it is usually 
impermissible to hurt people, it is permissible to hurt them with the sting of blame when 
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and because they have done something wrong.  In committing a wrong action, a person 
makes herself liable to (at least one kind of) harm – namely, the sting of blame.  
I reject this purportedly easy answer.  I argue that the commission of a wrong 
action does not, by itself, make it permissible to abrasively blame the person who 
committed the action.  My argument does not entail that abrasive blame is usually 
impermissible.  I argue that the commission of a wrong coupled with the presence of a 
certain kind of personal relationship (or community) can make it permissible for one 
party of the relationship to blame another.  To ease exposition of the argument, I give the 
basic structure in what follows.  In the remaining sections and the next chapter, I defend 
the premises in this argument. 
The Basic Argument 
1. An act of abrasive blame cannot be justified tout court; it cannot be justified on 
the basis of reasons that one can expect people to accept insofar as they are 
reasonable.  I say why this is the case in Supporting Argument 1. The relative 
weights of reasons for and against abrasive blame are evenly balanced.  A 
reasonable person who conscientiously considers all relevant reasons can decide 
that abrasive blame is either justified or not.188 
2. If an act cannot be justified on grounds that one can expect people to accept 
insofar as they are reasonable, then all other things equal, the act is morally 
impermissible.  This claim is an assumption.  Scanlon and other moral 
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 I am assuming, following Nagel, that “there is substantial middle ground between 
what it is unreasonable to believe [or in my case, accept] and what it is unreasonable not 
to believe [or in my case, reject],” (Equality and Partiality, 161). 
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philosophers have defended it in spirit,189 if not in specific formulation.190  It is 
beyond the scope of my argument to further defend this assumption.   
3. So an act of abrasive blame, all other things equal, is morally impermissible. 
But other things are not equal. 
4. Acts of abrasive blame are often embedded within the context of personal 
relationships.  Parties of these relationships often jointly accept norms that license 
them to express a reasonable degree of abrasive blame to one another.  When this 
is the case, parties can expect each other to accept a justification of abrasive 
blame insofar as they are reasonable people and reasonable parties of the 
relationship (or community).  I say how this works in Supporting Argument 2.  
5. Acts of abrasive blame can also be justified within the context of larger 
communities.  I say how this works with respect to political communities in the 
next chapter, The Political Sting.   
6. Within certain personal relationships and communities, parties can permissibly 
engage in acts of abrasive blame toward one another. 
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 See Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other.  I depart from Scanlon because I do not 
agree that the following two statements are equivalent:  1) an act is wrong if any principle 
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prohibited by any principle that people could not reasonably reject.  I believe my 
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impermissibility in terms of reasonable rejection.  Instead, I begin my argument with an 
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190
 What We Owe to Each Other, 4. 
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Before providing the supporting arguments, I want to emphasize two features of 
the basic argument to avoid confusion.  First, philosophers often consider abrasive blame 
in the same bundle as praise, benign blame, and other reactive attitudes.  The 
permissibility of commendation and condemnation, laud and reproach, resentment and 
guilt are sometimes thought to stand or fall together.191  This is likely due to the fact that 
philosophers tend to focus on whether or not these attitudes presuppose a kind of freedom 
or responsibility that people may lack.  As previously mentioned, my focus is different; it 
is not on the freedom/responsibility that blame (or praise) may presuppose, but on the 
hurtfulness that blame can have.  My argument is silent on praise, benign blame, and any 
other response to action that does not involve the intentional infliction of a hurt.  These 
responses lack the sting of abrasive blame and it is disagreement about whether “the 
sting” is justified that gets my argument off the ground in the first premise.   
Second, my argument is about the moral permissibility of engaging in abrasive 
blame, not about a political right to engage in abrasive blame.  A just society should 
protect a right to freedom of expression.  It should not coerce people or punish them for 
abrasively blaming one another just like it should not punish or use force to prevent 
people from expressing insults, swear words, or offensive images.  A just society ought to 
defend a person in her claim to say things like, “you dirty rotten bastard!”  But of course, 
there is a difference between defending a person’s right to express something and arguing 
that it is morally permissible for a person to express a particular thing.  I defend a 
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compromised by psychological determinism. 
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person’s right to express abrasive blame, but I have argued that she should not exercise it 
unless it is in the context of a certain personal relationship or community.  
Section III:  Reasonable Disagreement on Abrasive Blame (Supporting Argument 1) 
In this section I argue that an act of abrasive blame cannot be justified on the basis 
of reasons that one can expect people to accept simply insofar as they are reasonable.  I 
show that a reasonable person who is conscientiously considering reasons for and against 
abrasive blame can decide that abrasive blame is either justified or not.  
I begin with what I have referred to as a standing moral injunction against acting 
on an intention to hurt a person.  This standing injunction is not a categorical prohibition 
against acting on intentions to hurt people.  Such a prohibition would be unreasonable; it 
would prohibit dentists from performing root canals (and routine cleanings for that 
matter) and would-be murder victims from fending off their attackers with pepper spray 
or stern kicks to strategic locations.  The standing injunction is rather to be interpreted in 
the following fashion:  there is (at least) presumptive moral reason to refrain from 
intentionally hurting a person.  Other reasons, such as preventing future pain or bringing 
about various moral goods, might defeat the presumptive reason to refrain from 
intentionally hurting a person.  Some conditions, such as consent from the individual who 
is to be hurt, might undermine the reason to refrain from intentionally hurting a person.  
Giving a full analysis of all the potential defeating reasons and undermining conditions is 
well beyond my scope.  My focus is on the act of abrasive blame – when a person 
engages in abrasive blame, she intentionally hurts a person.  My question is:  are there 
reasons to engage in abrasive blame that defeat or undermine the reason to refrain from 
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answers.  In what follows, I describe several reasonable answers (the list is not meant to 
the exhaustive). 
The Qualified Retributivist  
Although people have a general reason to refrain from intentionally hurting a 
person, they do not necessarily have a reason to refrain from expressing attitudes that are 
intended to inflict pain that a person deserves.  As long as a wrongdoer had an adequate 
opportunity to avoid doing wrong, she morally deserves to experience (at least) some 
pain.  She does not deserve to experience more pain than is proportional to her wrong 
action, but the pain of abrasive blame rarely exceeds this amount.  Just because a 
wrongdoer deserves to feel pain, however, does not mean that an individual is morally 
licensed to inflict this pain in any fashion.  For example, if a criminal were to deserve 
imprisonment, this fact would not license any individual to lock him up in their closet.  
An individual is licensed to inflict morally deserved pain on others only if she has the 
right kind of social authority or standing to inflict the deserved pain.  Individuals 
generally lack the requisite authority or standing to inflict deserved pain in the form of 
physical injuries, imprisonment, or monetary fines. 
Individuals do, however, generally have the requisite authority or standing to 
inflict deserved pain in the form of expressing hurtful attitudes.  Recall the dialogue from 
Good Will Hunting quoted above.  Intuitively, Will does not need any special standing to 
sting Clark with words and facial expressions.  Abrasive blame does not intend to inflict 
just any pain in any fashion; it intends to inflict deserved pain through the expression of 
hurtful attitudes.  The armor of morality need not shield our skin from every single prick.  
It need not shield us from pricks that we deserve and that come in the form of words and 
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facial expressions.  Although there is generally moral reason to refrain from hurting 
people, there is generally not prima facie moral reason to refrain from abrasive blame.   
This argument relies on the claim that wrongdoers morally deserve to feel at least 
some pain for their wrong actions as long as they had an adequate opportunity to avoid 
committing them (this is why I label a holder of the view a “qualified retributivist”).192  
Although it is reasonable to reject this claim, it also seems reasonable to accept it.  It is 
supported by a set of strong intuitions; I present two such intuitions.  Consider a world in 
which wrongdoers experience some pain that is less than or equal to the amount 
proportional to their wrong.  Compare it with a world in which wrongdoers receive no 
pain.  Most people have the intuition that the former world is no worse than (and may 
even be preferable to) the latter world.  Although there is less pain in the latter world, this 
fact does not seem make that world preferable from a moral point of view – presumably 
because the pain that is missing is pain that wrongdoers morally deserve.  Consider 
another case:  if two innocent people and one murderer are on a lifeboat that will sink 
unless one of them is thrown off, then intuitively the murderer is the person who should 
be thrown off.  Intuitively we take ourselves to have less reason to avoid inflicting pain 
on guilty parties compared to innocent parties – presumably because guilty parties 
deserve (at least some) pain.   
One might object to the use of these intuitions to support the qualified 
retributivist’s view.  Perhaps these intuitions are parasitic on a set of commonly felt 
retributive emotions that are, like racial prejudices, pathological in their very nature.  This 
objection has its roots in Nietzsche’s powerful critique of the retributive emotions.  He 
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argues that these emotions are rooted in ressentiment.  Those who feel ressentiment are 
weak and jealous of the strong.  They make up the idea that people deserve to feel pain in 
order to feel good about themselves when they inflict pain on the “deserving.”  A number 
of philosophers have adequately responded to this critique by arguing that retributive 
judgments are not inevitably motivated by ressentiment or other pathological emotions.  
For example, Michael Moore argues that retributive judgments can flow from the same 
non-pathological, emotional root as personal guilt.193  Jean Hampton has reasonably 
argued that retributive judgments are a way of standing up for morality.194  Although 
these philosophers do not have abrasive blame in mind, their arguments can be adapted to 
justify abrasive blame along qualified retributivist lines.   
The Hard Incompatibilist   
The hard incompatibilist (at least the kind I am describing for the purpose of my 
argument here) is a variant on the qualified retributivist.  The hard incompatibilist holds 
that it is permissible to abrasively blame a wrongdoer insofar as she deserves it but she 
deserves it only if she had an adequate opportunity to avoid doing wrong.195  Hard 
incompatibilists (among others) argue that all wrongdoers lack an adequate opportunity 
to avoid doing wrong.  Others argue that we have strong reason to doubt and cannot be 
reasonably sure that wrongdoers have adequate opportunities to avoid doing wrong.  The 
longevity and tenacity, but most importantly the quality, of the free will debate indicates 
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 Scanlon maintains that an adequate opportunity to avoid doing wrong may not be 
sufficient to justify abrasive blame (especially if the sting is particularly severe and 
prolonged), but it is at least necessary to justify abrasive blame (Moral Dimensions, 187). 
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that such positions are reasonable; they are internally consistent and responsive to 
objections (which is not to say that a reasonable person must accept these positions; after 
all it is a debate).  According to this position, desert could justify abrasive blame but we 
cannot actually appeal to claims of desert in the actual world.  According to this position, 
abrasive blame may still be justified according to some other argument, but not along the 
lines that the qualified retributivist presents. 
The Qualified “Pacifist” 
In contrast to the argument above, the following argument suggests that individual 
acts of abrasive blame are unjustified.  The term “pacifist” generally refers to a person 
categorically opposed to war, but I use the term here to refer to a person who takes there 
to be a very strong moral reason to refrain from increasing pain and suffering of people in 
the world.196  The pacifist maintains that abrasive blame increases the amount of pain and 
suffering people experience.  She maintains that there are no prima facie reasons in favor 
of abrasive blame that are strong enough to defeat the very strong reason to refrain from 
increasing pain. 
I cannot prove the pacifist’s claim that there are no reasons in favor of abrasive 
blame that can outweigh the strong reason to refrain from increasing pain.  I do, however, 
defend the pacifist in the following fashion.  I consider the reasons in favor of abrasive 
blame that are the best candidates for outweighing the reason to refrain from increasing 
pain.  I argue that the pacifist can reject these reasons. 
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First, one might think that the pain caused by abrasive blame is somehow 
different from other pains.  It is the kind of pain that can be a morally good kind of pain 
to bring about, or at least not a bad kind.  Someone might support this claim, as the 
retributivist supported her claim, by appealing to intuitions.  Compare a world in which 
wrongdoers receive the pain of abrasive blame that is proportionate to their wrongs to a 
world in which wrongdoers do not receive the pain of abrasive blame.  If one has the 
intuition that the former world is morally preferable, then one might think that the pain of 
abrasive blame is a good kind of pain to bring about.  Perhaps some people have such an 
intuition (and the pacifist need not judge them pathological!), but this is certainly not an 
intuition that one must have insofar as one is a reasonable person.  The pacifist can reject 
it and maintain that there is nothing morally special about the pain inflicted by abrasive 
blame; it is like other pains, and we should not act in ways that increase it.  
Second, one might object to the pacifist by arguing that engaging in abrasive 
blame promotes, defends, or instantiates a moral ideal or value that outweighs the strong 
reason against inflicting pain.  There are two potential values that engaging in abrasive 
blame may promote or instantiate.  First, perhaps engaging in abrasive blame may 
promote or instantiate the morally valuable self-respect of the victim of wrongdoing.  The 
pacifist can reasonably insist, however, that there are reasonable methods to restore and 
defend the self-respect of the victim that do not involve intentionally hurting another 
person.  Given the strong reason against inflicting pain, the victim ought to use the non-
abrasive methods of defending and restoring self-respect.  On a rare occasion, these non-
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abrasive methods may not be available, but that is certainly an exception, not the rule.197  
In almost all cases, a victim can stand up for herself without pushing someone else 
over.198  
Perhaps, however, abrasive blame helps defend, promote, or instantiate some 
moral value other than self-respect.  One might argue that abrasive blame instantiates a 
way of caring about morality itself in the face of immoral actions.199  But this argument is 
unconvincing.  Surely one can take morality seriously in the face of an immoral action by 
expressing that the act in question was wrong and by encouraging the wrongdoer not to 
repeat his mistake.  To refrain from abrasively blaming a wrongdoer is not to condone 
wrongdoing.  There are other non-abrasive ways to hold people accountable to moral 
standards.  The qualified pacifist need not make the strong move of denying that abrasive 
blame is a way of caring about morality.  She simply thinks there are alternative ways to 
care about morality that introduce less pain into the world.  Given her firm moral 
commitment against increasing pain, she holds that abrasive blame is not justified in light 
of the presence of these alternatives.  
The pacifist is not yet “in the clear” in her argument that abrasive blame is 
unjustified.  One can object to the pacifist’s argument on the following pragmatic 
grounds.  The qualified pacifist claims that abrasive blame hurts people in a way that 
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 Nietzsche’s discussion of the will to punish may explain why people are often inclined 
to think that restoring self-respect requires hurting wrongdoers (On the Genealogy of 
Morality).  I insist, however, that this thinking is misguided; a self-respect worth having 
is generally not contingent upon hurting others.   
198
 Contra Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy. 
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 Jay Wallace, “Dispassionate Opprobrium.” George Sher also defends a view along 
these lines, see In Praise of Blame. 
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increases pain in the world.  This claim may be false.  Although abrasive blame is 
intended (and often succeeds) to inflict pain upon the wrongdoer in the moment, it may 
decrease overall pain in the long run by deterring the wrongdoer and others from 
committing future wrong acts that cause pain.  Abrasive blame may also decrease the 
pain felt by the victim of the wrongdoing.  It may help the victim vent her anger, or 
provide an easier, less painful way to restore or maintain her self-respect.   
The pacifist can respond to the objection in a reasonable fashion.  She can grant 
that an act of abrasive blame does not increase pain (and may even decrease it) when it is 
compared to condoning wrong action.  But abrasive blame may very well increase pain 
when it is compared to other non-abrasive responses to wrongdoing – such as engaging in 
benign blame, providing criticism that is intended to educate rather than sting, granting 
forgiveness, and giving support and encouragement to do better.  Empirical evidence is 
inconclusive on this point, but a substantial amount of evidence suggests that forgiveness 
(which is devoid of abrasive blame) is generally more effective than resentment (which 
usually involves abrasive blame) at both deterring future offenses and helping victims 
heal and recover.  Given the absence of definitive evidence to the contrary, it is 
reasonable for the pacifist to maintain that abrasive blame increases pain compared to 
other methods of responding to wrongdoing.  Given that such methods are generally 
available, it is reasonable for the pacifist to conclude that abrasive blame is generally 
unjustified.   
The Tough-Love “Pacifist”   
The above argument has revealed that it is also reasonable for a person to 
maintain the opposite stance.  The empirical evidence is inconclusive on the relative 
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amount of pain that abrasive and non-abrasive responses to wrongdoing cause in the long 
run.  A person, let us call her the “tough-love pacifist,” can review the evidence and 
reasonably conclude that abrasive blame does not increase pain when compared to non-
abrasive methods of responding to wrong action.  The tough-love pacifist, like other 
pacifists, recognizes a very strong moral reason against increasing pain in the world.  She 
maintains, however, that abrasive blame does not increase pain in the world; it is (equally 
or) more effective than the relevant alternatives at minimizing pain in the world.  As long 
as the tough-love pacifist sees no other grounds on which abrasive blame may be wrong, 
she will take it as a justified response to wrongdoing (perhaps even a required response in 
order to minimize pain in the world).200   
Although a pacifist described above disagrees with this argument, I do not think 
she can prove that it is an unreasonable argument.  She can reasonably reject principles 
that permit abrasive blame, but she does not have sufficient grounds to preclude others 
from reasonably rejecting principles that prohibit abrasive blame.  
An Objection 
 I have presented four positions that are internally consistent and able to respond to 
objections, but I have not shown that each is reasonable according to an explicitly shared 
standard of reasonableness.  Rather than providing such a standard, I indentify the types 
                                                        
200
 My argument in “The Political Sting” is similar to this argument.  But there is an 
important difference.  The tough-love pacifist reasonably claims that engaging in abrasive 
blame minimizes pain compared to the alternatives.  She does not have sufficient 
evidence, however, to reasonably refute those who disagree.  Although she has some 
reason to hold that abrasive blame minimizes pain, she lacks conclusive reason to hold 
that abrasive blame minimizes pain.  In “The Political Sting,” I argue that there is 
conclusive reason to hold not that acts of abrasive blame minimize pain, but that 
maintaining social rules about abrasive blame in a political community minimizes pain.   
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of disagreement that separate the various positions from one another.  Then, drawing on 
the tradition of political liberalism, I argue that respect for persons requires us to respect 
these types of disagreement.  From where we stand, we cannot reasonably expect all 
persons conscientiously considering the relevant considerations to arrive at the same 
answer on whether (and how) the commission of a wrongdoing justifies abrasive blame 
in the absence of special relationships or communities.   
 I see three different nodes of disagreement in arguments about whether and how 
abrasive blame is justified and I will consider each node in turn (see Figure 1 for my 
characterization of the debate and its three nodes of disagreement).  The first node of 
disagreement flows from a difference in basic value commitments.  The difference can be 
identified in different answers to the following question: would committing a wrong in 
the presence of an adequate opportunity to avoid doing so make it the case that a person 
deserves to be stung with abrasive blame?  By “deserve to be stung” I mean the 
following:  a person deserves to be stung if the fact that she committed a wrong action 
makes it the case that the sting is not a morally bad pain for her to suffer.  When a person 
deserves to be stung, the moral presumption against inflicting pain in the form of the 
sting is undermined because such pain is morally innocuous (and may even be morally 
good).  The qualified retributivist and the hard incompatibilist think that the commission 
of wrong in the presence of an adequate opportunity to avoid doing wrong does make it 
the case that a person deserves to be stung.  The qualified pacifist and the tough-love 
pacifist hold that it does not.  The difference in their answers flows from a general 
difference in their comprehensive moral (and/or religious) views, particularly in their 
conception of value.  The retributivist and the hard incompatibilist see value in a 
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wrongdoer suffering above and beyond the pangs of conscience that come with a 
recognition of having done wrong.  The pacifists see no value in this suffering; like other 
kinds of suffering, it is an evil to be avoided.   
The difference between these views often (but not necessarily) gets played out in 
the various players’ views about hell as understood in the mainstream Judeo-Christian 
tradition.201  The pacifist rejects the possibility that a morally perfect being could send 
persons to hell.  Her rejection is rooted in a commitment to seeing all suffering beyond 
internal pangs of conscience as evil.  The qualified retributivist might remain open to the 
possibility of hell.  Although she would be concerned that an eternity of suffering is 
disproportionate to most offenses, she does not share the pacifist’s commitment to seeing 
any suffering beyond pangs of conscience as evil.  The qualified retributivist thinks 
wrongdoers deserve suffering above and beyond pangs of conscience; she takes such 
suffering to be innocuous or even valuable.  Although it may not be pretty (albeit poetic) 
for a being to send people to hell (at least for some period of time), it is also not wrong or 
evil. 
The pacifist and the qualified retributivist do not share a common ground from 
which one of their views is decidedly better.  Neither is making a mistake in drawing 
inferences from shared premises.  Instead, the split between the pacifist and the qualified 
retributivist flows from a deep difference in value.  This kind of difference should be 
respected, not forcibly erased.  If a qualified retributivist respects that the pacifist has the 
moral power to autonomously develop her own conception of the good and the pacifist 
has indeed conscientiously and autonomously come to her view, then the retributivist 
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 Galen Strawson makes a similar move in “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.” 
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must respect the pacifist’s view.  Compelling her to change it would involve compelling 
her to change her more comprehensive understanding of value in which her view is 
situated.  The tradition of liberalism – rooted in respecting the individual’s power to 
develop her own conception of the good – stands strongly against such compulsion.  
This argument, however, does not necessarily entail that there is reasonable 
disagreement about whether abrasive blame is justified by the commission of a wrong.  I 
have thus far only shown that there is reasonable disagreement on whether the suffering 
inflicted by abrasive blame is deserved when a person commits a wrong in the presence 
of available opportunities to avoid committing the wrong.  If all those who think people 
deserve a sting for acting wrongly in the presence of adequate opportunities to avoid 
doing wrong deny (or must deny) that people have such opportunities, then regardless of 
the value disagreement with the pacifist, there may be no disagreement about whether 
abrasive blame is justified in actual cases.  (Figure 1 helps illustrate this point.)  But the 
antecedent here is false. The hard incompatibilist’s arguments are not strong enough to 
show that a reasonable person must deny that people have adequate opportunities to 
avoid doing what they do (in our case, doing wrong actions).  It is rational and reasonable 
to maintain that such opportunities exist for human agents and that we are in a position to 
know whether such opportunities are available to an agent with respect to a given action. 
I do not deny that the existence and knowledge of these opportunities is subject to debate, 
but I do claim that such debates are genuine debates.  As the history and quality of the 
free will debate indicates, the hard incompatibilist lacks sufficient evidence to decisively 
shut down the arguments of what I have called the qualified retributivist.   
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If one takes the qualified retributivist’s view, then there is no moral presumption 
against abrasive blame.  All other things equal, abrasive blame is justified in response to 
a wrong.  But one can respectably depart from the retributivist’s value judgment about 
deserved suffering or her judgment that people have adequate opportunities to avoid 
committing the wrong actions they commit.  If so, then the presumption against abrasive 
blame remains.  Even if the presumption stands, however, abrasive blame may still be 
justified in response to a wrong.  When a person commits a wrong action, there may be 
general reasons to abrasively blame her that outweigh the presumption against abrasive 
blame.  For example, stinging the person with abrasive blame may help the person 
flourish in the long run.  One might think that being stung with abrasive blame is like 
having a root canal; it hurts but the presumption against the hurt is outweighed because it 
brings about long-term benefits.  Perhaps abrasive blame helps the offender engage in 
moral reform that improves her life in the long run.  In addition, abrasively blaming the 
offender may help deter her (or others) from committing future offenses.  If abrasive 
blame has such benefits, they might be worth the cost of inflicting the sting.  But again, 
this claim is subject to reasonable disagreement.  The disagreement at this node is both 
empirical and moral. Data is inconclusive on whether the sting of blame deters future 
offenses or helps improve offenders’ lives.  Moreover, interpretation of the data is 
complicated by the fact that we disagree on what counts as an improvement to a person’s 
life.  Most importantly, there is reasonable disagreement on whether future benefits (to 
the offender or others) can justify the infliction of present harm in the absence of consent 
or special relationships.  As it did in the first node, the disagreement here is situated in 
broader disagreement over comprehensive moral theories:  most utilitarians would agree 
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that present harm is justified for future benefits, but needless to say there are other 
reasonable moral theories that reject such a view.  Once again, there is disagreement here 
that we must respect rather than erase.  
In sum, there is disagreement that we should respect on whether abrasive blame is 
justified in response to wrong action.  Some maintain that it is justified because deserved, 
others reject that it is deserved.  Of those who think abrasive blame is not deserved, some 
think it is justified by countervailing benefits and others reject that benefits cannot 
overcome the presumption against infliction of undeserved harm.  Each of these positions 
is internally consistent and responsive to objections.  Moreover, the type of disagreement 
that holds among these positions is the type we should respect. 
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Figure 1:  Reasonable Disagreement on Abrasive Blame  
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At this point, I hope to have shown that reasons do not conclusively count for or 
against abrasive blame in a way that we can force a reasonable person to accept.  A 
reasonable person who conscientiously considers all the relevant reasons can decide that 
abrasive blame is morally permissible or not.  If she holds one of the positions described 
above, we must respect this fact and not demand that she change her position.  The fact 
that a person is reasonable is not a sufficient ground on which to expect that she accepts 
a justification of abrasive blame.  Following the basic argument sketched above, I 
conclude that abrasively blaming her would, other things equal, be impermissible.  
I offer an example to help illustrate this conclusion.  Suppose Bob does something 
wrong to Jane.  Jane considers stinging him with abrasive blame.  Perhaps if she were in 
Bob’s shoes, she would think abrasive blame is justified.  But she is not in Bob’s shoes; 
Bob is.  Bob could make a good case that abrasively blaming him is wrong (perhaps he 
holds the pacifist position I described above) and Jane could not discredit such an 
argument.  All she could do is maintain that she “respectfully disagrees.”  Abrasive blame 
should not follow from reasonable disagreement.  Abrasively blaming Bob would hurt 
him under the pretext of reasons that he cannot be required to accept.202  That would not 
be “respectful disagreement.”  It would be disagreement that turns out to hurt Bob and 
not Jane; an asymmetrically hurtful sort of “respect” indeed.   
In this example, Bob and Jane are very abstract characters.  As the case is 
described, all that they can reasonably expect from one another is that they are reasonable 
                                                        
202
 If Jane could make a case that refraining from abrasive blame would hurt her, then she 
might have a leg to stand on.  She might argue that abrasively blaming Bob is the only 
way for her to recover her self-respect after having been wronged by him.  As previously 
discussed, however, reasonable methods to restore self-respect that do not involve 
intentionally hurting another human being are usually available.   
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people.  When all other things are equal and when no other reasonable expectations are in 
place, then abrasive blame is impermissible between them.  But the world is much more 
complicated.  If Jane and Bob are best friends, for example, then they reasonably expect a 
great deal more from one another than bare reasonableness.  As I argue in the next 
section, they may have developed their own “ways of doing things” that they reasonably 
expect one another (but not other people) to accept.  Often these “ways of doing things” 
permit abrasive blame. 
Section IV: Abrasive blame in personal relationships (Supporting Argument 2) 
In this section, I argue that abrasive blame can be permissible within certain 
personal relationships – namely those that maintain a shared acceptance of a norm that 
licenses reasonable degrees of abrasive blame.  My aim here is to explain (in a bunking, 
not de-bunking fashion) the common intuition that it seems “obviously right” for us to 
abrasively blame those with whom we have a personal relationship for the sole reason 
that those people have done something wrong.  Although it often seems right to cite the 
bare commission of a wrong as a justification for abrasive blame in personal 
relationships, we should be aware that the justification is conditional upon those 
relationships.  Therefore we should not (at least not without a great deal of caution) 
import intuitions about abrasive blame in personal relationships into analysis of abrasive 
blame toward those with whom we have no personal relationship.  This sets up my 
analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 of the political community’s institutional expression of 
abrasive blame toward offenders (as I explain later, there is no personal relationship in 
this context).  
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What I call a personal relationship holds when persons203 have a shared204 
acceptance of norms governing their interactions that are somehow different from the set 
of norms a person is required to accept insofar as she is reasonable.205  To explain what 
this means, I need to say what I mean by “norms.”206  Norms are standards that are meant 
to guide behavior.  They provide a basis for assessing behavior as correct or incorrect.  
When people accept a norm, they take the norm to guide their action.  They judge that 
they ought to act in ways that the norm deems correct and refrain from acting in ways 
that the norm deems incorrect.  They accept responsibility for acting in accord with the 
norm and they assess one another’s actions on the basis of the norm.  There are some 
norms, like basic moral principles, that people are expected to accept insofar as they are 
reasonable.  For example, we are expected to accept a norm prohibiting murder insofar as 
we are reasonable.  There are other norms, however, that people can reasonably accept, 
but they can also reasonably reject.  For example, many norms of fashion can be 
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 An individual person may have a personal relationship with herself if she accepts 
norms other than the ones she is required to accept for governing her own behavior. 
204
 By shared acceptance, I mean that they do not independently accept the same norm as 
a matter of personal policy.  They have a sense that the norm is shared, that it is their 
policy on how to treat one another.  I sometimes use the terms “joint acceptance” or 
“jointly accept” to refer to a shared acceptance. I owe this point to Postema, “Custom in 
International Law.” 
205
 I am not arguing that a jointly accepted, differentiated set of norms is the constitutive 
feature of what we paradigmatically call a personal relationship.  A good answer to, 
“what makes up your relationship with your mother?” is not (at least not only) “we 
govern our interactions with slightly different norms than we are required to accept.” 
Rather, the presence of a differentiated system of norms picks out the class of what I call 
personal relationships for the purpose of the paper.  Carving out this class of personal 
relationships may not be particularly interesting in and of itself, but I think it helps us 
gain important insight into the permissibility of abrasive blame. 
206
 In this discussion, I draw on Postema, “Custom in International Law.”   
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reasonably accepted but also reasonably rejected.  When people accept norms for 
governing the interactions between or among them that they are not required by reason to 
accept, then they have what I call a personal relationship.  
Sometimes parties of a relationship jointly accept a norm that licenses reasonable 
degrees of abrasive blame.  Call such a norm an abrasive blame norm. Drawing on 
arguments in Section II, we know that people are not required by reason to accept such a 
norm.  We also know that people are not required by reason to reject such a norm – so 
long as the norm does not allow unreasonably high amounts of abrasive blame.207  If 
parties of the relationship together accept an abrasive blame norm, then they take some 
degree of abrasive blame to and from the other to be correct.  The norm they accept 
guides the expressions of abrasive blame between (or among) them.  One would 
legitimately tell the other that she is “out of line” when she has abrasively blamed in a 
way that the norm deems incorrect.  When one party abrasively blames the other in a way 
that stays “in line” with their abrasive blame norm, she legitimately expects the other to 
accept the blame as justified – not because she is reasonable but because she is 
reasonable and a participant in their relationship with its own shared norms. Abrasive 
blame between the parties is morally appropriate as long as it is done in accord with their 
shared norm and their shared norm is not unreasonable. 
There are two ways people might come to share acceptance of an abrasive blame 
norm in their personal relationships.  First, they might give one another explicit or 
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 Some people (perhaps members of Emperor Nero’s inner circle or members of inner 
city gangs today) might have a shared norm that licenses unreasonably high amounts of 
abrasive blame.  These norms are not, strictly speaking, abrasive blame norms in the way 
I have defined them.  Abrasive blame norms only license reasonable degrees of abrasive 
blame. 
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implicit consent in the form of a contract.  Although it is certainly possible to do this, it is 
highly unlikely that people accept an abrasive blame norm in this fashion.  Much more 
commonly, members of a relationship come to share an abrasive blame norm by 
undertaking a mutual commitment that emerges from and is sustained by practice over 
time.  By interacting with one another and assessing one another’s behavior over time, 
they develop and sustain a shared understanding of what is correct and incorrect within 
their relationship.  It is not a matter of picking up on a pattern of behavior in the 
relationship and simply repeating it (they are not training each other to be good dogs), but 
rather picking up on a shared understanding of what counts as the right way to treat one 
another.208  When this happens, parties of a relationship share an acceptance of an 
abrasive blame norm.  
If a person jointly accepts an abrasive blame norm in one of her relationships, this 
does not entail that anyone can justify abrasively blaming her according to that norm.  It 
is reasonable, advisable, and indeed likely, for a person to jointly accept an abrasive 
blame norm for governing her interactions with one person (such as her mother) and not 
accept any abrasive blame norm for governing her interactions with another person (such 
as the clerk at the grocery store).  Also, a person may jointly accept a very different 
abrasive blame norm to govern her interactions with one person (such as her employees) 
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 A great deal of subtle social and moral psychology would be needed to determine 
exactly how and when people have developed such shared understandings of what counts 
as the right way to treat one another.  This work is beyond the scope of my dissertation.  
My ultimate aim is not to pick out when abrasive blame is justified in personal 
relationships.  My focus is on abrasive blame that political communities express through 
their criminal justice systems.  As I explain in the next chapter, in diffuse, pluralistic 
political communities there is no such shared acceptance of abrasive blame norms.  
Insofar as abrasive blame is justified in this context, the justification proceeds in an 
entirely different fashion.  
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compared to another person (such as her best friend).  The abrasive blame norms in our 
relationships may differ in the severity of abrasive blame they allow for and in which 
wrongs legitimately trigger the expression of abrasive blame.  For example, the abrasive 
blame norms in my relationships are such that it is permissible for my close friends to 
abrasively blame me in ways that it is impermissible from my professional acquaintances 
to abrasively blame me.209  
The account I am offering here helps explain a common intuition that very similar 
expressions of abrasive blame in response to the same wrongdoing can be wrong coming 
from some people, but morally legitimate coming from others.  Consider the following 
hypothetical scenario.  Imagine that you lie to a close friend about something important.  
Your friend finds out and she confronts you about it, stinging you with blame by 
scowling and telling you that you are a total piece of scum.  Meanwhile, a stranger has 
also found out about your lie.  One day you see this person at a coffee shop and she 
scowls at you, saying that you are a piece of scum for having lied to your friend.  
Intuitively, at least to me, your friend’s response is legitimate, but the stranger’s response 
is wrong.  If the moral permissibility of blame were dependent only upon people being 
free and responsible agents, then it seems there should not be anything wrong with the 
stranger’s response.  I hope to have explained, however, that other conditions need to be 
satisfied in order for blame of the abrasive kind to be permissible. 
Section V: Contrast to Scanlon  
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 In Neil Young’s words, “There ain’t nothing like a friend who can tell you you’re just 
pissin’ in the wind,” (“Ambulance Blues”). 
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My account echoes the work of several recent philosophers who have 
convincingly argued that our practices of blame are deeply dependent on personal 
relationships.  Personal relationships obviously affect who and how much we should 
blame.  It is less obvious that our personal relationships determine the nature of blame 
and the norms that govern it.  T.M. Scanlon takes this far-reaching approach in his recent 
book, Moral Dimensions:  Meaning, Permissibility and Blame.  Although Scanlon’s 
account offers crucial insight, it does not pay sufficient attention to abrasive blame.  
According to Scanlon’s theory, an agent is blameworthy for an action if the action 
demonstrates that there is something faulty about her attitudes that impairs the 
relationships that she has and can have with others.  To judge that a person is 
blameworthy, however, is different from blaming her.  Scanlon argues that blame is 
neither an evaluation of character nor a sanction.  Instead, blame is making a judgment of 
blameworthiness and accordingly making an appropriate kind of change in a relationship.   
To blame an agent is to modify one’s relationship with her in a way that is made 
appropriate by her impairment of the relationship.  “To blame someone is to hold 
attitudes toward him that differ, in ways that reflect the impairment, from the attitudes 
required by the relationship one would otherwise have with the person.”210  One can 
appropriately modify one’s relationship with a blameworthy agent by trusting her less, 
denying (or wishing her less) goodwill, and withdrawing in other ways from her.  
Scanlon maintains, however, that intentionally inflicting distress or suffering upon a 
wrongdoer is not an appropriate modification of one’s relationship with her.  People may 
call this “blame,” but they should recognize that this response is very different from his 
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concept of blame; it is something meant to hurt the blameworthy agent as an individual, 
not a modification of the relationship that holds between you and the blameworthy agent.  
Scanlon argues that this kind of response is very difficult, if not impossible, to morally 
justify. 
  I agree with Scanlon’s distinction between intentional infliction of distress or 
suffering upon a wrongdoer and what he calls “modification of a relationship.”  And I 
agree that the former is very difficult to morally justify.  But I disagree with Scanlon’s 
decision to set aside this kind of response to wrongdoing as something distinct from 
blame properly construed.211  I think this response to wrongdoing is a very important 
species of blame; it is what I call abrasive blame.  It is very common in our human 
experience and it is almost always recognized as blame.  If an analysis of blame does not 
capture abrasive blame as blame, then I think that analysis has missed something 
important.  
Scanlon’s account succeeds in explaining and justifying one flavor of blame, but 
he fails to provide a full account of blame because he leaves out the “nasty” flavor that is 
undeniably a part of human life.  I recognize abrasive blame as blame and so I maintain, 
contra Scanlon, that at least some blame makes sense outside the context of relationships.  
We can define and understand abrasive blame without appealing to a personal 
relationship (or even a bare moral relationship).  But similar to Scanlon, I argue that 
blame is permissible only within personal relationships, and as I discuss in the next 
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 This is not the only problem with Scanlon’s account.  I think he is mistaken in arguing 
that when a person acts in a way that indicates a faulty attitude, she thereby “impairs” her 
personal relationships with others.  I think the person violates norms of her relationship, 
but I see no reason to think that such violations necessarily impair a relationship.  I 
suspect that this has to do with the difference in how I define a relationship. 
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chapter, certain communities.  In the next chapter, I discuss the permissibility of blame in 
a political community, but the argument could be adapted to apply to various other 
communities.   
Conclusion 
The moral terrain regarding abrasive blame is indeterminate.  In this 
indeterminate terrain, a person ought to bear on the side of not harming others with the 
sting of blame.  She does not have sufficiently strong reasons to undermine (or override) 
the standing moral injunction against harming others.  Abrasive blame is impermissible 
in this indeterminate terrain.  People are not, however, stuck wandering in this 
indeterminate terrain.  When they form relationships with one another, they tend to 
navigate and together carve their own determinate paths through this terrain.  Some 
relationships carve paths that allow for a good deal of abrasive blame, others carve paths 
that allow for a more limited amount of abrasive blame, and still others do not allow any 
abrasive blame.  Relationships are a condition (not the only condition) in which abrasive 
blame can be permissible. In the next chapter, I show that a community, particularly a 
political community, is also a condition in which abrasive blame can be permissible.  
CHAPTER 4:  THE POLITICAL STING OF BLAME 
 
“You can spit in my face once or twice and it is nothing.  You can take something away 
from me and I can learn to live without it.  But you cannot spit in my face every day for 
ten thousand days…and say it is nothing.” 
~Jack Henry Abbott212 
 
In the previous chapter I identified abrasive blame (the intentional expression of 
attitudes meant to hurt a person because she did something wrong) and discussed its 
moral permissibility in the absence of any special social conditions as well as in the 
context of a personal relationships.  In this chapter, I investigate its moral permissibility 
in the context of a political community.  In Section I of this chapter, I explain why an 
investigation of abrasive blame is relevant to normative analysis of modern criminal 
justice systems.  I argue that particularly powerful and hurtful stings of blame accompany 
criminal punishment in modern political communities, especially in America.  It is easy 
to take these stings for granted and focus on other morally disturbing aspects of modern 
criminal punishment.  We should not, however, overlook the sting of blame in criminal 
punishment; we should not “say it is nothing.”  Can we say it is morally permissible?  
In Section II, I argue that when a political community has decent social rules 
allowing for abrasive blame, it is prima facie morally permissible for the criminal justice 
system to abrasively blame many offenders.  I argue in the next chapter, however, that 
                                                        
212
 In the Belly of the Beast, 37.  Abbott committed suicide in prison in 2002 after over 30 
years of incarceration. 
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even in such a context, it is prima facie morally impermissible for the political 
community to blame some offenders (Abbott happens to be among them).  
My approach here bears structural similarities to the approach Rawls takes up 
with respect to distributive justice.213  Rawls claims that people do not morally deserve 
high salaries for productive work, and I claim in “The Sting of Blame” that people do not 
morally deserve abrasive blame for committing wrongs (at least not in a sense we can 
reasonably agree to and act upon).  Rawls argues that under just background institutions, 
workers can be legitimately entitled to salaries even though they are not morally 
deserving of them.  I argue in Section II of this chapter that when just social rules are in 
place, members of a political community214 are legitimately entitled to abrasively blame 
certain offenders.  We both insist that the moral license to give or take something that a 
person appears to deserve on the basis of her own individual history (be it a salary based 
on her work or abrasive blame based on her offense) is conditional upon the justice of a 
broader social practice.  When the underlying practice is unjust (or in order to prevent it 
from becoming so), hard-workers may not be entitled to all the money they appear to 
deserve; it is only fair to withhold some and give it to those who lack adequate economic 
                                                        
213 I mention Rawls’ strategy as a point of comparison to give the reader a rough idea of 
my strategy.  The comparison to Rawls might, however, prove to be more fruitful.  As 
critics have duly noted, Rawls maintains that people who commit crimes pre-
institutionally deserve punishment whereas people who perform good work do not pre-
institutionally deserve reward.  Some of these critics have tried to explain away the 
asymmetry while others suggest that it is a deep problem for Rawls.  A Rawlsian may be 
able to adopt the argument of this chapter as a way to address the asymmetry.  I do not 
pursue this line of argument here, but it may be a project for future research. See 
Scheffler, “Justice and Desert in Liberal Theory,” and Mills, “Scheffler on Rawls, 
Justice, and Desert.”  
214
 The members of a political community are, roughly, all the people who are citizens or 
residents of a nation. 
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opportunities.  Along similar lines, as I argue in Chapter 5, members of the political 
community may lack the moral license to give some offenders the abrasive blame they 
appear to deserve for their crimes; it is only fair to spare these offenders from the political 
community’s sting of blame.215 
Section I:  Abrasive Blame in Criminal Justice Systems 
 Before discussing its permissibility or lack thereof, I describe the use of abrasive 
blame in criminal justice systems and emphasize the importance of a normative analysis 
of it.  I focus on abrasive blame in the American criminal justice system, but I assume 
that the discussion can be applied to abrasive blame in other political communities’ 
criminal justice systems.216  The American criminal justice system, as an organ of the 
political community, abrasively blames the millions of criminal offenders that it 
incarcerates.217  Abrasive blame is not equivalent to incarceration; incarceration includes 
deprivation of liberty that goes beyond the expression of attitudes intended to hurt a 
person because she did something wrong.  But being abrasively blamed is almost always 
                                                        
215
 I have been careful to say that offenders may “appear” to deserve abrasive blame for 
their crimes.  As I argued in Section III of the previous chapter, there is reasonable 
disagreement about whether persons deserve abrasive blame in the relevant sense (i.e., in 
the sense that would justify abrasive blame).  On what I call the hard incompatibilist or 
the pacifist line, offenders do not deserve abrasive blame in the relevant sense.  On the 
qualified retributivist line, offenders do deserve abrasive blame for committing crimes.   
216
 In Harsh Justice, Whitman suggests this assumption is unfounded given the massive 
differences among criminal justice systems worldwide.  He argues that continental 
criminal justice systems (especially the German system) are considerably more mild and 
respectful toward offenders than the American system. 
217
 Sometimes offenders are abrasively blamed at the time of arrest, conviction, or parole 
board hearings, but prison is the most common arena for abrasive blame of offenders.  
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a part of being incarcerated in America.218  Officials in the criminal justice system, 
primarily correctional officers, interact with offenders in a way that constantly expresses 
attitudes meant to sting them because they have committed crimes (or other infractions in 
the prison).  The expression of these attitudes is meant to hurt, not physically, but 
certainly emotionally.  This emotional hurt is hard to characterize in words, but as I did in 
the previous chapter, I try to describe it by offering examples and encouraging the reader 
to imagine what she would feel like if she were constantly subject to the expression of the 
same venomous attitudes.   
Consider accounts from two prisoners.  The first describes the remarks guards and 
passersby made toward Wilbert Rideau while he sat in a prison cell awaiting trial for 
murder: “a parade of white men, some well dressed, some not, some cops, entered the 
hallway periodically to stand in front of the cell and stare at me…cursing and telling me 
how many different ways they wanted to kill me.”219  Jack Henry Abbott, author of the 
quote that opens this chapter, describes several experiences of the sting of blame in 
prison after being convicted of burglary.  For example, consider his description of 
walking to the prison shower:  “the guards form a loose gauntlet from your cell to the 
shower stall…They look at you as if you are not there…They register your facial 
expression to see if you are anything but meek, humble.  Anything else raises their 
hackles, and their mouths turn down at the corners and they ball up their hands into fists 
                                                        
218
 I do not make (or reject) the strong claim that abrasive blame is a necessary part of 
punishment.  I only claim that it happens to be a part of the American criminal justice 
system.  As a matter of sociological fact, abrasive blame is a well-established part of 
American criminal justice that I do not expect to disappear anytime soon. 
219
 In the Place of Justice, 26. 
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at their sides.  You are nude.”220  These accounts are not descriptions of a few officials 
engaging in rogue behavior.  The accounts describe common practice, “the norm,” in 
American prisons where orange day-glo jumpsuits and, increasingly zebra striped scrubs, 
are standard issue,221 where strip searches and body cavity searches are routine, cells 
more closely resemble cages than rooms, and where arrangements for meals,222 jobs,223 
and family visits224 are shot through with a dose of derision, contempt, and disdain.225  
Joe Arpaio, dubbed “the toughest sheriff in America” puts his prisoners in stripes, 
makes male prisoners wear pink underpants, has men, women, and juveniles work in 
chain gangs, and has broadcast live video footage of prisoners over the Internet.226  He 
keeps surplus prisoners in “Tent City” which reaches 110 degree heat under Arizona sun; 
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 In the Belly of the Beast, 39. 
221
 A North Carolina sheriff “noted that in 1994 he won the election by 227 votes. Then 
he clad his inmates in stripes. At his next election, he won by 5,000 votes, though he 
spent only $15,000 to his opponent's $100,000. ‘The public loves them,’ he said of 
stripes,” (Vinciguerra, “The Clothes that make the Inmate”).  Some criminologists have 
voiced concern about the use of stripes on prison uniforms.  As Charles Friel commented, 
“Should uniforms be the wrong size or an unusual color for the sake of putting your foot 
on somebody’s neck? No, I think that’s being a bully,” (ibid.). 
222
 At some prisons, inmates are given less than twelve minutes to eat and some sheriffs 
pride themselves on moldy fifteen-cent meals (Hassine, Life Without Parole).   
223
 Many jobs are meaningless work for penny wages.  After having been phased out, 
chain gangs are increasingly popular in American prisons.  Compare this to the German 
system where offenders are allowed to have jobs outside the prison and receive normal 
benefits – like job protection, insurance, and four weeks paid vacation.   
224
 Unlike many European prisons, many American prisons only allow inmates to talk to 
visitors through a glass pane.   
225
 See Whitman, Harsh Justice. 
226
 “Con or Pawn?,” Ottawa Citizen. 
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he is infamous for telling prisoners who complained about conditions there, “it’s 120 
degrees in Iraq and our soldiers are living in tents too…and they have not committed any 
crimes, so shut your damned mouths!”227  The general public applauds Arpaio; they 
enthusiastically elected him for five consecutive terms and have dubbed him a folk 
hero.228  The general public accepts, as Nietzsche put it over a century ago, that “being 
punished has something to do with being treated with derision.”229 
It is important to mark a distinction between abrasive blame and degradation.  
Some activities in American prisons do something worse than express derision, they 
degrade offenders and attempt to strip them of their dignity.230  For example, making a 
person use a toilet under the eye of an official of the opposite sex (or over the Internet) 
does not just express an attitude meant to hurt him because he committed some crime, but 
it also degrades him.  Some of the policies I described above are arguably degrading; they 
mark the offender as a person of lesser dignity (I have in mind body cavity searches 
without reasonable suspicion as well as broadcasting footage of offenders’ use of the 
toilet).  In what follows, I do not mean to defend such degrading practices or the attitudes 
of degradation that they express.  Other philosophers have done well to argue that 
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 “Porridge That’s Hard to Stomach,” Birmingham Evening Mail. 
228
 Some Americans have spoken out about Joe Arpaio’s policies.  Complaints and some 
successful lawsuits have been filed for discrimination, violations of sanitary codes, and 
physical violence toward criminals.  Few complaints are voiced, however, over the 
generally abrasive atmosphere in his prison.  One lawyer did describe it, however, as a 
“culture of cruelty.”   
229
 As quoted in Whitman, Harsh Justice, 31. 
230
 Whitman argues that the purpose of most practices of punishment in America is to 
degrade offenders – to stamp them as people with lower status. 
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punishments that degrade criminal offenders are unjust and impermissible.231  I certainly 
do not stand in any disagreement with them on this point.  If abrasive blame toward an 
offender is degrading, then it is impermissible.  But I assume that a great deal of non-
degrading abrasive blame goes on in the American criminal justice system.  Officials in 
the system (and the public) express attitudes through their words and deeds that are not  
(at least not definitively) characterized as degrading, but are nevertheless meant to hurt 
offenders because they did something wrong.  The serious psychological blows that this 
abrasive blame delivers may be equally or more difficult to justify than degrading 
gestures toward offenders.  I want to call attention to this non-degrading abrasive blame 
(henceforth “abrasive blame”) and investigate whether it is morally permissible or not.   
 An objector may deny that officials in the American criminal justice system 
engage in abrasive blame toward offenders (or if they do, it is rogue behavior that is not 
formally or informally licensed by their office).  The objector argues that what appears to 
be abrasive blame is either degrading (and so it is impermissible on grounds given above) 
or it is a closely related but different phenomenon that serves some justified end of the 
criminal justice system.  Depending on what theory (or theories) of punishment the 
objector maintains, she might make her argument in any (or all) of the following three 
ways.  (The response to each is roughly the same.) 
First, she might argue that officials ought to act in certain ways in order to send 
offenders a message that their crimes were wrong.232  Acting in these ways may look like 
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 See Murphy and Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy; Hill, “Treating Criminals as Ends 
in Themselves;” von Hirsch, Principled Sentencing. 
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abrasive blame, but it is not.  To abrasively blame is to express attitudes that are meant to 
sting above and beyond what is needed to make a person recognize that she did 
something wrong.  Officials do not intentionally go above and beyond in this way.   
Second, she might argue that officials ought to act in certain ways to vindicate the 
political community’s scheme of rights; to stand up for the victim’s rights which the 
offender violated.233  Abrasive blame, however, is the expression of attitudes that are 
meant to hurt above and beyond the amount needed to vindicate rights.  Again, officials 
do not intentionally go above and beyond in this way.   
Third, the objector might argue that officials of the criminal justice system do not 
intentionally express any attitudes whatsoever through the practices I have described.  
Officials are simply trying to maintain a reasonable degree of security within prisons 
where offenders must be kept to provide a reasonable degree of security within society at 
large.234  Doing so requires acting in ways that may appear to express attitudes of 
abrasive blame, but once again, it is a mere appearance (or perhaps an unintended side 
effect).  For example, wardens issue striped uniforms to make sure prisoners can be 
caught if they escape, not to sting them with blame.  
 The objector is trying to shine benign light on abrasive blame in the criminal 
justice system, to explain it away as part and parcel of justifiable ends of punishment. 
Even if one agrees235 with the objector that officials of the criminal justice system should 
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 See Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy; Morris, “Persons and Punishment,” Ripstein, 
Equality, Responsibility, and the Law. 
234
 Deterrence theorists may be inclined to put the objection in these terms.   
235
 The reader is free to press the objector on these points, but doing so is beyond my 
present scope. 
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make offenders understand they did something wrong, vindicate rights, and prevent 
offenders from threatening security, the objection is nevertheless unsuccessful.  The 
objector is missing (or is blind to) facts about existing systems of criminal justice, at least 
the American system.  Officials in the American criminal justice system express much 
more derision than is required to accomplish what the objector takes to be justifiable ends 
of criminal justice.236  The criminal justice system is replete with the expression of 
venomous attitudes that are superfluous to the achievement of these ends.237  For 
example, even if stripes are necessary for security (and I highly doubt this is the case), 
pink underpants underneath the stripes are certainly not necessary for security.   
The presence and extent of the sting of blame in the criminal justice system may 
not be readily apparent to most Americans; abrasive blame, especially with respect to 
criminals, is “the norm” and we are sometimes prone to assume that what is normal is 
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 They are certainly not alone.  As Bentham observed centuries ago in England, 
“Legislators and men in general are naturally inclined [to err on the side of giving too 
much punishment]: antipathy, or a want of compassion for individuals who are 
represented as dangerous and vile, pushes them onward to an undue severity,” (“The 
Principles of Penal Law,” Part I, Ch. 6, p. 401). 
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 It is worth contrasting my position more carefully to those of philosophers who argue 
that condemnation is a necessary feature of punishment (see Feinberg, Duff, von Hirsch, 
Hampton, Morris, and Kadish.  Also see Sher, but he argues that “blame” rather than 
condemnation is necessary for punishment.) For the most part, these philosophers define 
condemnation such that it is not a species of what I am calling abrasive blame (for 
example, Hampton generally characterizes condemnation as the expression of attitudes 
that are necessary to assert that the offender’s act was wrong and/or to vindicate the 
system of legal rights).  Put another way, I am defining abrasive blame in such a way that 
it is not what these philosophers call condemnation.  I am not necessarily in disagreement 
with any of these philosophers.  I am only disagreeing with someone who claims that all 
the non-degrading, but nevertheless hurtful attitudes directed at offenders in criminal 
justice systems count as what the above philosophers call condemnation.  I think some of 
these attitudes are not what these philosophers call condemnation, but rather what I call 
abrasive blame.   
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required.  A comparison to a different criminal justice system is helpful to shake us out of 
this assumption.  The German criminal justice system meets justifiable ends of criminal 
justice as well as the American system, but it does so without very much abrasive blame.  
The conditions of incarceration in Germany are required by law to meet “the principle of 
normalcy:”  life in prison should mimic life in the outside world as closely as possible. 
Contrast this approach to Joe Arpaio’s unabashed aim to “run a very bad jail.”238  
Whereas American correctional officers call prisoners by number or last name, German 
officers (who are trained extensively as civil servants) address inmates respectfully as 
“Sie” (the polite and formal term for “you”) or “Herr So-and-So.”  Moreover, laws 
protect inmates from being insulted by both guards and one another.  Invectives cannot 
be hurled back and forth through bars as they so often are in American prisons.  Bars on 
doors have been eliminated in German prisons and cell doors remain unlocked during the 
day.  Prisoners have meaningful jobs supervised by employers rather than guards (and are 
even given four weeks of paid vacation!).  In France, prison uniforms have been 
eliminated.  German prisoners earn the privilege of wearing normal clothes if they have 
shown that they do not pose an escape risk.239   
For a few years, German law required prison officials to knock upon entering a 
prisoner’s cell (the law no longer requires a knock, it is left to the guard’s discretion).  
The rationale was that “managers were to work to create suitable forms of polite 
interaction between guards and inmates…Entering a place of confinement without first 
                                                        
238 Whitman, Harsh Justice, 62. 
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 See Whitman, Harsh Justice for a full description of German prison conditions 
compared to American prison conditions. 
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knocking means imposing limits on prisoners which are not necessary as an indispensible 
consequence of the deprivation of liberty.”240  The German system works to keep prison 
life as similar as possible to normal life; all aberrations must be justified on grounds that 
they are indispensible in fulfilling justified aims of punishment.  Note the stark contrast 
to the American criminal justice system.  The presumption here is to keep prison life 
harsh; any practice that counts as part of “prison management” is acceptable as long as it 
does not violate the court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment against cruel and 
unusual punishment.241  This means that punishment cannot offend the American 
population’s “evolving standards of decency.”  Whipping and other methods of physical 
violence toward inmates currently offend the American population’s standards of 
decency, but the emotional sting of abrasive blame does not.  Derision does not peel off 
skin or dignity, so it is fair game – at least in America and in its criminal justice 
system.242  
Abrasive blame by officials in the American criminal justice system is continuous 
with the harsh sentiments that the American public tends to have toward crime.243  As 
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 Ibid., 90. 
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 In contrast to European courts, the U.S. Supreme Court “has taken a distinctly hands-
off attitude toward overcrowding, observing simply that ‘restrictive and even harsh’ 
conditions ‘are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against 
society,” (Whitman, Harsh Justice, 61). 
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 As Judge Reinhardt put it in a case challenging the practice of hanging, Americans 
seem to have forgotten that “cruelty does not necessarily involve [physical] pain,” 
(Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662 (1994)). 
243
 I call these “harsh sentiments” instead of abrasive blame because in many cases, 
people who give words to these sentiments do not expect their remarks to fall upon the 
ears of criminal offenders and sting them (although perhaps I am being too charitable to 
the public here).  
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sociologist David Garland calls to our attention, the “openly avowed expression of 
vengeful sentiment” toward crime and criminals is commonplace in the American public 
square.  In France and other more bureaucratized cultures, such avowed expressions are 
unacceptable.  Calling a law “three strikes and you’re out,” argues Whitman, would be 
unheard of in French or German cultures where such “explicit attempts to express public 
anger and resentment are…taboo…rather than a recurring theme of the rhetoric that 
accompanies penal legislation decision-making.”244 
The American court of public opinion does not save its abrasive blame for 
criminals.  Editorial sections of newspapers are frequently ripe with invectives that are 
intended to sting dishonest leaders, greedy bankers,245 and lazy leeches.  Or consider Bob 
Dylan’s abrasive blame toward warmongers:  “for threatening my baby, unborn and 
unnamed, you ain’t worth the blood that runs in your veins.”246  Despite the 
pervasiveness of this kind of abrasive blame and the normative questions it raises, it is 
not my primary focus here.  I limit my discussion to the especially powerful and 
consequential form abrasive blame takes when political communities collectively and 
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 One angry editorialist seems to be calling for more systematic abrasive blame toward 
Wall Street:   
What will it take before someone on Wall Street is symbolically punished? Not 
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 Dylan, “Masters of War.” 
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institutionally express it in their systems of criminal justice.  It is important to recognize, 
however, that abrasive blame among members of the political community is not a 
phenomenon isolated within and tailored for use as part of criminal punishment.  
Abrasive blame is a widespread social phenomenon among members of a political 
community and it rears its head in an especially focused and powerful way in criminal 
justice systems.  Now the question is:  is such abrasive blame morally permissible?  Is the 
American criminal justice system, in contrast to most of the German criminal justice 
system, wrong to engage in abrasive blame toward criminal offenders; or is it just 
different, dare I say “tougher”?   
Section II:  The Permissibility of the Political Sting 
To investigate the permissibility of abrasive blame in a political community (and 
particularly in its criminal justice system), let us recall the argument presented in the 
previous chapter.  If an act cannot be justified on grounds that one can expect people to 
accept insofar as they are reasonable, then all other things equal, the act is morally 
impermissible.  I argued that absent special social conditions, the respective weight of 
reasons for and against abrasive blame is very well balanced.  Given this fact, abrasive 
blame cannot be justified on grounds that one can expect people to accept simply insofar 
as they are reasonable.  In the context of a personal relationship, however, things might 
be different.  When parties of a personal relationship have jointly accepted an abrasive 
blame norm that allows abrasive blame, they can expect each other to accept a 
justification of abrasive blame insofar as they are reasonable people and reasonable 
parties of the relationship.  Under such conditions, it is permissible for the parties to 
abrasively blame one another in accord with their jointly accepted norm.   
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Modern political communities are generally different from personal relationships 
in a respect that renders the above line of argument inapplicable.  Although modern 
political communities have developed norms about when, how, and to what degree 
abrasive blame is appropriate, it is doubtful (at best) that all members jointly accept these 
norms.  Most modern political communities are too heterogeneous and diffuse for us to 
expect that all individual members share and affirm these norms as guides to the way that 
they should treat one another.  Individual members of the community may all be able to 
report what the norms are, but it is unlikely that they will all be mutually committed to 
the community’s rules as picking out the right way of guiding behavior.  For example, 
there are some qualified pacifists in the American political community who do not accept 
American social rules that deem abrasive blame appropriate.  I suspect there are also 
some members of the German political community who object to the seemingly strict 
restrictions that German social rules place on abrasive blame in response to crime.  
Borrowing a phrase from Rawls, the “fact of reasonable pluralism” reigns with respect to 
abrasive blame in political communities.  If abrasive blame is to be justified in a modern 
political community, the justification must proceed without relying on a fact of shared 
acceptance of rules in the community.   
In what follows, I argue that abrasive blame can be justified in a modern political 
community in a different fashion.  First, I maintain that political communities have 
developed social rules about when, how, and to what extent abrasive blame is 
appropriate.  Then I argue that individual members have presumptive reason to follow 
those rules whether they accept them or not.  When the rules deem abrasive blame 
appropriate, the presumptive reason to follow the rules generally
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of abrasive blame.  In these cases, members of the community can expect each other to 
accept a justification of abrasive blame insofar as they are reasonable members of the 
community.247  In the context of the political community then, abrasive blame in accord 
with the community’s social rules is often – but, as I explain in the next chapter, not 
always – permissible. 
The Rules 
My argument begins by pointing to the fact that most political communities have 
community-wide social rules about when, how, and to what degree abrasive blame is 
allowed among the members.  First, I need to briefly explain what community-wide social 
rules are.248  The rules are practiced standards for correct and incorrect behavior (in my 
case expressions of abrasive blame) within the political community.  Although they are 
not necessarily written down or officially promulgated, members of the community 
generally know what they are.  In order to be social rules, it must be the case that 
members of the relevant community generally follow the rules.  They need not be entirely 
compliant with the rules, but they must be generally compliant and usually criticize those 
who deviate from the rules.  People need not (although they might) accept the rules in the 
sense of having undertaken a commitment to follow them; they may begrudgingly follow 
them to avoid criticism from others.  For this reason, I am using the term “social rule” 
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 The commission of a wrong action is the “first-order” reason why a person engages in 
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here rather than “norm” (which I used in discussion of personal relationships).  “Norm” 
tends to connote that those over whom it applies have accepted or committed to it, 
whereas “rule” (or social more) tends not to have this connotation.   
In order for people to have a community-wide social rules, they must not just 
follow the rules as a matter of what they take to be independent, personal policy.  Instead, 
they must recognize that the same rules govern the other members of the political 
community.  They must recognize, for better or worse, that following the rules is “how 
we do things around here.”  Examples of community-wide social rules include the basic 
standards of etiquette, some standards of fashion, the rules of the road and even the rules 
of games as simple as tic-tac-toe.  Smaller communities like athletic teams or orchestras 
have social rules governing how practice or rehearsal is to be run. 
Many communities (ranging from sports associations to political communities) 
have community-wide social rules about when, how, and to what degree abrasive blame 
is appropriate.  I henceforth refer to such a set of rules as a community’s abrasive blame 
rules or (CAB).  The contours of CABs differ from community to community (consider 
the difference between a neighborhood full of New Jersey housewives and an academic 
department in Oxford), but most249 CABs allow for some controlled expression of 
abrasive blame in response to wrong action.250   
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 In most communities, rules that prohibited any and all abrasive blame would be 
unstable, unpracticed, and would devolve into a condition without any abrasive blame 
rules.  However, such rules may work in communities where members are socialized in a 
way that minimizes the disposition to abrasively blame.  Quaker communities, Gandhi’s 
Ashram, and monasteries are arguably examples of groups that have rules against all 
abrasive blame.  These groups seem to be exceptional in their categorical stance against 
abrasive blame (and indeed they all involve socialization that is distinct from mainstream 
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Most political communities have a CAB that consists of a large number of rules 
about when, how, and to what degree abrasive blame is appropriate.  Many of these rules 
deem it appropriate for individual members to abrasively blame one another for various 
wrongs.  For example, the American political community’s CAB deems Bob Dylan’s 
abrasive blame toward warmongers correct.  It does not, however, deem it appropriate for 
a stranger in the community to abrasively blame me for telling a lie to friend.  My focus 
here, however, is on a very particular subset of rules in the political community’s CAB. 
The CAB in most political communities has rules according to which it is 
appropriate (sometimes even required) for the criminal justice system, as an organ of the 
whole political community, to abrasively blame criminal offenders.  The description of 
the American criminal justice system in the previous section supports this claim.  Most 
officials in the American criminal justice system do not abrasively blame offenders willy-
nilly; they abrasively blame offenders according to social rules which call for certain 
forms of abrasive blame in certain types of situations, but preclude abrasive blame in 
other forms and types of situations.  These rules are generally informal norms, but 
sometimes they take the shape of formal policy in penal institutions and they can even be 
ensconced in law.  According to these practiced standards, it is correct for correction 
officers to lock a criminal offender behind bars with disdain, to put him in stripes and 
strip search him regularly, to command where and when he can walk, sit, or spit.  It is 
                                                                                                                                                                     
culture).  Most communities have shared practiced rules that allow for controlled abrasive 
blame when certain conditions are met. 
250
 CABs also seem to allow for controlled expression of abrasive blame in response to 
actions that reveal bad character traits.  My focus, however, is on abrasive blame in 
response to wrong action. 
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incorrect for private citizens to do these things and it is incorrect for wardens to express 
derisive attitudes toward offenders using racist or sexist comments, physical violence, or 
starvation diets.  Members of the American political community, officials and non-
officials, recognize that these are the rules guiding how criminal offenders are to be 
abrasively blamed around here.   
I assume that most other modern political communities similarly have a CAB that 
includes rules regarding when, how, and to what degree abrasive blame can be expressed 
toward criminal offenders.  It is important to note, however, that the CABs in other 
communities may allow less (or more) abrasive blame than the American CAB in 
different types of situations.  Just as the norms that parties of personal relationships 
jointly accept differ greatly from one relationship to another, so too do CABs differ from 
one political community to another.   
Why Follow the Rules? 
According to the CAB of most political communities, the commission of certain 
wrongs makes it appropriate for members of the community to abrasively blame the 
wrongdoer.  And the commission of a crime makes it appropriate for a political 
community’s criminal justice system to abrasively blame the offender.  But the fact that 
there are rules according to which abrasive blame is appropriate does not entail that one 
has a morally legitimate reason to follow these rules.  Communities in the American 
South had rules according to which slavery was appropriate, but that did not entail that 
Southerners had a morally legitimate reason to follow those rules.  If I am to show that 
abrasive blame is morally permissible in political communities (and particularly in 
criminal justice systems), I need to show not just that political communities have rules 
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about abrasive blame, but that people have moral reason to follow those rules.  What 
gives the CAB its reason-giving or normative force (insofar as it has any) in the political 
community? 
In a full theory about the justifiability of abrasive blame, I would also discuss the 
justification (or lack thereof) of abrasive blame in communities other than the political 
community.  Sometimes abrasive blame can be justified in communities through the kind 
of argument I gave in the previous chapter (perhaps the community is a many-membered 
personal relationship in which all parties share acceptance of an abrasive blame norm).  
In other contexts, members of the community may not have a shared acceptance of a 
blame norm, but they might have a CAB that has reason-giving force.  For example, this 
might be the case in an academic department.  What the reason-giving force of the CAB 
is (if it has any at all) will highly depend on the type of the community.  In what follows, 
I focus on why the CAB of the political community has reason-giving force.251   
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 One might object that in order to investigate the permissibility of abrasive blame in 
the criminal justice system, we should look at the CABs in the smaller “communities” of 
individual prisons in America (and elsewhere).  I reject this move because the criminal 
justice system, including its prisons, is an organ for the political community’s expression 
of abrasive blame.  The derision that offenders receive from correctional officers within 
prisons is allowed, often encouraged (as discussed above, Sheriff Arpaio is a “folk hero” 
who is consistently re-elected by the public), and authorized by the political community. 
The norms that govern this expression are part of the political community’s CAB about 
when, where, who, and how people can engage in abrasive blame.  If wardens violate 
these norms, they might be criticized by other guards or prisoners, but what is important 
for my purpose is that they are criticized by the political community as violating our 
standards of decency about blame (consider, for example, the public reaction to Abu 
Ghraib). As Whitman illustrates, harsh treatment (including abrasive blame) in American 
prisons is continuous with, not an aberration from, American culture (including its 
abrasive blame norms).  It is within the political community’s power to stop or 
significantly curb back expressions of abrasive blame on a wide scale (as Germany has 
done), but this is very unlikely to happen without change in the political community’s 
CAB.  Moreover, the enterprise of justifying abrasive blame from within specific prison 
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In what follows, I argue that members of the political community have good 
presumptive reason to follow their CAB as long as their CAB is not unjust.  The 
argument has four basic steps.  First, there is good reason for a political community to 
have social rules about how, when, and to what degree abrasive blame is appropriately 
expressed.  People naturally engage in abrasive blame; that is, they are psychologically 
predisposed toward abrasively blaming those whom they judge to have done wrong.  
Moreover, in human groups (especially large ones) abrasive blame tends to cycle 
upwards in severity if left unchecked – derision tends to breed more intense derision 
which tends to breed hostility.  If political communities had no CAB, then people’s 
natural disposition to abrasively blame would lead to dangerous instability.  Political 
communities would be vulnerable to a spiral of costly vendettas; too much time would be 
spent blaming rather than engaging in other, more fruitful, pursuits.  Without any CAB, 
people’s chance of living together peacefully in their political communities would 
significantly decrease.  It would be more likely that life would be “nasty, brutish, and 
short” in human political communities.  CABs help prevent this volatile state of affairs by 
allowing for controlled expressions of abrasive blame that are less likely to snowball; 
CABs provide an important social check on people’s blaming behavior.252  Whether 
CABs historically developed as a response to this need is an anthropological question 
                                                                                                                                                                     
“communities” is likely futile.  Given that the “community” consists of guards and 
prisoners kept in cells, I suspect that any CAB that is specific to this group but not to the 
political community at large would have very little reason-giving force (certainly not 
enough reason-giving force to justify the guards in abrasively blaming the prisoners).  
Since I do not, however, discuss how abrasive blame is justified in smaller communities, 
I can do nothing more than register my suspicion here. 
252
 My argument here loosely echoes that of John Stuart Mill and Adam Smith.  Both 
argued for the need to civilize resentment with some kind of social rules.   
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beyond the scope of this paper.  My claim here is simply that the presence of some CAB 
in a political community – regardless of how it arose – significantly increases the chance 
that life in the community will be stable and peaceful.  I assume that we have good reason 
to seek and maintain peace in our political communities, so we have good reason to have 
some CAB that increases our chance at realizing such peace. 
This claim stands in need of qualification. The pursuit of stability does not count 
as a reason in favor of having any social rules about abrasive blame in the political 
community.  It does not count in favor of having unjust rules about abrasive blame.  
Remaining consistent with Part I of the dissertation, I call a rule unjust if it is 
incompatible with a full theory of political justice.  Although the exact relationship 
between justice and the pursuit of stability is contested,253 it is clear enough that we do 
not have morally legitimate reason to pursue stability at the price of supporting injustice.  
(A grossly unjust fascist dictator might increase a community’s chance for stability but 
that is not a morally legitimate reason to have such a dictator!)  A political community 
has moral reason to have rules about abrasive blame, but only insofar as those rules are 
not unjust (that is, insofar as they are decent). 
One might wonder what standard of justice is at work here.  As I argued in 
Chapter 3, there is reasonable disagreement from the point of view of comprehensive 
moral theories on whether abrasive blame is morally permissible.  A social rule is unjust 
not because it is ruled out by a comprehensive moral theory, but because it is ruled out by 
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 Is the maintenance of stability a proper aim of justice (as Rawls suggests at times) or 
is it an aim that is at odds with justice?  Rousseau, unlike Rawls, holds that it is 
impossible for a fully just institution to remain stable.  Investigating this debate is beyond 
my present scope. 
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a theory of political justice.  The shared political value of treating persons as free and 
equal persons puts constraints of political justice on rules of abrasive blame.  For 
example, the rules about abrasive blame should not be racially biased and they should 
respect individuals as free and equal persons.  In most political communities, it is likely 
that there will also be constraints on abrasive blame that arise from an overlapping 
consensus of comprehensive moral views in the political community.  Despite significant 
disagreement about abrasive blame among the four positions I described in Chapter 3, 
there is still some shared ground that can be appealed to in arguments from public reason.  
For one thing, all of these views stand against extremely harsh expressions of abrasive 
blame in most cases.  Both of the reasonable positions in favor of abrasive blame, the 
qualified retributivist and the tough-love pacifist, recognize upper bounds or at least some 
constraints on the amount of abrasive blame that is permissible (the qualified retributivist 
recognizes a proportionality constraint and the tough-love pacifist recognizes an 
efficiency constraint).  
A CAB is a set of many practiced rules about abrasive blame and it may include 
rules that are unjust and others that are decent (i.e. not unjust).  In the next three steps of 
the argument, I show that members of the political community have presumptive reason 
to follow the decent rules in their CAB (and lack a morally legitimate reason to follow 
the unjust rules of their CAB).  To simplify the writing of the argument, I will speak 
generally rather than strictly.  I use the term DCAB (“set of decent community abrasive 
blame rules”) to refer to a CAB that consists of rules that are, for the most part, not 
unjust.  And I will argue that members of a political community have presumptive reason 
to follow a DCAB.  
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With this first step and its qualification behind us, let us turn to the second step of 
the argument.  Due to the fact that there is reasonable disagreement on when abrasive 
blame is reasonable, there are a wide variety of DCABs that a political community might 
have.  Although there is a diversity of options, a political community actually practices 
one DCAB, its own.  A political community’s own DCAB is the set of norms that its 
members actually share and practice about how, when, and to what degree abrasive 
blame is appropriately expressed in the community.  Members may reasonably maintain 
that their political community’s DCAB is suboptimal – it is not the one that they would 
have in place given their own personal and reasonable convictions about abrasive blame.  
Insofar as they are reasonable, however, they must all recognize that their political 
community’s DCAB has the distinct advantage of existing as a practiced rule of the 
community.  Regardless of whether they agree that a community’s actual DCAB is ideal, 
they must recognize that it fills a morally important niche.  As explained above, a DCAB 
helps the community seek the worthwhile aim of peace and stability.   
Third, the fact that a DCAB fills a morally important niche in a community gives 
members a good reason to sustain the DCAB.  Recall that the social rules that make up 
the DCAB require general compliance in order to persist.  If members were not to 
generally comply with these social rules, then the rules would cease to persist and the 
community members would have failed to sustain their DCAB (a result they have reason 
to avoid).  So members have reason to generally comply with their DCAB.  More 
specifically, they have presumptive reason to follow their DCAB:  a reason that generally 
and non-decisively counts in favor of following their DCAB.  The reason does not count 
in favor of following the DCAB in every instance; it only counts in favor of following the 
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DCAB frequently enough to sustain general compliance.  Also, the reason to generally 
comply with the DCAB is non-decisive; it can be outweighed by other strong 
considerations in particular cases.   
 The pieces are now in place to tie the argument together.  Most modern political 
communities have decent social rules that deem it appropriate for members to abrasively 
blame one another for certain wrongs and for the criminal justice system to abrasively 
blame offenders for crimes.  The rules (the DCAB) are worth maintaining because they 
are a reasonable source of stability for the community.  As such, there is a presumptive 
reason for members to follow these rules.254  Barring special countervailing reasons in 
particular cases, members of the political community can reasonably expect one another 
to accept a justification for abrasive blame that is in accord with the DCAB.  
Accordingly, abrasive blame in accord with the DCAB is prima facie morally 
permissible.   
Members of most modern political communities are not like members of a 
personal relationship who together carve their own paths through morally indeterminate 
terrain, but this does not mean they have no path through this terrain.  They are like 
members of a herd that has developed a relatively clear migration course over time.  
Individual members often have reason to stay the course – to follow the rules that have 
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 We should be careful to note that although the presumptive reason to follow the 
DCAB is crucial to the justification of abrasive blame in the political community, it is 
usually not the reason why members abrasively blame one another.  Members blame a 
person because she has done something wrong (or committed a crime).  My argument 
here explains why wrongdoing (or crime) usually counts as a morally legitimate reason 
for expressing abrasive blame within the political community. 
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been developed.  But sometimes, as I discuss in the next chapter, they should turn away, 
hoping (but not necessarily expecting) the herd to follow and strike a better course. 
CHAPTER 5:  SUBSTANTIAL WOUNDS AND THE BANDAGE OF MERCY 
 
“Until you put these things right, you’re not entitled to boast of the justice meted out to 
thieves…You allow people to be brought up in the worst possible way, and 
systematically corrupted from their earliest years.  Finally, when they grow up and 
commit the crimes that they were obviously destined to commit, ever since they were 
children, you start punishing them.  In other words, you create thieves, and then punish 
them for stealing!” 
~Sir Thomas More255 
 
 
 In the previous chapter, I showed that some political communities abrasively 
blame criminal offenders through the organ of the criminal justice system.  I explained 
how such abrasive blame might be prima facie morally permissible.  Insofar as decent 
community-wide social rules deem it appropriate for the criminal justice system to 
abrasively blame offenders, it has presumptive reason to do so.  If this presumptive 
reason is not undermined or outweighed, it is permissible for the criminal justice system 
to abrasively blame criminal offenders in accord with the rules.  Although my own 
convictions about abrasive blame make me refrain from applauding “America’s toughest 
sheriff” Joe Arpaio, I have argued that his abrasive blame toward criminal offenders 
might be permissible.  It depends, of course, on whether his policies are in accord with 
American social rules (which they seem to be given widespread popular support), 
whether they are decent (at least some seem to be compatible with a theory of political 
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 Utopia, 27. 
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justice), and whether the presumptive reason to follow the rules is washed out by any 
stronger considerations in play.   
My task in this chapter is not to articulate all the social rules governing abrasive 
blame of criminal offenders and determine whether they are reasonably defensible.  Nor 
is it my task to determine whether the presumptive reason to follow the rules is 
outweighed or undermined by other considerations in individual cases.  I cannot 
determine the all-things-considered permissibility of abrasive blame in criminal justice.  
To do this, I would need to do substantial policy research on existing systems of criminal 
justice.  Instead, I am highlighting a general deficiency in social rules that govern 
abrasive blame toward criminal offenders in several political communities.  In several of 
these communities (e.g. America), the rules deem it appropriate for the criminal justice 
system to abrasively blame what I call battered and fragile offenders just like other 
offenders.  In Section I and II, I argue that it is unfair for the political community to 
abrasively blame battered and fragile offenders.  I argue in Section III that criminal 
justice officials have strong reason not to abrasively blame these offenders and to change 
social rules that would license such blame.  In general, abrasively blaming battered and 
fragile offenders usually does not sting them permissibly; it unfairly strikes at them and 
inflicts substantial wounds.  
Section I:  Battered Offenders 
 In the next two sections, I describe two types of offenders:  battered offenders and 
fragile offenders.  I assume that some political communities have social rules according 
to which it is appropriate for the criminal justice system to abrasively blame these 
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offenders for committing crimes.  I argue that it is unfair, however, for the political 
community to abrasively blame these offenders. 
I begin by defining a battered offender as a person who 1) has been denied rights, 
2) has culpably violated criminal law, and 3) would likely not have committed the 
criminal offense had her rights been satisfied.  She is a person for whom the denial of 
rights played a causally significant role in her culpable commission of crime.  
Identifying persons as battered offenders crucially depends upon identifying the 
rights that people have.  I will assume that people have the following rights (the list is not 
exhaustive):  rights to basic liberties,256 to fair equality of opportunity, to physical 
security, and to economic security required for a decent quality of life.257  In most 
political communities, there are at least some people who are denied these rights.  Of 
these people, most abide by criminal laws or at least do not culpably violate them.  Some 
culpably violate criminal laws in ways that are not significantly connected to their denial 
of rights.  Others, however, culpably violate criminal laws in ways that are causally 
linked to their denial of rights.  I assume that these people exist and I call them battered 
offenders. 
As I define the battered offender, she is culpable for violating criminal law; she is 
fully responsible for violating the law and none of the usual excusing or justifying 
conditions apply to her.  The battered offender is importantly distinct from a person 
whose rights are denied in a way that leads her to excusably or justifiably act in a way 
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 More specifically, people have a right to “a fully adequate scheme of equal basic 
liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all,” (Rawls, 
Justice as Fairness, 42). 
257
 It is beyond the scope of my project to defend this list of rights.   
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that is not in accord with criminal law.258  For example, consider a person who is acutely 
denied the right to physical security.  He is severely abused in such a way that he loses 
the ability to control himself from assaulting those who remind him of his abuser.  This 
person meets a man who reminds him of his abuser and he is unable to restrain himself 
from assaulting the man.  This person is not a battered offender; he should be excused on 
grounds of diminished responsibility.  To take another example, consider a person who is 
acutely denied her right to economic security.  She is on the brink of dying of starvation 
and decides to steal food (or the necessary means to acquire it). This person is not a 
battered offender; she is a person whose act was justified on grounds of extreme 
necessity.259    
Unlike these individuals, a battered offender is fully culpable for a violation of 
criminal law.  In practice it is very difficult to determine whether an offender is a battered 
offender.  One must not only confirm that she has been denied rights, but also confirm a) 
that the denial has been causally significant to her commission of the crime and b) that 
she is nevertheless responsible and for an unjustifiable offense.  Although the task of 
identifying battered offenders is difficult, the criminal justice system can be expected to 
perform this task.  In other arenas, it is already charged with the task of identifying what 
factors count as causally significant to human action as well as determining agents’ 
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 On one reasonable interpretation of the quote from Thomas More that opens this 
chapter, More is arguing that disadvantaged criminals are actually not culpable.  I do not 
think, however, that this is the only available interpretation and it is not the one I prefer.   
259
 The French and German penal codes excuse homicide on these grounds (French Penal 
Code art. 64; German (Federal Republic) Penal Code sect. 35).   
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responsibility and the presence of excusing or justifying conditions.  I offer the following 
examples of battered offenders: 
Underprivileged Offender:  Anna is a young woman who grew up in foster homes after 
her father left and her mother died from a drug overdose.  Although she attended school 
for twelve years, she never learned how to read or to do addition past a first grade level.  
Her neighborhood has always been full of gangs, one of which she joined for protection.  
She has never known anyone who could be described as a positive role model.  The only 
family she knows is an older brother who is in prison.  At age nineteen, Anna is 
impoverished; from where she stands, she can see no job prospects or positive direction 
in which to take her life.  Like many of her friends, she becomes more involved in her 
gang.  When she is twenty, Anna is convicted of prostitution, shoplifting, and possession 
of drugs with intent to sell.  Anna is fully culpable for her criminal offenses (she knew 
they were wrong, she had the self-control to refrain from committing them, she was not 
facing conditions of extreme necessity).  But she has also clearly been denied a right to 
fair equality of opportunity.  If she had received a fair equality of opportunity, it is very 
likely that she would not have engaged in criminal activity.260 
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 Contrast Anna to Johnny.  Johnny’s childhood was roughly the same as Anna’s, but he 
educates himself at a library downtown, goes to college, and becomes a broker on Wall 
Street.  Although he earns an excellent salary, he commits and is convicted of massive 
fraud.  He too was denied fair equality of opportunity.  The denial was not, however, 
causally significant to his commission of crime.  Johnny is not a battered offender. 
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Abused Offender:261  David is a man who suffered severe physical and psychological 
abuse as a child.  His father abandoned the family and his mother neglected and abused 
him.  She would lock the refrigerator and only reward the children with food when they 
stole for her.  She hosted a motorcycle gang in her home that sadistically tortured David 
and carried out sexual acts in front of him.  The state removed David from his mother’s 
custody when he was fourteen and rotated him through a series of inadequate foster 
homes where he was subject to more abuse and neglect.  When David was nineteen, he 
stabbed a man to death during a botched burglary.  The criminal justice system deemed 
David fully responsible and culpable for his offense; he knew right from wrong and had 
enough self-control to refrain from committing murder.  I am not sure whether the 
criminal justice system was correct in judging that David was fully culpable for his 
offense, but let us assume that he was for the sake of the argument here.  His right to 
basic security was denied for the fourteen years in which he incurred severe abuse.  It is 
very likely that he would not have committed murder if he had not been abused.262 
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 Unlike the previous example, this one is not hypothetical.  It is based on David Woods 
who was executed in 2007 for the murder of Juan Placencia (Woods v. McBride, 430 
F.3d 813, 824 (2005)).  Other examples of offenders like David Woods include Robert 
Harris (although he may not have been fully culpable; see Watson, “Responsibility and 
the Limits of Evil”) and Wilbert Rideau, In Place of Justice. 
262
 Contrast David to Gladys.  Gladys is married to a man who beats her.  She lacks the 
resources to leave him (she is not empowered to do so and she fears her husband will 
track her down and the police will not protect her).  After several years together, her 
husband leaves her.  Before, during, and after the years she is with her husband, Gladys 
participates in smuggling illegal immigrants.  She is convicted for her offenses.  
Although her basic right to security was denied during her time with her husband, the 
denial was not causally significant to her crime.  Gladys is not a battered offender.    
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Unjustly Punished Offender:  Henry is a member of a racial minority and commits a 
minor theft.  He has no other criminal record and no history of violence, but a racially 
prejudiced judge gives him an unjustly long sentence of twenty-five years. He is angry 
about having to serve such a long sentence and his anger often lands him in solitary 
confinement.  He is beaten by guards, raped by other prisoners, and eventually joins a 
gang in prison for protection.  When he is released, Henry cannot find a job; no one 
wants to hire a fifty-year-old ex-convict with no job experience aside from menial labor 
in prison.  He has lost any respect for the law that he once had.  Making use of his 
connections in the gang, Henry becomes a hardened criminal.  He commits and is 
convicted of armed robbery and assault.  He was responsible for his crimes, but it is very 
likely that he would not have committed them if he had not been denied his rights to 
liberty, security, and fair equality of opportunity. 
 
I argue that the political community has strong moral reason to refrain from 
abrasively blaming battered offenders even though the DCAB calls for such blame.  First 
I sketch the arch of my argument and then I defend its core claims.  The argument begins 
with the claim that the political community is collectively responsible for the battered 
offenders’ denial of rights.  Given that this denial plays a causally significant role in the 
crimes of battered offenders, the political community is in some sense complicit in the 
battered offender’s violation of criminal law.  Although the battered offender is fully 
responsible for her violation of criminal law, the political community bears some 
responsibility as well.  The community must accept responsibility for its own faults that 
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played a crucial role in causing the offense. This acceptance of responsibility is 
incompatible with abrasively blaming a battered offender.  
Defense of this line of argument hangs on defense of the claim that the political 
community is complicit in the battered offender’s violation of criminal law.  As a 
collectivity, the community bears responsibility for the denial of rights that was crucial in 
causing the battered offender’s violation of criminal law.  The community does not bear 
collective responsibility for each individual act (or omission) that violated the offender’s 
rights.  The community as a whole, however, is responsible for the fact that the offender’s 
rights were denied – that is, systematically violated with general impunity.263  When the 
battered offender’s rights were violated, the community did not make a concerted effort 
to vindicate her rights, make amends, or take steps to assure that her rights would not be 
violated over and over again.  To systematically fail to take adequate steps upon violation 
of a person’s rights over long periods of time (decades, but maybe less) is to deny them 
those rights.  As Arthur Ripstein puts the point, “a right that can knowingly be violated 
with impunity is no right at all.”264  This systematic failure to stand up for the rights of 
battered offenders is a collective wrong attributable to the political community.265 
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 The political community often prosecutes child abuse, but such prosecution does not 
qualify as adequate vindication of the child’s right to basic security unless the child is 
guaranteed a safe home.  It also does not qualify as vindicating the child’s right to fair 
equality of opportunity unless the child is guaranteed help to overcome the scar left by 
severe abuse.   
264
 Equality, Responsibility and the Law, 158.  It is beyond the scope of this dissertation 
to give an account of rights and use it to rigorously defend this claim.  I am drawing on 
the work of others to defend this claim.  
265
 I assume here that a collectivity can be responsible for a wrong.  Discussion and 
defense of this assumption is the scope of my project, but I direct the reader’s attention to 
the following work:  May, Sharing Responsibility; May and Hoffman, Collective 
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As a whole, the community is responsible for denying the battered offender her 
rights.  That is obviously unfortunate, but why does it matter to abrasive blame in 
criminal punishment?  When a party (in this case the political community) is responsible 
for some wrong that plays a significant causal role in another agent’s culpable violation 
of law, that party is complicit in the violation.  We need to take a detour into the morally 
mysterious territory of complicity, broadly understood as “participation in the wrongs of 
another.”266  To be complicit is to somehow contribute to the commission of an offense in 
a way that makes one partially (or fully) at fault for it, but in a way that is distinct from 
culpably committing the offense oneself.267  It is a way of being partially (or fully) 
responsible for an action through the mediation of another agent or agents.  But how? 
Complicity, like straightforward responsibility, comes in degrees.  If a party acts 
with full knowledge and intention to assist or encourage another agent to violate criminal 
law, the party is complicit in a very strong sense.  She is an accomplice or co-conspirator 
and her complicity makes her equally (or sometimes even more) culpable as the principal 
agent.  Each member of a conspiring group of bank robbers is fully culpable for the 
robbery even if only one of them performed actions that actually violated law.  Under the 
doctrine of complicity in American law, each is liable for criminal punishment for their 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Responsibility; Smiley, Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community; and 
Norrie, Punishment, Responsibility, and Justice.  
266
 Gardner, “Complicity and Causality,” 127. 
267
 According to Gardner, complicity, generally, is “participation in the wrongs of 
another.”  More specifically in certain bodies of law, it is “a mode of contribution” that 
demarcates a wrongdoer as an accomplice rather than a principal (“Complicity and 
Causality,” 128). 
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contribution to the offense.268  The political community is not complicit in this strong 
sense for the offenses committed by battered offenders.  The reason is simple:  the 
political community does not have full knowledge and intention to assist and encourage 
battered offenders to commit crimes.   
There is, however, a weaker sense of complicity.  One is complicit in a weak 
sense if one recklessly, albeit not intentionally, sets the stage for another person to 
commit a criminal offense.  Consider the following examples.  A man sells guns to 
minors whom he has heard talking about vague plans for a shooting; the minors use the 
guns to commit the massacre at Columbine.269  A person engages in a road race on a two-
lane public street; his competitor swings out to pass and collides with another car, 
resulting in the death of the driver of the other car.270  A person plays Russian roulette 
with another in the course of which the other shoots and kills himself.271  In Rebel 
Without a Cause, Jim plays a game of chicken in which he and his opponent (Buzz) drive 
stolen cars toward a cliff.  Buzz’s seatbelt malfunctions and he drives off the cliff to his 
death.272  In each case a person acts in a wrongful way that unintentionally, but with 
reasonable foreseeability, results in another’s crime.  Intuitively, the person is responsible 
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 Another example is in Rachel Getting Married.  A mother left her substance-abusing 
teenage daughter Kym home alone to take care of her kid brother.  Kym is high, takes her 
brother to a nearby park to play, and then drives off a bridge with him in the car.  He dies, 
Kym survives.   
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not only for her own wrong action (selling guns to minors, speeding, and gambling with 
her life), but she also bears some responsibility for the resulting crime.  Her responsibility 
does not take away responsibility from the principal actor; the principal actor is fully 
culpable for making his own choice to kill, to drive recklessly, to shoot himself, and to 
drive full speed toward a cliff.  The complicit actor sets the stage for the principal actor to 
get out there himself and break a leg, not to have his arm twisted.   
This kind of unintended but reasonably foreseeable participation in another 
person’s criminal act (call it “weak complicity”) is often not deemed strong enough to 
make an actor fully culpable for the principal agent’s crime.  Weak complicity does not 
seem, at least to most, to be adequate grounds for criminal punishment for the ensuing 
crime.  (Although the American criminal justice system did find the actor in the car race 
guilty of manslaughter and the actor in the Roulette game liable for involuntary 
manslaughter.)  The jury is out on this question and it appears to be ripe for closer 
philosophical investigation.  Fortunately, however, I do not need to answer whether weak 
complicity grounds full culpability or justifies criminal punishment for ensuing criminal 
offenses.  I only argue that weak complicity grounds some responsibility or liability for 
ensuing criminal offenses.  As Sanford Kadish points out by appealing to our intuitions 
and judicial decisions on some of the above cases, “it is both sound in policy and 
conformable to our intuitions of just blaming to hold a person liable for recklessly 
facilitating the criminal action of another.”273  The law of torts offers support for this 
point.  As Kadish explains, “if the voluntary and intentional action of another was one of 
the risks in virtue of which the defendant’s conduct was negligent…tort liability for 
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damages could be imposed on the defendant.”274  In other words, even if weak complicity 
does not ground full culpability for the ensuing crime, it at least grounds civil liability for 
damages caused by the ensuing crime.   
The example from Rebel Without a Cause helps illustrate this point.  Regardless 
of whether it would be right to criminally punish Jim for the death of Buzz, it is right for 
Jim to take up a special sense of responsibility for Buzz’s death.  Jim’s acceptance of 
responsibility does not in any way deny his recognition that Buzz made his own, fully 
autonomous choice to take the risk that led to his death.275  Jim recognizes that his own 
behavior calls out for special justification with respect to Buzz’s death.  Given that he has 
no justification, his behavior calls for acceptance of liability and some kind of atonement 
for Buzz’s death.  Even if it is not right to send Jim to prison, it is certainly not right for 
Jim to walk away and deny all liability in Buzz’s death.276  The point comes to the fore 
when Jim argues with his parents about what to do after the incident.  His parents try to 
convince him that it is enough for him to know that he did something wrong, but that it is 
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silly and “idealistic” to take public responsibility for it.  They advise moving away and 
maintaining an evasive stance with the police.  After all, “nobody thanks you for sticking 
your neck out.”277  But Jim rightly rejects his parents’ suggestion.  He states simply and 
forcefully, “I am involved… Mom, a kid was killed tonight.  I don’t see how I can get out 
of that by pretending that it didn’t happen.”278  His acceptance of responsibility is 
palpable and intuitively correct.   
Even if weak complicity does not ground criminal culpability, it certainly does 
ground some morally important responsibility and liability.  Let us return to the context 
of the political community and the battered offender.  Although the political community 
does not intend for, assist, or encourage the crimes of battered offenders, the political 
community is responsible for wrongs – the denial of rights – that set the stage for these 
crimes.279  The political community knows that by denying some of its members the right 
to security and fair equality of opportunity, it puts these people at substantially higher 
risk to commit crime.280  Given contemporary sociological analysis, we can reasonably 
foresee that a significant percentage of those denied their rights will go on to commit 
crimes that they otherwise would never have dreamt of committing.  The political 
community ought to recognize the role it plays in the crimes of these battered offenders.  
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 Unlike the examples I provided above, the wrongs are actually done to the person who 
commits the ensuing offense.  This difference only seems to heighten the political 
community’s complicity. 
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It is weakly complicit.  Like Jim, it should step up and accept its responsibility and 
liability.  Acceptance of this liability does not entail any suggestion that the battered 
offender is less culpable for his offense.  The political community is not taking any 
responsibility away from the battered offender; it is rightly sharing in it.  
It is difficult to discern how the political community should act in accepting 
responsibility for its complicit role in battered offenders’ crimes.  Simply knowing that 
the political community played a role is not enough, but what is enough?  Generally, a 
person who bears responsibility by being weakly complicit should openly admit her fault 
and the role it played, apologize for it, make amends, and put forward a sincere effort to 
fix the underlying problem.  But a collectivity like the political community may need to 
bear its responsibility somewhat differently than an individual would.  It is beyond the 
scope of my project to say exactly how the political community should act in light of its 
complicity.  Proper acceptance of its complicity may well be compatible with punishing 
the battered offender, but I leave this important question for future work.281  Here I want 
only to raise a red flag with respect to abrasive blame.  
The political community’s responsibility in the crimes of battered offenders 
stands in strong tension with the political community abrasively blaming battered 
offenders.  The tension presents itself in (at least) three ways.  First, expressions of 
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abrasive blame tend to single out the offender, separating him off from others for the 
sting.  Consider expressions like, “you had it coming” (as if the rest of us did not?) and 
“you should rot in ____ ” (while the rest of us carry on nicely?).282  This singling out of 
the offender seems incompatible with sharing in responsibility for his crime.  Second, if 
the political community accepts its responsibility, it should own up to its denial of the 
battered offenders’ rights in the past.  This seems to require an apologetic stance toward 
the offender that is incompatible with stinging him with abrasive blame.  Try sincerely 
saying “sorry” and spitting in someone’s face.  It does not work.283  Third, accepting 
responsibility seems to require making (or renewing) a commitment to move forward in 
addressing underlying faults that led to the problem.  Stinging battered offenders is often 
in tension with this commitment.  The offender should be assured that he does have equal 
rights in the community even if they were denied in the past.  But abrasive blame does 
not give this forward-looking assurance; instead, it piles hurt on top of the denial of rights 
that offenders have already been made to endure.  Abrasive blame does not help the 
political community disavow its prior denial of offenders’ rights, instead it seems to 
affirm (or at least condone) that denial. 
Although some punishment may be compatible with the political community’s 
acceptance of responsibility in the crimes of battered offenders, abrasive blame is 
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generally incompatible with such acceptance.  A political community that abrasively 
blames battered offenders fails to take seriously its own responsibility that it bears for 
their offenses.  It does not act in a way that respects or aims to restore reciprocity in its 
relationship with the offender.284  Instead, it engages in a kind of hypocrisy writ large 
(blaming others while failing to actively accept responsibility oneself).  Such hypocrisy is 
not only dishonest, but also unfair.285  It does not give battered offenders the apology or 
the future reassurance that they are entitled to as people whose basic rights have been 
denied.  Nor is it simply silent.  Instead, it singles these people out for yet another hurt 
(the sting) which they would likely not have received had their rights not been denied in 
the first place.  The political community takes for itself a benefit (the license to abrasively 
blame) that is not fit for its “dirty hands,” while imposing yet another burden (the sting) 
on the already battered offender.  Doing so is not fair. 
One might object that the political community is acting unfairly if it abrasively 
blames non-battered offenders and not battered offenders who commit exactly the same 
offenses. The political community’s action may appear unfair at a superficial level 
because it treats the offenders differently without marking any distinction in their actual 
offenses or culpability.  Treating people fairly, however, is not fundamentally about 
treating all like crimes alike, but about treating all members of the community as free and 
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equal persons.286  The ideal of “treating like cases alike” requires us to identify the 
relevant respects in which cases are alike.  Two similar cases are not “alike” in the 
relevant respect if the state has battered one of the offenders but not the other.  This is a 
difference that should make a difference.  The political community must treat battered 
offenders differently than many of those who commit the same crimes in order to treat 
them all fairly as equal persons in the community.  An appeal to the political 
community’s complicity is not only not unfair in distinguishing one offender from 
another, but it is actually motivated by a more comprehensive sense of fairness.  
Section II:  Fragile Offenders 
It is unfair for the political community to abrasively blame a second type of 
offender that I call a fragile offender.  The fragile offender is a fully culpable criminal 
offender whose social basis for self-respect hangs in jeopardy.  To describe this type of 
offender and to argue that the political community should not abrasively blame them, I 
need to explain what a social basis for self-respect is and why it is important.  A social 
basis for self-respect is, to draw on John Rawls’ definition, the basic social “institutions 
that are normally essential if citizens are to have a lively sense of their worth as persons 
and to be able to advance their ends with self-confidence.”287  Self-respect is distinct 
from self-confidence, self-assurance, or generic warm-fuzzy feelings about oneself.  Self-
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respect is not pride in one’s actions or traits regardless of whether they are morally good 
or bad.  Instead, self-respect is a morally decent sense of self-worth; a sense that one is no 
less of a person than anyone else, that one is a moral agent who has equal moral standing 
with other such agents.  Self-respect is importantly distinct from the social basis for self-
respect; the latter is what is normally essential in the fabric of a society in order for 
people to have the former.  A social basis for self-respect is the kind of underlying social 
soil most humans need to become and remain self-respecting persons. 
Having self-respect is essential for a person to develop what Rawls calls her two 
moral powers:  the capacity for a sense of justice (to understand, apply, and act from 
principles of political justice) and the capacity for a conception of the good (to have, 
revise, and rationally pursue a conception of the good).  Having self-respect is essential to 
act autonomously and to be a free and equal person.  If members of a political community 
treat one another as free and equal persons, they should (among other things) design their 
social institutions in such a way that provides, rather than denies, each member a social 
basis for self-respect. The community cannot guarantee that each member will have self-
respect, but it should design its institutions (including its system of criminal justice) to 
provide a social basis for it.  
The basic institutions of many existing political communities provide a social 
basis of self-respect for most people.  Many institutions that are supposed to provide a 
firm soil for self-respect instead provide a soil that has deep fissures and cracks.  Many 
people fall through these cracks; they lack a social basis for self-respect.  This leaves us 
in the realm of non-ideal theory.  The political community should not just give up on 
these people who find themselves without a social basis for self-respect.  Instead, it 
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should have policies to provide a safety net for these people.  Even if it cannot ensure that 
these people develop self-respect, it can provide social conditions that act as a back-up 
social basis of self-respect.  The political community should do what it can (within 
reason) to provide all members with an adequate social basis for self-respect – be it 
through its basic institutions or supplementary safety nets.288  To fail to do so is to fail to 
make reasonably available the tools that human beings need to have a sense of self-worth 
and to act autonomously.  It is to fail to treat them as free and equal persons. 
But what does all this have to do with criminal punishment and abrasive blame?  
Just like anyone else, a person who has committed a criminal offense (and/or a moral 
wrong) can and should maintain decent self-respect.  Her criminal actions do not 
somehow carve out her worth as a person; “people are more than the worst thing they 
have ever done.”289  She cannot draw her sense of worth from misplaced pride in having 
committed wrongs; doing so would not result in a morally decent sense of self-worth.  
She can, however, draw a morally decent sense of self-worth from other aspects of her 
personhood.  The political community should do what it can to provide her, like anyone 
else, with the social conditions to restore, develop, or maintain her self-respect.   
Many penal institutions, however, do not provide a social basis for self-respect for 
criminal offenders.  On the contrary, penal institutions are often a social environment that 
threatens the self-respect of criminal offenders.  At least as it is practiced in most modern 
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political communities, criminal punishment involves the deprivation of liberty.  Liberty is 
one of the social conditions that is usually necessary for people to have self-respect.  If a 
person is denied liberty to walk around freely, to make daily life choices, or to 
communicate with others, it is easy (indeed normal) for her to think that she has less 
worth as a person.  But criminal offenders are different from non-offenders in this 
respect.  I agree with philosophers who argue that deprivation of liberty (and perhaps 
other forms of criminal punishment) – if it is done properly – can express the fact that 
offenders have equal (rather than inferior) standing as persons in the moral community.290  
German penal institutions, at least as they are described by Whitman, stand as 
examples.291   
In many penal institutions (especially those in America), however, offenders are 
not punished in a way that is conducive to their maintenance or recovery of self-respect.  
The expression of abrasive blame in prisons poses a particularly powerful threat to the 
self-respect of many criminal offenders.  The expressions of abrasive blame, particularly 
when coupled with the deprivation of liberty, do not help offenders regain or maintain a 
sense of their intrinsic self-worth or their equal membership in the moral community.  
Abrasive blame (even the non-degrading abrasive blame that is my focus), in so many 
words and deeds, tells the offenders that they are trash and scum, refuse of the moral 
community that is begrudgingly kept alive, not full members of it.  Even if these 
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expressions are not degrading, they do tend to jeopardize offenders’ social basis for self-
respect.   
Abrasive blame in the criminal justice system tends to jeopardize offenders’ 
social basis for self-respect, but it does not necessarily expunge it.  For some offenders, 
penal conditions that involve abrasive blame may provide an adequate social basis for 
self-respect.  What counts as an adequate social basis will vary based on specific prison 
conditions and the psychology of individual offenders.  Consider the different effects 
abrasive blame may have on four kinds of offenders.  Some fortunate offenders will 
retain an adequate social basis of self-respect regardless of whether the political 
community abrasively blames them.292  Offenders in the direst cases will lack an 
adequate basis of self-respect regardless of whether the political community abrasively 
blames them or not.293  Still other offenders’ chances of recovering or retaining an 
                                                        
292
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social stigmas that tend to effectively destroy adequate social bases for self-respect. 
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adequate social basis of self-respect would be improved if the political community were 
to abrasively blame them.294  On the other hand, some offenders’ chances of recovering 
or retaining an adequate basis of self-respect would be significantly diminished if the 
political community were to abrasively blame them.  If the political community were to 
refrain from abrasively blaming these offenders, their chance of recovering or retaining 
an adequate social basis of self-respect would be significantly improved.   
I call this last type of offenders “fragile offenders.”  A fragile offender is a 
criminal offender whose social basis for self-respect “hangs in the balance.”  I offer the 
following examples of fragile offenders.  They are hypothetical examples based on 
features of actual offenders.  The examples are representative of two ways in which an 
offender may be fragile:  by being deprived of an adequate social basis for self-respect 
prior to their crime and by committing a crime that makes their self-respect especially 
vulnerable for the foreseeable future.   
Socially Oppressed Offender:  Maria is a Hispanic woman who was born in America to 
parents who had immigrated illegally. At the age of 2, she is an orphan and grows up 
under the care of the state, bouncing from foster home to foster home because no family 
wants her.  She goes to school where her teachers tell her that she, and other kids “like 
her” are “slow.”  She has a relatively low I.Q., she does not speak much English, and kids 
in school constantly subject her to ethnic slurs and bully her.  Foster parents, teachers, 
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and people in her neighborhood subject her to degrading sexual harassment that she takes 
to be normal treatment for a woman.  She is raped and impregnated at the age of 18.  
Maria is both slow and obese.  By the time she figures out that she is pregnant, it would 
be too late to have a legal abortion (moreover, having an abortion at any time is a stigma 
in her neighborhood).  So she has the baby on the street and leaves it by a dumpster.  She 
is convicted of manslaughter.  When people ask why she did it, she says that she is trash 
and what comes out of her is probably trash too.  Maria has been deprived of an adequate 
social basis for self-respect throughout her life and is devoid of self-respect when she 
commits her crime (she may also be a battered offender).  The criminal justice system can 
respond in a way that plants a seed for self-respect or it can bury any reasonable chance 
of her having self-respect by incarcerating her in a prison replete with abrasive blame.  
 
Oppressed-by-Guilt Offender:  Every summer a handful of parents accidentally leave 
babies and toddlers in their cars and return to find their children dead, baked and 
suffocated in the car.  There is generally a frantic call to 911 followed by genuine 
expressions of massive amounts of guilt from the parents.  One father was in a catatonic 
state for several days after killing his son.295  Some of these parents are guilty of culpable 
violation of criminal law and they are genuinely fragile offenders.  They have self-respect 
prior to the crime, but they lose self-respect upon commission of their crime.  If they are 
subject to the usual abrasive blame offenders receive in prison, most of them will not 
have an adequate social basis from which to recover their lost self-respect.  But if they 
are spared from such abrasive blame, then they might have an adequate social basis for 
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self-respect.  Refraining from abrasive blame increases their chance of having a social 
basis of self-respect.   
(I should note that the fragility of these offenders may not undermine the reason to follow 
the DCAB.  It may be that on a careful understanding of American social rules about 
abrasive blame, abrasive blame toward these parents is inappropriate (presumably 
because they are “already suffering enough”).) 296 
 
When a fragile offender stands before the criminal justice system, the practiced 
social rules of the community deem it appropriate for the system (as an organ of the 
political community) to abrasively blame the offender.  But, I argue, it would be unfair 
for the political community to follow these rules and abrasively blame the fragile 
offender.  As I argued above, the political community should, within reason, help provide 
each of its members with a social basis of self-respect.  The political community can, 
within reason, achieve the justifiable aims of punishment while helping to provide the 
fragile offender a social basis for self-respect. The political community can do so by 
sparing the fragile offender from abrasive blame (either by sending her to a prison 
without abrasive blame, or, if none are available, by giving her a sentence that involves 
little or no prison time).  For example, a judge could sentence a fragile offender like 
Maria to a halfway house that deprives her of liberty as punishment for her crime, but 
supports rather than further obstructs her development of self-respect.   
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A political community that abrasively blames a fragile offender not only misses 
an opportunity to help provide a social basis for self-respect, but it also puts a social basis 
for self-respect even further out of reach for the fragile offender.  The abrasive blame of 
the political community actively hinders and obstructs the fragile offender’s social basis 
of self-respect.  It is bad enough that a fragile offender thinks of herself as trash.  The 
political community should not fertilize the social soil in which such thoughts take root – 
but its abrasive blame does just that.  To treat a human being as the free and equal person 
she is, the political community should do what it can to provide her with a social basis of 
self-respect.  By obstructing the fragile offender’s social basis of self-respect, the political 
community fails to treat her as the free and equal person she is.  Instead, it treats her as 
the trash she thinks she is.  Assuming that fairness requires treating people as free and 
equal persons, abrasively blaming fragile offenders is not fair.   
Section III:  Wounds, not Permissible Stings 
There is something unfair (or if one prefers, “otherwise wrong”) about the 
political community abrasively blaming battered and fragile offenders.  But does this 
mean that it is generally impermissible for the criminal justice system to abrasively blame 
these offenders?  Perhaps not.  As explained in the previous chapter, the criminal justice 
system has a presumptive reason to abrasively blame offenders in accord with the DCAB, 
the set of decent community-wide social rules about when, how, and to what degree 
abrasive blame is appropriate.  The DCAB in America (and probably other political 
communities) deems it appropriate for the criminal justice system to abrasively blame 
battered and fragile offenders (with the possible exception of the guilt-ridden fragile 
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offender).297  The social rules carve out no recognized exceptions for these offenders.  So 
although there may be something unfair about blaming battered and fragile offenders, 
there also appears to be a presumptive reason to abrasively blame them.   
In this Section, I argue that the unfairness of abrasively blaming battered and 
fragile offenders washes out the presumptive reason to abrasively blame them.  Unless 
there are other strong considerations in favor of abrasively blaming these offenders, 
criminal justice systems should refrain from abrasively blaming them and work to carve 
out a recognized exception for them into the political community’s DCAB.  The 
argument takes two different forms. 
The first form of the argument insists that social rules which license the criminal 
justice system to abrasively blame battered and fragile offenders are unjust.  Unlike most 
of the other rules in the political community’s DCAB (its entire set of rules about 
abrasive blame), the rules that deem abrasive blame appropriate for battered and fragile 
offenders are incompatible with the principles and values in a full theory of political 
justice.  Particularly, the rules seem incompatible with the commitment to treat 
individuals as free and equal persons.  By following the rules and abrasively blaming a 
battered offender, the political community fails to take seriously her standing as an equal 
member of the community.  The rules here fail to instantiate the value of reciprocity.  By 
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 In general the DCAB tends to deem abrasive blame appropriate (and sometimes 
required) for all criminal offenders unless their culpability is somehow diminished (they 
are found not morally responsible or are otherwise excused).  Battered and fragile 
offenders, as I described them, do not have diminished culpability.  The DCAB may take 
other factors into account, such as remorse, but these generally only decrease the 
appropriate amount of abrasive blame rather than render abrasive blame categorically 
inappropriate.  Moreover, these other factors often do not apply to battered and fragile 
offenders (they are often lacking in remorse with the exception of the guilt-ridden fragile 
offender). 
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following the rules and abrasively blaming a fragile offender, the political community 
fails to respect the offender’s capacity for autonomy by further jeopardizing rather than 
forwarding her development of that capacity.  The rules as applied to a battered or fragile 
offender fail to take seriously her standing as a being capable of making free and 
meaningful choices.  Even if following these unjust rules is conducive to stability in the 
community, this does not give the political community good reason to follow them.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, there is no good moral reason to pursue stability in a 
way that rests on injustice.  Officials in the criminal justice system should take a general 
stance against abrasively blaming battered and fragile offenders and should work on 
changing their social rules to make them decent in this respect. 
One might argue, however, that the above argument is too quick.  I have shown 
that abrasively blaming battered and fragile offenders is unjust, but I have not shown that 
the rules allowing such behavior are also unjust.  Perhaps there are other reasons standing 
in favor of the rules which make them compatible with a full theory of justice.  If so the 
rules are decent.  Even if this is the case, I argue that the presumptive reason to follow 
these rules with respect to battered and fragile offenders is outweighed.  
The second form of the argument presses not on the decency of the relevant social 
rules, but on the relative strength of the presumptive reason to follow these rules.  As I 
argued in the previous chapter, the reason to follow the DCAB is presumptive; it 
generally and non-decisively counts in favor of following the DCAB.  The reason does 
not count in favor of following the DCAB in every instance; it only counts in favor of 
following the DCAB frequently enough to sustain general compliance.  Although the 
political community has reason to maintain general compliance with the DCAB, 
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refraining from abrasive blame toward battered and fragile offenders usually does not 
threaten general compliance with the DCAB (for one thing, the social rules usually do not 
require abrasive blame for battered and fragile offenders, they only deem it appropriate).   
So why not refrain from blame when engaging in it would be unfair?  The 
presumptive reason counting in favor of abrasive blame is washed out by the strong 
consideration of unfairness counting against it.  Unless I am missing some general reason 
counting in favor of abrasively blaming battered and fragile offenders, there is usually no 
reason that justifies abrasively blaming them.  It would not be a permissible sting, but an 
unfair strike which is marked by a distinct lack of reciprocity and which leaves 
substantial wounds in its wake. 
I am not only arguing that criminal justice officials should refrain (or at least have 
very strong reason to refrain) from abrasively blaming battered and fragile offenders in 
individual cases.  I am also arguing that they and others outside the system should work 
to change the rules so as to deem it inappropriate for the criminal justice system to 
abrasively blame battered and fragile offenders.  Even if the existing rules allowing such 
blame turn out not to be unjust, they are at best minimally decent and we can make them 
much better, much closer to achieving justice as fairness, by carving out a recognized 
exception for battered and abused offenders. 
It is important to remember that community-wide social rules about abrasive 
blame are not written in stone.  The DCAB is the political community’s way to actively 
work out its reasonable disagreements on abrasive blame, not to have them settled 
forevermore.  The rules tend to be roughly hewn, it is not as though all members of the 
political community sat down and carefully wrote out the rules with special attention to 
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capture all the relevant exceptions.  As history shows, community-wide social rules about 
abrasive blame are dynamic.  They are refined and changed over time as people stop 
using certain practices (like branding and the stocks) and start favoring others.  The rules 
change when people change their tune in ways that turn out to command general 
compliance.298  I have argued that, out of fairness to some of the least advantaged in their 
community, people should change their tune.  Criminal justice systems should ebb the 
tide and refrain from abrasively blaming these offenders.  I hope that individuals’ 
proposed changes will command general compliance; that they will not just permissibly 
veer off from the herd’s well-worn path, but get the herd to change its path.  With time 
and attention, these individuals may carve out a recognized exemption for battered and 
fragile offenders.   
American traditions have given us a criminal justice system that is long on 
abrasive blame and short on fairness to the least advantaged.  James Whitman, a legal 
scholar whose critique of the American criminal justice system is loosely similar to my 
own, writes that the harshness of the American criminal justice system is a product of 
long tradition.  Changing this harshness would require “real change…not just in 
punishment practices but in much grander American cultural traditions.  It would be 
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 It is important to note that not all changes are permissible.  Unlike decreasing the 
amount of abrasive blame, drastically increasing the amount of abrasive blame is 
generally not permissible – because one cannot reasonably expect others to accept a 
justification for doing so (increases have more hurts to justify, not less).  Gradually 
nudging up the amount of abrasive blame while being sensitive to any objections, 
however, can be permissible.  Indeed this is the strategy that the American criminal 
justice system (including Sheriff Joe Arpaio) has taken.   
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foolish to think that such change is coming soon.”299  So what is to be done in the 
meantime?  In the conclusion that follows, I argue that positive mercy may not solve our 
problems, but it might offer us one way to take a step forward.
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 Harsh Justice, 207.  Whitman identifies degradation (very loosely construed) as the 
primary problem in American criminal justice, but we have the same general concerns in 
mind. 
CONCLUSION:  MERCY AS A BANDAGE? 
 
What is to be done for battered and fragile offenders? 
 Over the past three chapters, I have investigated abrasive blame and raised 
concerns about its expression in the criminal justice system.  I dispelled a common view 
that abrasive blame is justified simply in virtue of the fact that a person has committed a 
wrong action.  I argue that abrasive blame is justified under certain conditions and the 
conditions vary depending on context.  In the context of a political community, abrasive 
blame is justified when it is in accord with decent social rules and the presumptive reason 
to follow those rules is not outweighed.  Given that the justification of abrasive blame is 
fragile at best, I encourage a full investigation of abrasive blame practices in criminal 
justice systems to determine their moral permissibility.  For now, however, I raise two 
general concerns about abrasive blame in criminal justice systems.  I argue that it would 
be unfair for political communities to abrasively blame battered offenders and fragile 
offenders.  I also argue that this consideration washes out the presumptive reason to 
engage in abrasive blame.  I suggest that the social rules that call for abrasive blame 
toward these offenders are potentially unjust.  These rules should be reformed so as to 
recognize exceptions for battered and fragile offenders with respect to abrasive blame in 
the criminal justice system.  
My analysis of abrasive blame does not entail a specific recommendation about 
how criminal justice systems should punish (or otherwise respond) to battered and fragile 
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offenders.  I recommend future research into whether the arguments I gave against 
abrasively blaming battered and fragile offenders can be applied to argue for mitigating 
criminal punishment of these offenders.  I am highly sympathetic to such a proposal, but I 
have not been able to consider it within the limits of this project.  Here I emphasize that 
although abrasive blame is not an essential part of criminal punishment, it is often 
robustly entwined with the way modern political communities do punish criminals.300  
Questions about abrasive blame thereby bear heavily on our decisions about how and 
even whether to punish criminals in our system.  
In some cases, concerns about abrasive blame and punishment conflict and force 
us to make difficult decisions and compromises.  Consider a case in which a) giving a 
battered or fragile offender Punishment X is the only way to achieve some end required 
by criminal justice (for example, to send a message that the crime was wrong, to 
vindicate a system of rights, or to maintain social security) and b) there is no way to give 
the offender Punishment X without subjecting the offender to abrasive blame (because 
the wardens keep up a robust practice of abrasive blame toward all offenders in prison).  
It may be that these conditions are never jointly satisfied in a given political community, 
but I suspect this may be the case in America.  In such a case, the right decision for a 
judge (prosecutor, police officer, or parole board) might be to give the offender 
Punishment X.  If so, the abrasive blame accompanying that sentence is a necessary evil.  
Alternatively, the right decision might be to give the offender an alternative that does not 
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 Abrasive blame and punishment may not only be entwined in our prisons, but also in 
the way our brains work.  Research suggests that the inclination to blame an offender is a 
driving force behind most people’s judgments of whether to punish the offender.  See 
Lerner, Goldberg, and Tetlock, “Sober Second Thought;” Small and Loewenstein, “The 
Devil you Know.” 
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involve abrasive blame but which falls short of required ends of corrective justice.  If so, 
falling short of an end required by justice is a necessary evil.  Adjudicating between these 
two alternatives is beyond the scope of my project.  What I want to point out, however, is 
that neither alternative is fully just (even if it is all-things-considered the right decision in 
a given case).  In these conditions, a fully just outcome is out of reach.  Second best (or 
less unjust) is our only option.  
A political community need not, however, resign itself to second-best treatment of 
battered and fragile offenders in the long run.  Not only can it work to eliminate (or limit) 
the incidence of battered or fragile offenders, but it can also work to develop alternative 
punishments that accomplish the required ends of corrective justice without abrasive 
blame (for all offenders or just for battered and fragile offenders).  The example of 
German penal institutions suggests that such alternatives are available.  With such 
alternatives in place, the criminal justice system could respond to battered and fragile 
offenders with a fully just punishment.301  The criminal justice system could punish them 
in a way that would meet required ends of criminal justice, but which would not involve 
(or be otherwise accompanied by) abrasive blame.  
What about Mercy? 
 In Part I, I identified and defended the exercise of positive mercy in the criminal 
justice system.  The exercise of positive mercy is treating someone justly when unjust 
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 There are two ways this might work:  1) all offenders, including battered and fragile 
offenders, are punished without abrasive blame (this is only possible if it would not 
undermine general compliance with community-wide social rules about abrasive blame) 
or 2) battered and fragile offenders are punished without abrasive blame but other 
offenders receive punishment that involves the amount abrasive blame deemed 
appropriate by the DCAB. 
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social rules call for a harsher response.  If conditions are such that the criminal justice 
system cannot respond to battered and fragile offenders in a fully just fashion, then the 
system cannot respond with “full” positive mercy either.  The system might rightly spare 
an offender a harsh treatment that rules would have called for, but the response would not 
be a perfect instance of positive mercy because the response is less than fully just.  Let us 
call this kind of rightful sparing imperfect positive mercy.  (This rightful sparing may be 
very close to negative mercy – except it is unlikely to be supererogatory.) 
Suppose, however, that there are legally available punishments that meet required 
ends of corrective justice, but which do not involve abrasive blame.302  Officials should 
derogate from social rules that call for abrasive blame and give battered and fragile 
offenders these alternative punishments.  In doing so, these officials might be exercising 
law-abiding positive mercy.  If social rules about abrasive blame are indeed unjust, then 
these officials are exercising positive mercy.  If the social rules about abrasive blame are 
minimally decent, then these officials who derogate from the rules and withhold abrasive 
blame are not exercising positive mercy.  Rather, they are exercising something more 
akin to equity (generally equity is used for behavior that derogates from law, here 
officials are derogating from a presumably non-legal rule).  Or to put it more plainly, the 
officials are acting rightly by making an exception to a general rule.  Although I maintain 
a theoretical distinction between positive mercy and equity, the distinction in this context 
does not really matter.  What matters in these cases is that the officials refrain from 
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 Working to create alternative punishments that do not involve abrasive blame may be 
a kind of proto-positive mercy.  It is work that we need to do in order to practice positive 
mercy.   
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abrasive blame and treats battered and fragile offenders justly.  If even a few officials act 
in this way, then we will already be one small step forward. 
 Cases concerning abrasive blame may often (and likely do) arise that give 
officials occasion for exercising positive mercy that derogates from law.  It is in these 
cases that the two parts of my dissertation best work together to shed light on Lenin’s 
question.  Suppose (not unrealistically) that an unjust303 mandatory minimum sentencing 
law requires a judge to give a battered or fragile offender a sentence that is longer than 
what is needed to serve justified ends of criminal punishment.  To make things both easy 
and realistic, let us say the sentence is twenty-five years for petty theft.  I think the judge 
in this case has a reason to exercise positive mercy regardless of whether the offender is 
battered or fragile.  If the offender is battered or fragile, however, the judge has an even 
better case to make for positive mercy.  Sentencing the offender for twenty-five years 
would not only incapacitate him (the “need” to incapacitate recidivist offenders is 
generally cited as the reason for three-strikes laws), but it would also subject him to 
                                                        
303
 I stipulate that the law in this case is unjust.  If in other cases the law is not unjust, 
then the judge has occasion to exercise not positive mercy, but equity.  I am not entitled 
to conclude that the judge has standing reason to exercise equity in such cases.  Although 
I am highly sympathetic to the proposal that judges would have reason to exercise equity 
in such cases, I have not argued for this proposal in the dissertation.  Other legal 
philosophers argue that judges have reason to exercise equity and I am sympathetic to 
their arguments.  I have not, however, defended these (or other) arguments in this 
dissertation.  I gave a defense of positive mercy, not equity, in Chapter 2. My suspicion is 
that this defense can be applied to equity without considerable difficulty.  Equity – at 
least when it is limited to the context of criminal punishment – seems easier to defend 
than positive mercy.  Equity stays within the spirit of the laws and is thereby less (if only 
slightly less) subject to objections that it violates the judicial obligation to uphold the rule 
of law.  Given that mercy meets these objections, I suspect that equity with respect to 
criminal punishment does too.  But I cannot be sure.  Equity might pose unique 
challenges that I have not explored here.  I leave a full investigation of equity for future 
work. 
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twenty-five years of near continuous abrasive blame given the current state of American 
prisons.  The judge can argue that the political community should not sting the offender 
with abrasively blame at all, let alone do so for twenty-five years.  This is not merely an 
impermissible sting; it is constant and wrongful abuse.   
If the judge orders such abuse on the grounds that she has “no choice” but to 
apply the law, her order inflicts a deep wound on both the offender and the rule of law in 
the political community.  This is a prime occasion for the exercise of positive mercy.  My 
work in the first part of the dissertation does more than give a label to the action of a 
judge who makes the brave decision to derogate from the unjust law and give the 
offender just treatment in the form of an alternative sentence (in the absence of an 
available alternative to blame-ridden incarceration, the judge can at least shorten the 
sentence to months).  In Chapter 2, I argued that the judge who makes this decision 
stands up not only for the offender, but also for the rule of law.  She need not weigh 
whether to uphold the law or do substantive justice to the offender, she can stand firm in 
the belief that she is doing her job:  pursuing justice under the rule of law.304   
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 This argument is a new way in which a “rotten social background” can mitigate 
sentencing – namely by rendering abrasive blame unfair.  My approach differs from those 
who suggest a “rotten social background” can mitigate punishment only by excusing 
offenses of the least advantaged on grounds that they are somehow less responsible for 
their actions.  This latter approach has been objected to on grounds that it vitiates the 
autonomy of the least advantaged.  The “rotten social background” excuse as it has been 
interpreted thus far in the literature, is said to insult the least advantaged by denying them 
full moral agency and responsibility for their actions. See Stephen Morse, “Deprivation 
and Desert,” as well as his four-part debate with Judge Bazelon in Southern California 
Law Review.  The argument I have offered, however, might be applied to mitigate 
punishment without any implication that offenders have diminished responsibility or 
culpability. 
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Her action is not negative mercy; she is giving the offender what he does deserve 
in the form of a just alternative sentence, she is moved by reasons and a firm sense of 
justice rather than pity or charity, and her action is not optional from the moral point of 
view.  She may well do the action without a warm, willing heart or any special concern 
for the particularities of the offender.  She may be angry at both the state and the offender 
for putting her in a position where she has to stick her own neck out to do the right thing.  
I mention this not because it would be a good thing if the judge felt this way, but to 
highlight the contrast that I developed in Chapter 1 between negative mercy and positive 
mercy as it is exhibited in this case.305  
One might wonder why I insist on calling positive mercy “mercy” instead of 
simply justice.  (Why not leave mercy to the defenders of negative mercy?)  Although 
positive mercy is a part of justice, there is merit in giving positive mercy its own name 
and account as I did in Chapter 1.  First, I am interested in the idea of making mercy 
work in a criminal court.  I have argued that positive mercy has a great deal of potential 
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 I have no objection to those who continue to work on defending negative mercy.  I 
simply want to show that positive mercy has different and significant work to do in 
criminal justice systems.  Although my project has concentrated on positive mercy, the 
second part of my project may be of use to those interested in negative mercy.  Writers 
about negative mercy, such as Tasioulas (in “Mercy”) and Murphy (in Forgiveness and 
Mercy) and others, claim that an offender who has suffered “positive evil” or has 
crippling remorse should be granted negative mercy.  It is left unclear exactly why these 
facts should mitigate what these authors take to be deserved punishment.  My work in the 
second part of the dissertation might be applied to explain what is going on here.  Many 
offenders who have experienced positive evil or crippling remorse are battered or fragile 
offenders.  I have explained why these offenders should be given less abrasive blame 
than the amount generally correlated with their culpability.  This work can be applied to 
explain why – in some cases – these offenders should be given less punishment 
(generally punishment involves abrasive blame to which they should not be subject) than 
they deserve (deserved punishment is generally taken to be the amount correlated with 
culpability).   
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for use in this context.  But in the context of the modern courtroom, the term “justice” 
often refers to a very specific and narrow kind of justice:  justice that is in accord with 
valid laws (“legal justice”).  Even though the judicial exercise of positive mercy serves 
the rule of law, it is a departure from particular laws and so it departs from this kind of 
justice.  It may, therefore, be misleading to conflate mercy with justice in the context of 
the courtroom. 
Second, when we talk about “justice” in the courtroom, we generally assume that 
the judge has a right to exercise it.  Similar to a citizen who engages in a morally right act 
of civil disobedience, however, the judge who exercises positive mercy acts rightly – but 
without a right to so act.  I follow Raz in thinking that there are two ways one can show 
that one is entitled to some action.  One can show that one’s action is right or one can 
show that one has a right to the action; “to show that one has a right to it is to show that 
even if it wrong, one is entitled to perform it.”306  The judge who shows positive mercy 
must demonstrate that her action is right; her case rests on its own moral merit.  If 
“positive mercy” is wrong, she is not entitled to show it.  In this sense, mercy is an 
exceptional political action.  Mercy is part of justice, but it is an exceptional part and 
giving it a name of its own helps us to appreciate this fact.   
Third, and finally, mercy is almost always understood as a response to 
imperfection in both human beings and, as I argue here, in human institutions.  Mercy 
reminds us that there are always problems, even ones that we do not yet know about, that 
we have to work on upon our muddy planet.  In this, it keeps us humble.  Moreover, 
mercy keeps us active.  It does not purport to solve the imperfections to which it 
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 Raz, The Authority of Law, 274. 
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responds.  It is not an achievement that has any laurels upon which to rest.  Justice keeps 
us asking what we should be aiming for, but the part of justice that is mercy keeps us 
asking:  What is to be done now?
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